(R. C. KIRK) imp
WH/3/UP 03
6047
5 DEC 63

SECRET

5 Dec 63 15 57z

JMWAVE (MONTEVIDEO) 16-24

DIRECTOR

WH 6

DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

ROUTINE

WAVE INFO (MONT) 16-24 CITE DIR

87291

REFS A. DIR 78231*

B. WAVE 8204 (IN 68510)**

C. WAVE 8439 (IN 72764)**

[illegible] DTVOUR

IN VIEW CONTINUED OPS INTEREST (URUG DIPS) EXPRESSED REFS B AND C, REQUEST WAVE REPLY REF A. YOUR ANSWER DEEMED NECESSARY FOR PROCESSING POA REQUEST REF C.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Requested WAVE review entire scope and purpose recruiting (Urug dips) assigned Hava in light of past and anticipated future developments.

**WAVE requested POA on wife of (one dip) and on another (dip) who both represent ops potential.

WH/3/UP [signature]

C/WH/3 [signature]

SAS/MOB/Mr. (Bryant) by Phone

SAS/MOB/Mr. (Monahan), by Phone

C/SAS [signature]

J. C. KING
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

10835

P.A.MACCIO:cmf
C/SAS/MOB/FI
6957
10 DECEMBER 63

JMWAVE

DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE WAVE

88119

RYBAT TYPIC AMWEE AMFAUNA

REFS A) WAVE 8316 (IN 70529)

B) WAVE 8346 (IN 70905)

C) DIR 87628

D) DIR 87290

E) DIR 87508

F) WAVE 8762 (IN 76933) *

FOR NEUTEMAN

PLEASE BRIEF DAINOLD ON WAVE'S VIEWS RE (AMWEE-1) CACHING AND MAKING DEAD DROPS AT THIS TIME IN LIGHT REF F. IS IT REASONABLE TO ASSUME (AMWEE-1) UNDER DSE SURVEILLANCE, PARTICULARLY SINCE EXFILTRATION AMWEE-2 AND AMFAUNA-14? KEYWAY DEEPLY CONCERNED CONTINUED USE (AMWEE-1) FOR CACHING AND MAKING DEAD DROPS UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

END OF MESSAGE

12168

WE/4 (S. Munger by phone)

WE/5 (T. Bussetti by phone)

DESMOND FITZGERALD
AC/SAS

WE/INT

W. A. MALONEY
C/SAS/MOB

6/RJ

10-7

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: RABUZZETTI/pk
UNIT: WE/5
EXT: 8303
DATE: 10 DEC 63

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

10 DEC 63 22 54z

TO: MADRID JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WE 6
INFO: C, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

INFO WAVE CITE DIR 88252

AV PBRUMEN (QUOTA)

REF: 88251*

IDENTITIES:

A. (ODON ALVAREZ DELALA CAMPA)

B. (JOSE LUIS GONZALEZ GALLARRETTA)

C. (GILBERTO LIWAY RODRIGUES)(201-328941)

D. (ROGELIO IGLESIAS PATIÑO)

END OF MESSAGE

*CABLE SECRETARIAT: PLEASE REF ATTACHED CABLE TO THIS CABLE.

12180

SAS/EOB Mr. Armstrong (TELECOORD)

SAS/MOB Mr. Maggio (TELECOORD)

C/WE/INT

for C/WE/5 (RC Locke)

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING

SECRET

SECRET

EXT: 5254
DATE: 10 DEC. 1963

INDEX / NO INDEX / FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO: JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WE 6
INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/..., FI, ..., SAS 8, VR

11 DEC 63 20 46z

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 88425

KEYWAY (MIGALE) 01

FOR JENTONS: PER YOUR DISCUSSION HQS, PLANNING HAVE (MIGALE/2) VISIT YOU 16 TO 19 FEB 1964 PRIOR HIS RETURN BRUS. HQS OFFICER WILL ESCORT. ADVISE IF NOT CONVENIENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WE COMMENT: (MIGALE/2, CHIEF MIGALE SERVICE,) VISITING HQS FEB 1964. (MIGALE/2) PERSONAL FRIEND JENTONS AND PLAN PERSONAL VISIT JENTONS FOLLOWING HQS TALKS.

12193

C/SAS
C/WE/X
C/WE/2

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10078-10014
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO : JMWAVE
TITLE : DIRECTOR CABLE RE TRAVEL TO SAO PAULO.
DATE : 12/14/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS : TRAINING
BRIEFING
TRAVEL PLANS
WITHHELD
DIRECTOR CABLE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/27/95
COMMENTS : JFK17 : F21 : 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10078-10014

ORIG : A. SHATTON:jg
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14 DEC. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

TO : SAO PAULO RIO DE JANEIRO JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WH 7, VR

☐ DEFERRED
☒ ROUTINE

TO SAOP INFO RIOD WAVE CITE DIR 89299

DYVOUR PBRUMEN BETIDE

REF: SAOP 4538 (IN 80402)*

MR. ALEXANDER SHATTON ETA SAO PAULO PAN AIR DO BRASIL 201 ON 20 DECEMBER. TRAVELLING LIGHT STATE. [redacted] WILL CONTACT STATION ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED BRIEFING AND TRAINING OF BETIDE.

J. C. KING
C/WH

C/SAS/EOB

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

11206

Print One Document with Issues - All Input Fields

Sorted by Issue

Record ID no (104/180): 104-10078-10014 **104 No:** 104-10078-10014 **jfk id no:** 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028 **box number** JFK17

vol folder: F21 **status:** SAN **record number** **meeting date:** 8/25/98

status validation SAN **postpone count:** 9 **first postpone date:**

fed registry notice no: **fed registry date:** **new postpone date:**

Next Doc Issue Date: 12/01/2005

General Comments: SAO PAULO AND RIO de JANEIRO, SAOP; PROTECT (BE) RELEASE (TIDE); OPS DETAIL: LIGHT STATE

ISSUES Subform:

issue: BE DIGRAPH **occur count:** 2 **action** **doc issue date** 12/01/2005
action date: **issue comment:** SEE 104-10017-10041. OTHER DOCS W/LATER DATES.

issue: CABLE PREFIX **occur count:** 1 **action** **doc issue date** 10/01/2017
action date: **issue comment:** NOTE EXCEPTIONS TO 2017 RELEASE IN DOC COMMENTS

issue: CIA INSTALLATION **occur count:** 5 **action** **doc issue date** 10/01/2017
action date: **issue comment:** NOTE EXCEPTIONS TO 10/2017 IN GENERAL COMMENTS

issue: OPERATIONAL DETAILS **occur count:** 1 **action** **doc issue date** 10/01/2017
action date: **issue comment:** NOTE EXCEPTIONS TO 2017 IN GENERAL COMMENTS

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10078-10014
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO : JMWAVE
TITLE : DIRECTOR CABLE RE TRAVEL TO SAO PAULO.
DATE : 12/14/63
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : DIRECTOR CABLE
TRAVEL PLANS
BRIEFING
TRAINING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/27/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK17:F21 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028:

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ORIG : A. SHATTON:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14 DEC. 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

X NO INDEX

TO : [16-27] [16-20] JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WH 7, VR

TO [16-27] INFO [16-20] WAVE

CITE DIR 80299

DYVOUR PBRUMEN [02] TIDE

REF: [21-27] 4538 (IN 80402) *

MR. ALEXANDER SHATTON ETA SAO PAULO PAN AIR DO BRASIL 201 ON 20 DECEMBER. TRAVELLING [24] WILL CONTACT [16-27] ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED BRIEFING AND TRAINING OF [02] TIDE.

J. C. KING
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

C/SAS/EOB

~~WH/5~~

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

AUTHENTICATING

~~SECRET~~

Technical Corrections By NaraID

05-Oct-99

NARA ID	Date Of Change	Meeting Date	Page	Change of Postpnement	Comments
104-10077-10371	11-Dec-98	06-Aug-98	2	12 vice 7	ARRB missed reviewing page 2. One name and 2 digraphs are protected on page 1; 2 names of CIA employees need to be protected and are on the list for protection . See pages 48-49, para 2.a. of ARRB final report for justification.
104-10078-10014	15-Dec-98	25-Aug-98		9 vice 8	Additional postponement conforms to previous ARRB determination. Substitute missed words with "official cover" per page 56, para 3.k. of ARRB Final Report. Also, see 180-10145-10233.
104-10093-10032	05-Oct-99	23-Sep-98		9 vice 11	Document partly illegible; only redactions needed are protection 9 digraphs--root words can be released. Slug line/pseudos are releasable. See 104-10093-10033.
104-10093-10033	14-Dec-98	23-Sep-98		9 vice 8	The document sent to ARRB was partly illegible; the only redactions needed are 9 digraphs. ARRB protected 4 crypts, the root word is now released. 5 more digraphs of this crypt were missed; 4 other authorized postponements are released.
104-10103-10333	02-Dec-98	25-Aug-98		27 vice 25	Additional postponements conform to previous ARRB determinations. Protection of two missed digraphs approved by ARRB elsewhere in this document.
104-10106-10383	08-Dec-98	25-Aug-98	1	7 vice 6	Additional postponement conforms to previous ARRB determination - missed name on cover sheet was protected by ARRB elsewhere on this page.
104-10106-10421	10-Dec-98	25-Aug-98	1	14 vice 13	Additional postponement conforms to previous ARRB determination. Missed dispatch prefix was protected by ARRB elsewhere in this document.

HRG Record Print Printed on: 10/5/1999

ID: 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028
File Title: JFK
Job Num: 80T01357A
Location: HRG
Box Num: JFK17
Vol/Folder: F21

Title: DIRECTOR CABLE RE TRAVEL TO SAO PAULO.

Title Res: N
Date of Document: 12/14/1963
Status: SAN
From: DIRECTOR
From Res: N
To: JMWAVE
To Res: N
Pages: 1
Orig. Classification: S
Originator: CIA

Last Reviewer:
Review Date:

Exemptions:	1A	1B	1C	2	3	4	5
		X					

Medium: PAPER
Last Inputter: coller
NARA Comments:

Agency Comments: ORIGINALLY UNIT INDEXED

Release: ARRB
Release Date: 25-Aug-1998

Doc Num:		Res:
	DIR 89299	N
	11206	N

Keywords:		Res:
	DIRECTOR CABLE	N
	TRAVEL PLANS	N
	BRIEFING	N
	TRAINING	N
	BETIDE	Y

Duplicate Document Of:

Component Review Info

COMPONENT	DATE TASKED	DATE REVIEWED	RESPONSE	APPEAL DATE	DECISION

Sent to NARA: Y
Agency Name: CIA

HRG Record Print

Printed on: 10/5/1999

Agency Number: 104
Disk Number: 10078
Control Number 10014

ORIG : A. SHATTON:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14 DEC. 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

X NO INDEX

TO : [16-27] [16-20] JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WH 7, VR

TO [16-27] INFO [16-20] WAVE CITE DIR 80299

DYVOUR PBRUMEN [02]TIDE

REF: [21-27]4538 (IN 80402) *

MR. ALEXANDER SHATTON ETA SAO PAULO PAN AIR DO BRASIL 201 ON 20 DECEMBER. TRAVELLING ~~LIGHT STATE.~~ 24 [redacted]

WILL CONTACT [16-27] ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED BRIEFING AND TRAINING OF [02]TIDE.

J. C. KING for
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

C/SAS/EOB

~~WH/5~~

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~

8/17/98

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10078-10014
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DIRECTOR
TO : JMWAVE
TITLE : DIRECTOR CABLE RE TRAVEL TO SAO PAULO.
DATE : 12/14/63
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : DIRECTOR CABLE
TRAVEL PLANS
BRIEFING
TRAINING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/27/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JFK17:F21 1995.09.27.16:41:00:970028:

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ORIG : A. SHATTON:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 14 DEC. 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX
X NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

TO : SAO PAULO 16-27 RIO DE JANEIRO 16-20 JMWAVE

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : SAS 8

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, FI, FI/INT 2, EE 4, WH 7, VR

TO SAOP 16-27 INFO RIOD 16-20 WAVE

CITE DIR 80299

DYVOUR PBRUMEN BETIDE 02

REF: SAOP 4538 (IN 80402)* 21-27

MR. ALEXANDER SHATTON ETA SAO PAULO PAN AIR DO BRASIL 201 ON 20 DECEMBER. TRAVELLING LIGHT STATE. [redacted] WILL CONTACT STATION 16-27 ON ARRIVAL.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *CONCERNED BRIEFING AND TRAINING OF BETIDE. 02

J. C. KING for
C/WH

RELEASING OFFICER

C/SAS/EOB

WH/5

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION ... 14-4

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: G. A. LADNER, JR.:clh
UNIT: SAS/SECURITY
EXT: 5909
DATE: 16 DECEMBER 1963

TO: JMWAVE
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: SAS 8
INFO: DDP, OS 2, VR

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO WAVE INFO CITE DIR 89360

TYPIC SECUR

REF: WAVE 8344 (IN 70903)

PCSA GRANTED EFFECTIVE 13 DEC.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS COMMENT: Requested PCSA/CSA for Frank M. WARREN, Jr., Sea Dade Industries, Miami to backstop WAVE cover corp.

DESMOND FITZGERALD
CHIEF, SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GEORGE A. LADNER
C/SAS/SECURITY
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

11216

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10079-10391
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : HANDWRITTEN LIST ENTITLED "ASSETS KNOWN".
DATE : 01/01/1900
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS : HANDWRITTEN
LIST
ASSETS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/01/97
COMMENTS : JFK18 : F23 : 1997.12.01.17:12:45:216031

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10079-10391

Alvarez 201-119523

June 10
by J Barry
WH-1

assets known

(1.) LIEMPTY

LICALLA - 1 (All agents)

LILYRIC - 4

LIEMPTY - 4 (Aid in law Gerende)

LIMOUSINE

(2.) LIMESA FID Sweep Op

6 agents

(3.) LIEMBRACE unilateral Surv team

LIEMBRACE 1, 2, 4 + others

LIEMBRACE - 8 → Raymond L. BARCENAS

LIEMPTY - 10 & 12

(4) LIFEAT - knows about op.

A. wife LIEMPTY - 19 substitute transcriber

B. LIFEUD - 19 former base house keeper in op is Gerendes [illegible].

c. David M. Wilsted - outside c/o & P/A for project

d. Sister Gerende ?

(5) Case Officers or NOC

Matthew H. Dingley

Vincent P. RIZZUTO

Bruce H. FERNALD alias "Victor Bellini"

Andrew E. PELLEMENT alias

David M. WILSTED

RAYMOND L. BARCENAS

~~LISTEN~~

"Bill Wells"

- [illegible] Farmer (T)

ANDREW R. DOSCHER -

11815

6. LISTERINE (George Wadsworth (T)) who has supplied cover, ghost payrolling, to Gerende over the years to evolve social security payments & income tax payments to GOM.

7. LIRAZOR-1 (Oliver Scantling)

8. LIANVIL-1

9. LIBAND-1 husband of Gerende sister who working against Soviets & quite active (bro in law)

10. Gerende received 5 wks of Hqs Covert trng, 1957

11. Supported JMROD operations - dealt directly with URQUHART.

General Comments

Gerende has worked in almost every phase of the Station's support activity, and even tho in recent years he has been pretty much restricted to LIEMPTY, his knowledge of activities and assets which are still current is considerable.

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM


The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.



Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISG Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISC. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:			EXTENSION	NO.
				DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s)
4.				of 201-______________.
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ______ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ______ (date)
14.				retained at ____________ desk.
15.				

FORM 3-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED CL BY: 007622

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

_______ NAME _______ BADGE _______ COMPONENT _______ EXT.

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REQ. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______ (NAME)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS   CONFIDENTIAL   E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: CC7522 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

FOI A CHINA
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	01-1	01-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/		17JUL14	CHIN,KHANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0230059			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0038		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CHAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CHAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905390			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CHAT	0832855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-YEI /7115/1109/495		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091803			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040289			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-SAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2885/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KHANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CHAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHUAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,KUAN TANG TS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2885/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CHAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2885/2797	A	CIRC22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0988577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3105/		08JUL14	CHIN,KHANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0044759			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2885/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KHANGTUNG		CCOM?	0023195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2885/8133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179622			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2885/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CHAT	0839156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179623			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0647/009		CIRC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0858650			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CHAT	0096947			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/		15APR30	CHIN,[illegible]	CHMO	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KHANGTUNG PROV.		CHAT?	0052630			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2885/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN, KHANGTUNG		CHIN?	0085119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0103289			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2885/1795/		21DEC[illegible]	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0763816			CHIN	BUSH	
CHEN, SHU TEH /MTS/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013991			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639		CIRC[illegible]	CHIN,HANG CHOW		CHIN?	0153929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2885/2737/		18MAR[illegible]	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	0767462			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0037/	A	02FEB0[illegible]				0151329			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YAO /7115/2885/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, K[illegible]		CCOM?	0093196			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	0107306			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2885/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN,[illegible] KW		CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/		09OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CHAT	0340528			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB39	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	0313610			CHIN	DENK	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0044010			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

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E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

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All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP/SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

   All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

   a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

   b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

   c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

   d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

CSHB ~~43-1-1~~ 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Rlsc by Annex B to Chapter III to CSHB 70-1-1 dated [illegible]

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No.
XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No.
201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

SECRET

CLANDESTINE SERVICES INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5

CSI NO. 10-5
SECURITY
Revised 17 July 1958

COVERT APPROVALS AND RELATED MATTERS

Reference: CSI-F No. 10-5, 17 July 1958

Rescission: CSI No. 10-5, 31 January 1955

CONTENTS

1. PURPOSE

This instruction describes the functions of headquarters components with regard to covert approvals and related matters which are the subject of CSI-F No. 10-5.

2. GENERAL

a. The Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, is delegated authority to act for the Deputy Director (Plans) in the exercise of all functions which are the latter's responsibility with regard to the granting of Operational Approvals and Provisional Operational Approvals.

b. The Director of Security has designated the Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support, Office of Security, to represent him in discharging the functions which are reserved to him with regard to the granting of Covert Security Approvals, Provisional Covert Security Approvals, Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.

c. It is the basic intent of both components that sensitive operational data shall remain within the custody and knowledge of the Clandestine Services, and that sensitive security investigative data shall remain in the custody and knowledge of the Office of Security. It is recognized, however, that such data may be necessary for proper performance by either component and, consequently, where necessary, it shall be made available or shall be discussed to the extent necessary.

SECRET

SECRET

CSI NO. 10-5

CLANDESTINE SERVICES INSTRUCTION NO. 10-5

SECURITY
Revised 17 July 1958

3. INVESTIGATIONS

The function of performing all investigations in the United States in connection with approval matters, except for the check of certain Agency records, is reserved to the Office of Security.

4. OPERATIONAL APPROVALS

a. The assembly and analysis of all file material (including the files of the Records Integration Division) in the Clandestine Services will be accomplished by professional personnel of the interested operating divisions under the technical supervision of the Counter Intelligence Staff and subject to spot check by the Counter Intelligence Staff. Certification will be made in each case by a responsible official of the requesting division that the material furnished is complete and accurate.

b. The requesting division will assemble any biographical data; information of investigative or security significance (such as additional names the subject may have used); information relating to character, reputation, politics, or other activities, favorable and unfavorable information or comments; background information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. Any information previously furnished by the subject concerning himself (such as a personal history statement, records of activities or employments, memberships in organizations, etc.) will be furnished verbatim. All pertinent information thus produced--including that resulting from technical interrogations, personal observation, field investigations, etc.--will be furnished to the Counter Intelligence Staff for necessary transmission to the Office of Security. It is also necessary to forward PRQ Part II to the Counter Intelligence Staff before an Operational Approval will be issued. The Counter Intelligence Staff will not forward PRQ Part II to the Office of Security. In rare, complicated, or sensitive cases the Office of Security, in coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff, may wish actually to review the material of the Records Integration Division. A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of the proposed usage of the subject will be furnished to the Office of Security along with the other data.

c. The requester should also furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff for transmission to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

d. Following appropriate investigation and analysis of a case, the Office of Security will forward its recommendation to the Counter Intelligence Staff, with the investigative data enclosed. Upon receipt of this material

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the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or his designee, will, if the Office of Security does not recommend against the use of the individual, determine whether an Operational Approval should be granted and will notify the Office of Security of its decision. However, in the event the Office of Security recommends against the use of an individual and the Clandestine Services still desires, on a calculated risk basis, to use the individual, the Counter Intelligence Staff will inform the Office of Security of this fact. In this event, the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Security Support Division will endeavor to arrive at an agreed position and, to this end, the former will hold the granting of the Operational Approval in abeyance until five days have elapsed after the Office of Security has been advised of this intention. The Counter Intelligence Staff will notify the Office of Security whenever it has:

(1) Granted an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval.

(2) Cancelled an Operational Approval.

e. In Operational Approval cases the Office of Security will forward investigative reports, name check results, etc., to the Counter Intelligence Staff. In extremely sensitive cases, however, particularly those in which the security or good of the Agency as a whole is involved, the Office of Security will not be obliged to furnish all investigative material. In such cases the Office of Security will inform the Counter Intelligence Staff that such material has been withheld and will, upon request, discuss the matter with the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or other appropriate official of the Clandestine Services.

f. A Provisional Operational Approval may also be requested where circumstances warrant. A search of the indices of the Agency, including those of the Office of Security, is a minimum requirement for issuance of a Provisional Operational Approval.

g. Whenever interest in an individual under consideration for either an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval is terminated for any reason, the requester, in order to prevent needless processing, will notify the Counter Intelligence Staff promptly so that the latter may in turn advise the Office of Security.

5. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS AND PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

a. All background material will be assembled by the interested divisions and will include any biographic data; information of an investigative or security significance; information relating to character, reputation, politics, past employment, residences, and other activities; favorable and unfavorable information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. This material is forwarded directly to the Office of Security in its original form. (Traces need not be obtained from the Records Integration Division; see paragraph 5.b., below.) A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of use of the subject will also

be furnished to the Office of Security. The requester should also furnish to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as, special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.

b. In Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases, the files of the Records Integration Division will be searched by representatives of the Office of Security. All files of the Records Integration Division, except those portions containing specific sensitive operational data, will be made available to the representatives of the Office of Security. In those instances where a document of interest contains sensitive operational data, designated professional personnel within the operating division will review that portion of the information and furnish therefrom to the representatives of the Office of Security all information of the nature described in paragraph 5.a., above. The Office of Security will conduct appropriate investigation in each case and will issue or deny Covert Security Approvals and Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Covert Security Approvals and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.

c. The Office of Security will retain the investigative files in Covert Security Approval cases or Proprietary Approval cases, but will:

(1) Make available to the Counter Intelligence Staff any significant information in cases where Covert Security Approvals or Proprietary Approvals are granted.

(2) Immediately call to the attention of the Counter Intelligence Staff any new evidence in Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases that reflects the subject's connection with a foreign government, the Communist Party, or any front organization of the Communist Party.

d. Where the Office of Security issues or denies a Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval, formal notification will be directed to the requester. In the case of disapproval one copy of the security disapproval will be forwarded to the Counter Intelligence Staff. Where a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval is denied and the Clandestine Services still desires to use the subject on a calculated risk basis, the Office of Security will, upon request, furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff a summary of the investigative data. Thereafter, the Counter Intelligence Staff, the requester, and the Security Support Division will attempt to reach an agreed position.

e. A Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval may be preceded by a Provisional Covert Security Approval or a Provisional Proprietary Approval.

f. Unless otherwise designated by the Office of Security, investigative data in either Operational Approval or Covert Security Approval cases involving aliens may be shown to proper offices of the division and may, if deemed necessary by the division, be forwarded to the field. The dispatch or cable in such cases will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Office of Security. No investigative data will be transmitted or disclosed to other than Agency staff officials without the specific prior approval of the Office of Security. The need-to-know principle will be applied strictly in such cases. No investigative data regarding United States citizens will be transmitted to the field without the specific prior approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Director of Security and subsequent to such approval without coordination with the Office of Security on the dispatch or cable involved.

6. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS FOR LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS

Requests for Covert Security Approvals for Liaison with U.S. officials, whether such officials are in the United States or abroad, will be transmitted directly to the Office of Security. Each request shall be specifically indicated as a request for a Covert Security Approval for Liaison. The request shall be accompanied by all available biographic information, to include wherever possible in cases of civilian employees of United States Government agencies the name, date and place of birth, the employing agency, and the position and assignment of the person involved. In cases involving military personnel the minimum biographic information required shall consist of the name, date and place of birth, rank and serial number, and the parent service. In each case the details of the liaison with the individual must be set forth.

7. SERVANTS OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES

Requests to headquarters for appropriate checks on domestic personnel employed in the homes of Agency employees overseas shall be forwarded by the requester to the Office of Security accompanied by all available biographical information and the results of overseas investigations.

8. EMPLOYEES OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Proper clearance of staff or contract employees (including indigenous employees) of other U.S. Government agencies for operational use includes notification to and approval by the employee's parent agency in Washington. Requests for clearance will be forwarded to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, Attention: CI/Liaison. Clearance will not be given until the approval of the parent agency has been obtained. If, after such approval is obtained, it is decided that the employee will not be used as requested, or upon termination of use, CI/Liaison will be notified so that the employee's parent agency may be advised.

9. EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN SERVICES

Requests for searches of the indices of other United States agencies or the Office of Security, or investigation of employees or officials of foreign

intelligence services with whom Agency employees maintain liaison, shall be forwarded by the requester to the Counter Intelligence Staff for processing to the Office of Security. Such requests shall be transmitted with complete results of field traces, all available biographical information, and a statement as to the service which the subject represents.

10. NOTIFICATION OF TERMINATION OR DISCONTINUANCE OF COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS OR PROPRIETARY APPROVALS

The Office of Security shall be promptly advised by the requester of the discontinuance of interest in or termination of employment or use of a person on whom a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval has been requested or granted.

11. SPECIAL SERVICES

a. Requests for Covert Name Checks and Special Inquiries will be transmitted to the Office of Security through the Counter Intelligence Staff. Each request shall indicate the reason for the inquiry, shall specify the exact action required, and shall contain all available background and/or biographical information concerning the subject.

b. In the case of Special Inquiries, the request should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed during the inquiry and any other information which would provide guidance as to the conduct of the investigation.

12. DOUBLE AGENTS

The operational decision authorizing the doubling of an agent of a foreign power will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff even though no Operational Approval or Provisional Operational Approval is required.

13. DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT IN PLACE

No attempt to defect or recruit in place (a) a member of the Communist Party or (b) a government official of a denied area country shall be made in the United States without prior coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff which will immediately inform the Director of Security and such other United States agencies as may be appropriate.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

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DOI 50-10

DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

OPERATIONS-GENERAL
4 September 1973

RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE OF CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS

Rescission: CSI 50-10, 13 July 1970

1. GENERAL

a. Elemental in the conduct of clandestine operations is the use of human agents to accomplish the missions of the Operations Directorate. In general, it is DDO policy to select agent assets with primary regard to the agents' abilities, target access, and security, and with few restrictions as to their origins, professions or status as members of particular groups. The basic rule is that any consenting adult may be used by the Operations Directorate. There are, however, certain sensitive categories of individuals or groups whose operational use by the Operations Directorate is prohibited or in some way restricted for reasons not necessarily related to security considerations.

b. These prohibitions or restrictions stem from one of the following:

(1) The Agency has been directed by U.S. Governmental authority to restrict or avoid the operational use of a particular category of individuals.

(2) The Agency has entered into a special restrictive agreement with an organization, government, corporation, or official responsible for a category of individuals.

(3) The Director or the Deputy Director for Operations has imposed restrictions on the operational use of a certain category of individuals due to the extreme risk or sensitivity of such exploitation.

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this instruction is to set forth the prohibitions and policy restrictions (as distinguished from security restrictions) which currently pertain to the operational use of various categories of individuals, together with the special approval procedures to be followed in certain cases. Where appropriate, reference has been made to another publication which provides more detailed guidance than has been attempted in this instruction. The special approval procedures set forth in this instruction do not supersede or alter in any way the requirements for covert approvals contained in DOI and DOI-F 10-5.

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3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. *Operational Use*
Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.

b. *DDO Element*
Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.

c. *Operational Contact*
Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) *Operational Use is Prohibited* (see paragraph 5):
(a) Members and trainees of ACTION; 99
(b) Fulbright grantees; 99

(c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom;
(d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations;
(e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies.

(2) *Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence* (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.
(a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;
(b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;
(c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;
(d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand;
(e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;
(f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) *Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO* (see paragraph 7):
(a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;
(b) CARE employees;
(c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;
(d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;
(e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned;
(f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;
(g) Officials of the Vatican State;
(h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
(i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
(j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
(k) Volunteers to America.

(4) *Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division* (see paragraph 8):
(a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
(b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations organizations not assigned in the U.S.;
(c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.

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5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

a. *Members and Trainees of ACTION*

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.)

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following:

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of ACTION but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.

(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION.

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.

(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. *Fulbright Grantees*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students (including student artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 7.j., below).

c. *Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. *Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.

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e. *Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies*
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations.

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. *Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies*
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5.

b. *DDO Agents or Assets in the United States*
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff.

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions.

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI.

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be

provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.

c. *Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other U.S. Agencies*

The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.

d. *Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand*

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

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e. *Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands*

The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division.

f. *Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries*

The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED

Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations

Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.).

a. *Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media* (see DOI 240-6)

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control.

b. *CARE Employees*

It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)

Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States.

d. *Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States* (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.

e. *Delegates or Employees of the United States* NATIONS
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. *Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies*
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

g. *Officials of the Vatican State*
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.

h. *U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees*
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other

exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.

i. *Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations*

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.

j. *Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute*
Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. *Volunteers to America*
Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a

counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION

Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.

a. *Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas* (see DOI 50-19)

The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

b. *Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.*

The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

c. *Members of the Academic Community*

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community.

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is

operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning;

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad.

If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:

(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the

academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

S-E-C-R-E-T

HQ. INSTRUCTION SHEET 733

REMOVE			INSERT			EXPLANATION
REG. NOS.	PAGE NOS.	DATE	REG. NOS.	PAGE NOS.	DATE	
HR 20	iii 125-127	2/6/73 3/9/64	HR 20	iii 125-127	2/23/73 2/23/73	Paragraph 53 is revised to redefine categories of contract personnel. Minor revisions are made to up-date the paragraph.
	128	6/16/70		128-131	2/23/73	Former paragraph 54, Procurement Contracts for the Services of Individuals, is renumbered 55 with no change in text.
						New paragraph 54, Agents, is added to establish authorities and responsibilities for the management of agents and to clearly distinguish between agents and contract personnel.
HN 20-129		3/9/64				Rescinded.

Arrows in the page margin show the locations of the changes described above.

DISTRIBUTION: AB

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CONTENTS—Continued

53. CONTRACT PERSONNEL. This paragraph sets forth policy, authorities, and responsibilities concerning the management of contract personnel. It does not apply to consultants (see HR 20-52), to personal services acquired through industrial or procurement contracts (see HR 20-55), to personnel employed by proprietary projects (see HR 230-8), or to agents (see HR 20-54).

a. **GENERAL.** There are two categories of contract personnel: contract employees and independent contractors.

(1) CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. Although they are not appointed employees, contract employees are employees of the U.S. Government. They have all the rights and privileges granted by law to U.S. Government employees in accordance with their citizenship status as well as those rights and privileges specified in their contracts. They work under supervised conditions and are compensated on a salary basis. Contract employees are grouped into three categories:

(a) **Career Associate (Type C) Contract Employees:** Contract employees who perform duties, usually of a clandestine and operational nature, on a career basis. They are normally required to demonstrate their operational value to the Agency for not less than three years, in the case of U.S. citizens, or not less than five years, in the case of foreign nationals, to qualify for career associate status. When it is necessary for a career associate to have the staff-type access to an Agency installation or classified information, he must meet the same security approval criteria as a staff employee.

(b) **Internal (Type I) Contract Employees:** Contract employees, engaged for a specific period of time, who normally work inside Agency installations. They are required to meet the same security approval criteria as staff employees, but are permitted only such access to classified information as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the performance of their duties.

(c) **External (Type E) Contract Employees:** Contract employees, engaged for a specific period of time, who normally work outside Agency installations. They are not required to meet the same security approval criteria as staff employees and are not permitted the same access to Agency installations as staff employees or internal contract employees. They are permitted only such access to classified information as is authorized in their security approval and is required in the performance of their duties.

(2) INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-employed individuals who are engaged under contract to provide specific services. They receive only the compensation and benefits considered necessary to retain their services. In the Operations Directorate, their duties are normally limited to historical research and analysis and to the direction, utilization, spotting, or support of agents. They normally do not carry out espionage or covert action tasks. (Care must be taken to distinguish between independent contractors, defined herein, and agents, defined in HR 20-54.)

b. **POLICY**

(1) Contract personnel may be engaged when

(a) it is necessary to provide for operational or support needs which cannot be met through the use of available staff personnel;

(b) services are required of particularly well-qualified individuals who cannot meet all requirements for staff employment;

(c) there is a requirement to meet operational needs without obligating the Agency to long-term employment;

(d) the nature of the mission for which the individual is being engaged precludes his being subject to administrative control or working specifically defined hours;

(e) the individual's primary employer or interest is not the Agency and the services the Agency desires from him are supplementary to his primary interest or vocation; or

(f) there is a long term requirement for personal services which, for operational or security reasons, cannot be performed by Agency staff personnel.

(2) The engaging of contract personnel is subject to the following restrictions:

(a) New contracts, contract renewals, and contract amendments for individuals under current or anticipated nonofficial cover, must have prior approval of the appropriate component of the Operations Directorate.

(b) Contract personnel may be engaged only for approved activities for which funds have been made available. Funds for these activities will be budgeted annually and will not exceed limitations imposed by the head of the component concerned.

(c) Contract employees are subject to directorate manpower controls and ceilings established by the Director of Central Intelligence during the annual budgetary review cycle. Independent contractors are excluded from ceiling controls.

(d) Contracts will, whenever possible, be written and signed. However, when special security or operational factors prevent the execution of a formal written contract, a memorandum in lieu of such a contract may be prepared to document the commitments and obligations of the Agency and the individual.

(d) Appropriate security or operational approvals will be obtained before any contractual commitments are made to individuals and before any disclosure to them of classified information.

(f) No commitments relating to the use of the services of an employee of another Government agency will be made without prior approval of the Operating Official or Head of Independent Office concerned and the Director of Personnel.

(g) No commitments will be made to contract personnel that appointed employment status will be offered at the conclusion of or during any period of their contract service, without prior approval of the Director of Personnel and the Director of Security.

(h) Contract employees must meet Agency medical standards prior to the approval and authentication of their contracts. A psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation of those contract employees in whom the Agency may have more than a short-term interest will be carried out whenever feasible.

(i) Independent contractors are normally not required to meet Agency medical standards; however, if their contract contains any provision which obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits, a satisfactory medical examination is required, to include a psychological assessment and psychiatric evaluation, if necessary.

(j) Contract personnel candidates whose employment with the Agency cannot be acknowledged must be provided adequate cover and an appropriate cover legend. This requires that legal entitlements and other contractual benefits be provided and tax liabilities satisfied in a manner consistent with the character of the cover and cover legend.

(k) Although staff employees are expected to sever active connections with the Agency upon retirement, there may be instances in which continuation in service under contract after retirement is necessary or clearly in the best interests of the Agency. The use of retired annuitants under contract is governed by policies specified in HR 20-13.

(l) Not used.

(m) Contracts providing for basic compensation at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum annual rate for a GS-15, will not be executed without the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence. All such requests will be forwarded through the Director of Personnel for his recommendation.

c. RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL will

(a) formulate contract personnel management policies and procedures and provide guidance in improving the effectiveness and flexibility of the program within the Agency;

(b) monitor contract personnel management to assure consistency among the directorates while giving due regard to their differing needs;

(c) provide a repository for sensitive suitability information using the guidelines for special files set forth in HR 20-30b(4);

(d) approve and authenticate contracts;

(e) monitor contract employee ceiling authorizations established by the Director of Central Intelligence;

(f) maintain computer-based records on contract personnel and ensure currency and accuracy of input and output data.

(2) THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY will

(a) establish standards and procedures for granting security approvals which meet the Agency's contract personnel requirements;

(b) grant security approvals for the use of contract personnel including their access to classified information and Agency installations;

(c) ensure currency and adequacy of security approvals by making periodic reviews and reevaluations;

(d) provide a repository for all security information pertaining to contract personnel.

(3) THE CHIEF, CENTRAL COVER STAFF will

(a) provide cover and cover legends for contract personnel whose employment by the Agency cannot be publicly acknowledged;

(b) ensure currency of such cover and cover legends by making periodic reviews and reevaluations;

(c) ensure that the methods of providing legal entitlements and contractual benefits and satisfying tax liabilities are consistent with assigned cover and cover legends.

(4) THE DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL SERVICES will

(a) establish standards and procedures for medical and psychiatric evaluations and for psychological assessment of contract personnel;

(b) make periodic reviews and medical reevaluations of contract personnel when requested to do so.

(5) DEPUTY DIRECTORS AND HEADS OF INDEPENDENT OFFICES will ensure directorate uniformity of contract administration in matters such as qualifications determination, compensation, allowances and other benefits, personnel record keeping, systematic cost accounting, performance evaluations, cover determination and training, terminations, and security and medical approval processing requirements.

(6) THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING will provide appropriate training courses and facilities for contract personnel.

(7) THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE will

(a) administer pay, leave, and allowance entitlements of contract personnel consistent with contract provisions and cover requirements;

(b) in coordination with the Covert Tax Board, administer a secure system for the settlement of Federal income tax and social security tax obligations.

d. AUTHORITIES

(1) The Director of Personnel, his Deputy, and the Special Contracting Officer (Chief, Contract Personnel Division) are, upon request of a Deputy Director, an Operating Official, Head of Independent Office, or a duly appointed contract approving officer, authorized to execute, amend, renew, and terminate contracts with contract personnel.

(2) Deputy Directors and Heads of Independent Offices may designate Contract Approving Officers to approve contracts when payment is to be charged against funds under their control.

(3) Authority delegated to Chiefs of Station and Base under the provisions of FR 20-31 is subject to the following limitations:

(a) All contracts executed in the field will be subject to review by the Director of Personnel.

(b) Deputy Directors may limit the exercise of the authority granted to chiefs of field installations to any extent they deem desirable.

(c) Contracts prepared by headquarters will be amended only by, or with the prior approval of, headquarters. Contracts executed in the field may be amended in the field, but all such amendments must be forwarded to headquarters.

(4) All contracts written under the authority of this regulation will be subject to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

e. PROCEDURES. Requirements and procedures concerning personnel records, personnel actions, security approvals, cover, cover salary, medical evaluations, compensation, qualifications determination, training, and processing of contracts, are set forth in HHB 20-12.

54. AGENTS. This paragraph sets forth policy, responsibilities, and authorities concerning the engagement and the management of agents.

a. GENERAL. Agents are witting manpower assets, unique to the Operations Directorate, who carry out espionage and covert action tasks on behalf of the Agency. Agents are not employees of the U.S. Government. They are self-employed individuals whose services may be acquired or terminated at any time. Care must be taken to distinguish between agents, defined herein, and independent contractors, defined in HR 20-53a(2).

b. POLICY

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b. POLICY

(1) Agents cannot claim rights and privileges normally granted to U.S. Government employees; therefore, they will not be managed in accordance with normal personnel and administrative standards.

(a) Initial approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff is required before any commitments are made or any classified information is disclosed to an agent.

(b) Agents will receive compensation, benefits, and emoluments in amounts and a manner deemed best by the Operations Directorate to motivate and control them, subject to the following limitations:

(1) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide gross compensation (basic compensation, additional compensation, fees, etc.) at a rate which, if projected on an annual basis, would exceed the maximum rate for a GS-15, without prior approval of the Director. This limitation applies only to payments made by the Agency. It does not apply to bona fide cover income.

(2) No commitment may be made to an agent to provide special benefits, without the prior approval of the Director of Personnel. Special benefits are Agency obligations other than basic compensation, normal overseas cost of living payments, and travel or operational expenses.

(3) No commitment may be made to an agent that appointed status will be offered at the conclusion of his service unless such commitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security, and has been approved by the Director of Personnel.

(c) Engagement of agents will not be subject to Agency personnel ceiling controls.

(d) In general, agents will not be required to meet Agency medical standards. However, if an agreement with an agent obligates the Agency to provide medical or disability benefits, a medical examination will be carried out, unless precluded by security considerations.

(e) Agents who are U.S. citizens, resident aliens, or foreign nationals in the United States, must pay Federal tax on all income derived from their association with the Agency. Procedures for satisfying Federal tax liability will be determined by the Covert Tax Board. (See HR 20-35.)

(f) The use of retired civilian annuitants of the U.S. Government as agents will be governed by policy set forth in HR 20-13.

(2) All commitments made or implied to agents will be recorded in either a Formal Agreement or a Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

(a) A Formal Agreement is a written agreement, signed by the agent and an authorized Agency representative. Formal Agreements will be negotiated whenever operationally feasible.

(b) A Memorandum of Oral Commitment is a written record of an agreement, signed by an authorized Agency representative but not by the agent. Use of Memorandums of Oral Commitment will be limited to those cases when it is in the Agency's best interest not to solicit an agent's signature on a Formal Agreement.

(c) An agent will never be given a copy of the Formal Agreement or Memorandum of Oral Commitment.

c. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES

(1) The Deputy Director for Operations is authorized to

(a) formulate procedures for the engagement and management of agents and to issue operating directives and special instructions, as necessary, to control the use of agents by headquarters and field units;

(b) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment with agents; and to review Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment executed in the field;

(c) suspend procedures implied in this regulation upon his personal determination that operational and security aspects of an agent's management are so sensitive as to require processing through special channels.

(2) The Director of Personnel is authorized to

(a) approve, after coordinating with affected Agency components, the commitment to an agent that he will receive special benefits;

(b) approve the commitment to an agent that he will be offered appointed status at the conclusion of his service, when such commitment has been recommended by the Deputy Director for Operations or his designee, with the concurrence of the Director of Security;

(c) execute, amend, renew, and terminate Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment when requested to do so by the appropriate Operations Directorate approving officer. This authority may also be exercised by the Deputy Director of Personnel and the Special Contracting Officer, Office of Personnel.

(3) All Formal Agreements and Memorandums of Oral Commitment written under the authority of this paragraph will be subject to legal review by the General Counsel under such conditions as he may prescribe.

55. PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS FOR THE SERVICES OF INDIVIDUALS

a. POLICY. Procurement contracts whose basic purpose is to obtain the services of one or more individuals, negotiated with profit and nonprofit institutions, associations, partnerships, proprietorships, and other organizations, are permitted only when the particular services sought cannot be obtained in any other practicable way.

b. PROCEDURES

(1) Except as provided in subparagraph b(3) below, all proposals for such procurement contracts and their renewal must be justified in writing by the component seeking the services and be submitted to the Director of Personnel for his approval before commitments are made or negotiations started. These proposals will describe in some detail the services to be rendered, the qualifications required, the proposed duration of the task, and the reason or reasons why a procurement contract is judged to be the best method of acquiring the needed services.

(2) The Director of Personnel will ascertain whether any staff or nonstaff personnel are available to perform the needed services. If not, he will examine the feasibility of satisfying the requirement by hiring new personnel. If this latter course of action also proves impracticable, the Director of Personnel will approve the proposal and return it either to the Office of Logistics or to the originator for subsequent submission of a contract request to the appropriate procurement unit. Procurement contracts are written under the authority of the Director of Logistics as stated in HR 45-2.

(3) The approval of the Director of Personnel is not required

(a) for procurement contracts involving the services of individuals incidental to research and development or the preparation of studies or reports, where the fee reflects an end product (a report written, a task performed, etc.) rather than a computation based mainly on time (per hour, per man year);

(b) for procurement contracts involving the purchase of equipment which requires the services of experts or technicians in delivery, installation, testing, initial operation or maintenance, training, etc. However, any follow-on contract for services only—such as maintenance or operation—requires the Director of Personnel's prior approval as set forth above.

c. RESTRICTIONS

(1) Operating Officials are responsible for monitoring all personnel acquired through these procedures. They will ensure that such personnel are properly briefed and thoroughly understand any limitations on their access to Agency information and buildings and other pertinent security restrictions. Operating Officials are required to advise appropriate offices at any time the relationship or use of such individuals is subject to a change which affects the terms of their contractual arrangements, their status, or security clearances.

(2) Technical representatives and other types of personnel engaged under procurement contracts or other agreements which do not create a direct employer-employee relationship are prohibited by law from holding formal organizational positions or positions requiring the exercise of any administrative authority. They are also prohibited from formally representing the Agency in meetings with representatives of other Government agencies, private industry, or foreign governments or industries.

56-59. Reserved.

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM: | EXTENSION | NO. | DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of ____ volume(s) of 201-________.
4.				
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ______ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ______ (date)
14.				retained at ________ desk.
15.				

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FORM 3-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ BADGE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM. OR TEMP	REQ. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CL. BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE ET-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______ (NAME)
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS   CONFIDENTIAL   E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field, based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

FUL A CHINA
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/		17JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG								
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/					CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11		DIPT		0230859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0038		90	CHIN,AMOY			0178655			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-MEI	V	04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1108/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CNAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN		CNAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHIEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1108/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	DIPT	CCOM	0905390			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO	ENGR	CNAT	0832655			CHIN	HK	
CHIEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1108/435		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON		CCOM?	0091803			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-GAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV	PROF	CHIN?	0040288			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2885/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU CHUAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,KUAN TANG IS	ARMY	CNAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHIEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2885/2		NOV30	HK		CHIN?	0124638			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2885/2797	A	CIRC22	CHIN,PEILIU	TSEA	CNAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU FEN	R				CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2885/3105/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG			0988577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHIEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2885/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0044759			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2885/8133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CCOM?	0073195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26			CHIN?	0179622			CHIN	CHIN	
CHENG, SHU-I /7115/2885/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	DIPT	CNAT	0839156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN	PROF	CHIN?	0179623			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0547/009		CIRC21	CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHENG, SHU-LING /7109/2373/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	28SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU	MECA	CCOM	0858550			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/		15APR30	CHIN,CHENGHAI		CNAT	0096947			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	CMMO	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2885/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CNAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHIEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0085119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2885/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0103289			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TEH /M75/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU	GEOL	CHIN?	0763916			CHIN	BURM	
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0547/6639		CIRC75	CHIN,HANG CHOW			0013991			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2885/2737/		18MAR17	CHIN		CHIN?	0152929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0037/	A	02FEB06		BIN	CCOM	0767442			CHIN	UK	
CHIEN, SHU-YAO /7115/2885/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG			0181329			CHIN		
CHENG, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CCOM?	0093176			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2885/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN,FANG CHEN KH		CHIN?	0107306			CHIN	CHIN	HK
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6892/		07OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB33	CHIN, CHEKIANG		CNAT	0335624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CCOM	0313810			CHIN	PERU	
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3942/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0154010			CHIN		
					CHIN?	0144750			CHIN	TAIW	

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E2 IMPDET CL BY 056979

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All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

 a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

 b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

 c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

 (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

 a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

 b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

 c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

 d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

 Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

 a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

 b. Military attaches.

 c. Assistant military attaches.

 d. Identified intelligence officers.

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5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

CSHB 70-1-1 ~~43-1-1~~
CHAPTER III

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Resc by Annex B to Chp III OCSHB 70-1-1 dated 1 ... [illegible]

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON          (4)                        201-0032671* (8)
(1) SEX M DOB 12 APR 26             POB GERM, BERLIN (5)          TYPE NAME T (9)
(2) CIT GERM                        OCC PHARMACIST                OI CODES AA XX (10)
(3) REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53       OCC CODE CHEM (6)             RCD DATE 53 (11)
SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
(7) CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
(12) 29 OCTOBER.

                        30 NOV 70            00833555
                        (13)                 (14)
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

SECRET

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e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term File on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field-master 201 record.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : SAS 8*

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, WH 7, RF, VR

S E C R E T 011753Z

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6338 1 Oct 63 IN 30830

REF WAVE 5189 (IN 30172) **

MEXI REQUESTING VISA FOR [SILVIA ANNA] ONE OCT. PRIORITY VISA PROCESSING REQUIRES MINIMUM SEVENTY TWO HOURS BEFORE TELEGRAM SENT. IT UNLIKELY THAT CABLE WILL REACH HAVANA BEFORE 4 OCT.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *ACTION UNIT DETERMINED AS THOUGH INDICATOR TYPIC USED.

**RYBAT REF.

RS

12960

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : CA/O 4 (CA/O COPY SLOTTED AT 1405, 3 OCT, LMG)

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT, WE 4, WH 7, RF, VR

S E C R E T 031610Z

3 OCT 63 IN 32419

PRIORITY DIR INFO PALP CITE MEXI 6385

DTDORIC HBEPITOME

REF MEXI 6384 (IN 32461)

IDENS OF REF: A, ALFONSO DIBILDOX, B, CNE, C, FUSA.

S E C R E T

VBR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, SR 7, RF, VR

S E C R E T 082315Z

DIR CITE MEXI 6445

LCIMPROVE

24, 06

1. REQUEST TRACES [AND INITIATION POA ON HECTOR RAFAEL LARA VAZQUEZ] DOB 6 AUG 1908 MEXICO CITY. SUBJ RESIDED CHICAGO AREA 1927-4[illegible]. FIRST WIFE (NUI) U.S. [NATIONAL, HAS FOLL U.S. NATIONAL DAUGHTERS: MRS. GRADELLE PONZIO [RESIDING 239 FREDERICK LANE, ROSSELLE, INDIANA. PRICILLA LAWOCKI, ALSO IN ROSSELLE. MEXI HAS NO TRACES ANY ABOVE.]

2. [LARA] ADVISED EMB SECURITY OFFICER 24 SEPT THAT WAS AT PARTY WEEK EARLIER WITH [SOV FIRST SEC SERGEY SERGEYEVICH KONSTANTINOV (SUSPECT KGB RESIDENT)], [TASS CORRESPONDENT PIOTR FEDOTOV] AND THIRD SOV (NUI). PARTY AT HOME OF [VIRGINIA GOMEZ NIETO,] OTHER PERSON IN ATTENDANCE WAS [GOMEZ BOYFRIEND RICARDO POERY CERVANTES.] (INTERRELATIONSHIP OF ABOVE IS THAT [GOMEZ IS SUBJ'S WIFE'S HAIR DRESSER, GOMEZ] INTRODUCED SUBJ TO [POERY] ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO. [POERY] IS PROMINENT MEXICAN JOURNALIST OF EXTREME LEFTIST ORIENTATION AND [PRESIDENT OF MEXICAN ASSOCIATION] OF JOURNALISTS. COMMON GROUND BETWEEN [POERY] AND [SUBJ] IS THAT LATTER IS SUCCESSFUL [ADVERTISING] SALESMAN AND PUBLICIST FOR [GARCIA] CHAIN NEWSPAPERS WHICH CONSERVATIVE. IS ALSO [illegible] [illegible]STS.)

[illegible] TOLD EMB SECURITY OFFICER, AND LATER [illegible] THAT [illegible]

15417

17/pj

[illegible] MESSAGE [illegible] IN [illegible] PAGE 2

[illegible] SOV CONTACT SINCE HE PRO AMERICAN AND DOES NOT WANT

JEOPARDIZE HIS PRIVILEGE TRAVEL US., NOR JEOPARDIZE POSITION HIS

[DAUGHTERS.] ASKED WHETHER SHOULD CONTINUE SEE SOVS WHO TENTATIVELY

INVITED HIM PARTY NEAR FUTURE.

4. NEXI TOLD SUBJ TAKE NO INITIATIVE WITH SOVS BUT FOR PRESENT

ACCEPT INVITES, [illegible] INTEREST CURIOSITY SOV REALITIES, NOT

CHANGE CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL STANCE WHICH SUBJ SAYS KNOWN [POERY.]

5. 8 OCT SUBJ REPORTED MET [FEDOTOV] AT JOURNALIST ASSOCIATION MEETING

7 OCT, LATER ENTERTAINED [FEDOTOV], [POERY] AND [illegible] AT DINNER.

[FEDOTOV] AGAIN TENDERED TENTATIVE FUTURE INVITE.

6. TOO EARLY SPECIFICALLY DETAIL OBJECTIVE SUBJ UTILIZATION BUT IF

[illegible] [illegible] [ACCESS] [illegible] [FEDOTOV] OF [KONSTANTINOV.]

BASIS DESCRIPTION, THIRD MAN AT FIRST PARTY COULD BE [SOV INFO

BULLETIN REP SERGEY SEMENOVICH KUKHARENKO.] (ACCORDING LIENVOY

INFO, LATTER HAS [illegible] INDEPENDENT PERSONALITY, FREQUENTLY TALKS

DISPARAGINGLY OF SOVAMB, GETS DRUNK OFTEN, IS ON POOR TERMS WITH

[illegible] SOVEMB OFFICERS.) IF OP DEVELOPS, NO FUNDING NECESSARY.

S E C R E T

15417

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, DODS/L, DODS 4, SPOG 2, CI/OPS, FI, SAS 8, RF, VR

S E C R E T 151758Z

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6536

PBRUMEN HTBASTE

15 Oct 63 IN 40401

1. WHILE IN NEW YORK 7 OCTOBER CONTACTING CUBAN EXILES WITH POSSIBLE LINKS MEXI, L[ITAMIL-3] HAD CHANCE ENCOUNTER AND CHATTED BRIEFLY WITH [ANTONIO DE SOUZA CARBAJAL] MEMBER CUBAN UN DELEGATION. ON OWN INITIATIVE, L-[3] SUGGESTED DEFECTION TO WHICH [DE SOUZA] REPLIED HE MERELY PERFORMING HIS DUTY AND VERY FRIGHTENED. [DE SOUZA] DID STATE HE WOULD TALK WITH L-[3] AGAIN IN FUTURE UNDER SECURE CIRCUMSTANCES. L-[3] DESCRIBES [DE SOUZA] AS "A KEY MAN."

2. REQUEST TRACES, COMMENTS, ADVICE ON ANOTHER TRIP BY L-[3] TO N.Y. FOR PURPOSE TALKING [DE SOUZA.]

S E C R E T

00053

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

S E C R E T 191817Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 6587

RYBAT PBRUMEN

1. REQUEST TRACES AND POA [BENITO RUIZ GUARDILOA] DOB 19 JAN [1894,] LOS ARABOS, MATANZAS. WIFE [OFELIA LOYNAZ RUIZ,] BORN SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR, HAVANA PROVINCE. [MANAGER] NATIONAL TRAVEL SERVICE, HOTEL NACIONAL, HAVANA. [FOUNDER] AMERICAN SOCIETY TRAVEL AGENTS (ASTA). ACQUIRED AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP EARLY YOUTH; RELINQUISHED CERCA 1930. NO LIVING CHILDREN. GRANDDAUGHTER [MILDRED SIMON] LIVES NEAR SANTIAGO DE LOS BANOS. GRANDDAUGHTER [JENNY LAVIN] AND GRANDSON [JOHN P. RUIZ] LIVE MIAMI. THIRTY-THIRD DEGREE MASON.

2. SUBJECT IS SOLE [CUBAN] DELEGATE ASTA CONVENTION MEXI CITY 21 THRU 28 OCTOBER. ALLOWED TRAVEL DUE PRESTIGE AS FOUNDER ASTA, PRESIDENT CARIBBEAN AREA, AND DEAN ALL HAVA TRAVEL AGENTS. STATES HAS ACCESS TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRAVEL INFO, INCL PRIOR NOTICE MUCH OF LATTER. CLAIMS VALUABLE INFORMATION CONTACTS IN NATIONAL POST OFFICE, ESPECIALLY CENSORSHIP SECTION. SAYS HAS ASSISTED ANTI-CASTRO PERSONS BY FORGING VISAS. KNOWLEDGEABLE BLOC TECHS LIVING HOTEL NACIONAL.

SECRET

12882

3. APPROACH TO SUBJECT FACILITATED DUE CASUAL ACQUAINTANCE WITH [illegible] IN HAVANA 1959. SUBJECT AGREES COOPERATE AND COMMUNICATE VIA SW. PRQ PART I BEING FORWARDED. NO NEXT TRACES.

SECRET

12882

: DIRECTOR

OM : MEXICO CITY

TION: WH 8

FO : DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, RF, VR

S E C R E T 222330Z

23 OCT 63 IN 45573

DIR INFO WAVE MNTY CITE MEXI 6620

PBRUMEN

1. REQUEST TRACES AND POA [JORGE ANTONIO ABASOLO GARCIA], CUBAN, DOB 1927, [INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER, GRADUATE GEORGIA TECH,] ADDRESS [CALLE 96 OXABER 308 TELEPHONE 2-6301, MIRAMAR,] HAVANA. SUBJ DIVORCED FROM [MARIE PAZ SOMEILLAN] WHO NOW REPORTED LIVING WITH TWO CHILDREN AGES 5 AND 7 IN [MNTY.] SUBJ [CHIEF OF DIVISION IN MINISTRY INDUSTRIES,] WORKS CLOSELY WITH [ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA. CONTROLS WOOD FURNITURE INDUSTRY, PORTION OF PAPER INDUSTRY INCLUDING PAPER SACKS, TOY INDUSTRY,] ONE OTHER UNSPECIFIED INDUSTRY. HAS HAD SOME CONTACT WITH SOVIETS IN CONNECTION WITH [CEMENT] PROCUREMENT RECENTLY REPORTED BELIEF SOVS CONSTRUCTING SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA. CAME TO MEXICO ON SPECIAL PASSPORT 2 AUG 63 TO SEE CHILDREN BUT FORMER WIFE MANAGED PREVENT CONTACT. RETURNED CUBA 21 AUG.

2. BROTHER OF SUBJ IS [GUSTAVO ABASOLO,] CUBAN, ABOUT 42, LEFT CUBA ABOUT 1959 OR 1960 GOING FIRST TO [BERMUDA,] LATER TO MEXICO. EMPLOYED CONTINUOUSLY [22 YEARS COMPANIA INTERAMERICANA DE SEGUROS,] NOW [ASSISTANT MANAGER SALES] FOR MEXICO. STRONGLY ANTI-CASTRO, FRIEND OF AMSEVER-2. CORRESPONDS WITH SUBJ THROUGH [NETHERLANDS] EMBASSY DIPLOMATIC POUCH. AT STATION REQUEST THROUGH A-2 [GUSTAVO] -

SECRET

Copy No. 12716

14/21

RECENTLY ASKED SUBJ IF WOULD BE WILLING FURNISH "CERTAIN INFORMATION" FOR A-2 WHOM SUBJ KNOWS AS ANTI-CASTRO. SUBJ GAVE TENTATIVE AGREEMENT BUT ASKED HOW FAR DO YOU WANT ME TO GO?

3. SUBJ PLANNING TO LEAVE CUBA AT END OF YEAR, DISILLUSIONED WITH REGIME. BELIEVE STATION MIGHT BE ABLE PERSUADE HIM STAY IN PLACE.

4. DIVORCED MOTHER OF EX-WIFE HAS RE-MARRIED TO [JOAQUIN MIRABAL,] 06 COMMUNIST; FORMER "CHIEF OF SECURITY SERVICE" HAVANA, RECENTLY PROMOTED TO MORE IMPORTANT POSITION.

5. ABOVE INFO FROM [GUSTAVO ABASOLO,] 06 FLESHED OUT BY A-2 WHO MET SUBJ DURING AUGUST COJOLTN [illegible]. NO STATION TRACES ANY PERSONS MENTIONED HEREIN [illegible] FOR CONFIRMATION SUBJ TRAVEL. LIFIRE LISTS SHOW HE CARRIED SPECIAL PASSPORT 63/442, SHOW HIS ADDRESS AS [CALLE 34 NUMBER 1712,] 08 MARIANAO.

SECRET

3/14

12716

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR
FROM : MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 012356Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 6761

PERUMEN

REF: A. MEXI 6620 (IN 45873)

B. DIR 79070

1. FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS AS RESULT MEETING WITH AMSEVER-2 OCT 30 AND 1 NOV.

2. SUBJ IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA.

3. ADDITIONAL MOTIVATION BEHIND SUBJ PLAN LEAVE CUBA IS DESIRE BE ABLE HELP SUPPORT CHILDREN.

4. POUCH COMMO SYSTEM NOW IN EFFECT WORKS AS FOLLOWS. BROTHER GIVES LETTERS TO MISS (FNU) [PRESIAINE] AT [NETHERLANDS] EMBASSY, MEXI. OUTER ENVELOPE MARKED FOR [CORNELIS BJIPUST] [NETH] EMBASSY, HAVA. INNER ENVELOPE MARKED FOR SUBJ CARE OF [E. CABANES.] [CABANES] DELIVERS LETTERS TO SUBJ FOR WHOM HE WORKS. SYSTEM WORKS BOTH WAYS.

5. A-2 KNOWS [CABANES,] FORMER OWNER [NUEVA PAPELERA DE PUENTES GRANDES.] IS OLD MAN, SICK, GOING BLIND. BROTHER OF SUBJ SENDS MEDICINES TO [CABANES] THROUGH POUCH. [CABANES] ARRANGED COMMO CHANNEL AS RESULT HIS FORMER DIPLOMATIC CONNECTIONS. A-2 BELIEVES [CABANES] MAY HAVE WORKED FOR [SPANISH] FOREIGN SERVICE IN PAST, WAS ORIGINALLY [SPANISH] CITIZEN.

(3-JD)

6. A-2 HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED GET WORD TO SUBJ ASAP THAT HE CAN SERVE SELF, CHILDREN, AND DEMOCRATIC CAUSE BEST BY STAYING IN PLACE. LETTER TO INDICATE THAT FINANCIAL AID FOR CHILDREN CAN BE ARRANGED IN MEXICO. THIS FIRST LETTER, OSTENSIBLY FROM BROTHER, BUT ACTUALLY DRAFTED BY A-2, WILL NOT HOLD OUT SPECIFIC AMOUNT AS BAIT BUT WILL SOUND SUBJ OUT ON WILLINGNESS STAY IN PLACE IN RETURN FOR SOLUTION CHILD SUPPORT PROBLEMS AND GOOD CHANCE OF HAVING NAME CLEARED AFTER FALL OF CASTRO REGIME.

7. BELIEVE APPROX TWO THOUSAND PESOS MONTHLY PAYABLE IN MEXICO MIGHT DO THE TRICK. WILL KEEP HQS INFORMED ALL DEVELOPMENTS.

8. PLS POUCH SOONEST COMPLETE PERSONALITY PROFILE ON SUBJ FROM CLOSE FRIEND [MARIO DE LA GUARDIA] OF REF B.

9. INDEX [221-356959.]

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: *SUBJ IS [JORGE ANTONIO ABASCLO GARCIA.]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 (WH TEMPO COPY SLOTTED AT 1630, 2 NOV 63)BP

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, VR

SECRET

2 Nov 63 IN 53108

DIR CITE MEXI 6772

KUWOLF LICOAX

IMMEDIATE ACTION

REF MEXI 6771 (IN 53107)

IDEN IS: [CARLOS CRUZ MORALES, PRESIDENTE FEDERACION UNIVERSITARIO DE SOCIADADES ESTUDIANTILES. (FUSA)]

SECRET

SECRET

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1/BR

NO.	DATE	CATEGORY			DATE		T/TIME YRMODA	COU
063074	530401	1	XX	450	580701	POSTANY FLOYD	050301	MEXICO
061280	530501	1	VV	450	551115	KENNER RODHAM W	020615	MEXICO
055304	530901	1	VV	450	600226	OHARA PAULINE C	060526	MEXICO
010778	530901	1	SE	450	551101	STRATTON EUGENE A	020201	MEXICO
061591	530911	1	VV	450	560121	KRAVCOV FRED	020411	MEXICO
011047	540303	1	VV	450	590421	MAHONEY HARRY T	050119	MEXICO
012161	540701	1	32	450	560801	NEELY JOHN C	020101	MEXICO
011331	541201	1	XX	450	580701	HILL WILLARD R	030701	MEXICO
006475	541201	1	62	450	561101	SCHNITMAN EDWARD P	011101	MEXICO
057661	550816	1	VV	450	581023	FLORSTEDT ROBERT F	030208	MEXICO
009029	550911	1	VV	450	570322	MACPHEE KEITH L	010612	MEXICO
010694	551101	1	64	450	580801	JETT CHARLES K	020901	MEXICO
059299	560506	1	46	450	581114	BRONDER IRMA	020609	MEXICO
017558	560601	1	64	450	580801	GORDON MORRIS H	020201	MEXICO
039366	560701	1	XX	450	581101	HUTCHISON AUDREY	020401	MEXICO
005578	560801	1	64	450	580701	SCOTT WINSTON M	011101	MEXICO
056304	560901	1	62	450	580701	VAN BIESBROECK M	011001	MEXICO
055966	561101	1	64	450	580701	WEITZEL ISABELLE	010801	MEXICO
009368	561201	1	XX	450	590701	DICKOW DANIEL R	020701	MEXICO
055866	561220	1	CC	450	610930	SHORT STANNARD K	040911	MEXICO
055744	570101	1	38	450	590718	LATHAM ROBERT F	020618	MEXICO
015780	570301	1	64	450	580301	JOHNSON KATHERINE	010001	MEXICO
057303	570506	1	CF	450	681022	GOODPASTURE ANN L	110517	MEXICO
057110	570618	1	VV	450	591002	LYON LOUISE ANNE	020315	MEXICO
057550	570901	1	64	450	580801	BODDEN ROBERT C	001101	MEXICO
057820	570901	1	RR	450	571001	SLOAN LIN S	000101	MEXICO
013355	571001	1	18	450	580601	NORWAT STUART G	000801	MEXICO
025139	571014	1	CC	450	610121	CANTY KATHRYN	030308	MEXICO
061599	571201	1	VV	450	590517	CLARK PHILIP H	010517	MEXICO
063159	571201	1	XX	450	581201	BROMUND DANIEL	010001	MEXICO
006191	571215	1	48	450	580910	CLINTON JOHN A	000826	MEXICO
025120	580201	1	CC	450	580501	RAWLS WILLIAM E	000301	MEXICO
057135	580201	1	VV	450	600215	BOWERS BETTY A	020015	MEXICO
061894	580403	1	VV	450	631204	WHIDDEN GLENN H	050802	MEXICO
063186	580502	1	XX	450	580601	NORWAT STUART G	000030	MEXICO
027409	580601	1	64	450	580701	GUINAND ALICE B	000101	MEXICO
057999	580625	1	FF	450	630628	PUCKETT LOUIS D	050004	MEXICO
027607	580915	1	64	450	601028	WILSON RONALD J	020114	MEXICO
055931	581004	1	VV	450	621202	DEAN WARREN L	040129	MEXICO
060393	581029	1	46	450	610723	SCHERL FRANK	020825	MEXICO

SERIAL NO.	ARRIVAL DATE	TOUR	C/S CATEGORY	AREA	RETURN DATE		T/TIME YRMODA	
007547	590320	1	VV	450	630608	ANDERSON EDWARD L	040219	MEXICO
CC7143	590510	1	VV	450	641202	OFFENBACHER ROSE R	050623	MEXICO
C22592	590630	1	41	450	640405	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	040906	MEXICO
C63565	590713	1	VV	450	620610	SPATHAR RICHARD Z	021028	MEXICO
C574C8	590915	1	CC	450	620705	CARLSCN WILLIAM T	020921	MEXICO
C63028	590916	1	53	450	600217	NONNEMACKER HAROLD	000502	MEXICO
C194C8	591029	1	CC	450	620927	STRUBE MURIEL D	021029	MEXICO
027643	591117	1	64	450	611215	MOONEY MARY P	020029	MEXICO
055544	600204	1	CC	450	620401	STEWART JACK	020128	MEXICO
C546C3	600206	1	51	450	611031	BRADY JOHN B	010826	MEXICO
C31735	600308	1	50	450	621114	OSTROM GAIL A	020807	MEXICO
C29622	600821	1	51	450	630926	TRINNICH SEYMOUR D	030106	MEXICO
C13368	601009	1	VV	450	630601	SUPERFISKY AMELIA	020723	MEXICO
C15399	601011	1	CC	450	621217	LINTON JEAN L	020207	MEXICO
C16245	601016	1	39	450	620105	HARMAN THELMA G	010220	MEXICO
C25629	601113	1	45	450	630309	STINEBISER H C	020327	MEXICO
000322	610408	1	CF	450	630804	KLEIN OSCAR B	020327	MEXICO
C61877	610702	1	CC	450	630716	BRIDGE JOSEPH F	020015	MEXICO
C12796	610924	1	CC	450	631009	DEMBRY A G	020016	MEXICO
024349	610925	1	RR	450	640915	PHILLIPS DAVID A	020521	MEXICO
185016	611001	1	FF	450	660825	RESCIGNO JOSEPH M	041029	MEXICO
C17690	620102	1	51	450	630401	ROBERTS GRACE W	010230	MEXICO
C16198	620205	1	51	450	640717	GUDNEY CAROLE T	020913	MEXICO
055544	620401	1	CC	450	650801	STEWART JACK	030401	MEXICO
C12741	620623	1	CC	450	670131	MARHEINE PRENTICE R	040709	MEXICO
COC390	620719	1	CC	450	640727	DAIUTO DANIEL J	020009	MEXICO
C25654	620818	1	CC	450	640925	BECKMAN GUNNAR W	020108	MEXICO
C18687	630303	1	CC	450	630703	GORE LAURA T	000401	MEXICO
C19477	630605	1	RR	450	670928	FEINGLASS DOUGLAS J	040324	MEXICO
C55664	630618	1	FC	450	650908	WHITE ALAN P	020221	MEXICO
C57746	630619	1	FF	450	650703	HARRIS HUGH F JR	020015	MEXICO
C13079	630722	1	51	450	650915	CHANDLER HARRY A	020124	MEXICO
C09274	630806	1	VV	450	641122	KARTY FLORYAN R	010317	MEXICO
C37815	630901	1	CC	450	660109	WALSH GERTRUDE A	020409	MEXICO
C33314	631130	1	CC	450	660119	STEEVES CAROL C	020120	MEXICO
C19704	631213	1	CC	450	660507	ETSINGER HOWARD T	020425	MEXICO
C36069	631226	1	CC	450	641115	FULLER VENNETTE K	001020	MEXICO
C61062	640202	1	VV	450	650630	FLANNERY JAMES E	010429	MEXICO
CC8165	640617	1	CC	450	680417	PAXTON PAUL P	031001	MEXICO
C24345	640824	1	CC	450	650606	PHILLIPS DAVID A	000913	MEXICO

029790	520701	1	CC	450	561001	DICKENS CHARL[illegible]	040401	MEXICO
058051	520903	1	CC	450	551115	KING MARY E	030213	MEXICO
060736	521104	1	VV	450	570221	MORGAN JOHN S	040318	MEXICO
014561	541006	1	CC	450	570406	GIAMMARINO J P	020601	MEXICO
056629	550401	1	CC	450	600401	MAGGARD PEGGY M	050001	MEXICO
059409	560109	1	VV	450	580215	BEARDSLEY BASIL A	020107	MEXICO
010947	560130	1	CC	450	580221	EDMUNDS BARBARA J	020022	MEXICO
061922	560501	1	CC	450	581101	HUTCHISON TERRELL	020601	MEXICO
055495	560601	1	CC	450	590704	SHAW ROBERT T *nogales*	030104	MEXICO
056282	560701	1	CC	450	580701	RODRIGUEZ ALFONSO	020001	MEXICO
059820	560810	1	VV	450	620131	ESTANCONA FRANK R	050522	MEXICO
063380	561206	1	CC	450	580615	SANCHO JOSEPH G	010610	MEXICO
063429	570211	1	VV	450	630630	MCALPINE RICHARD D	060420	MEXICO
022489	570301	1	CC	450	610901	PALMER SYLVIA	040601	MEXICO
063114	570324	1	CC	450	630630	TORVESTAD GROVER E	060307	MEXICO
005956	570407	1	FF	450	620707	SANCHEZ LORENZO B	050301	MEXICO
014267	571001	1	CC	450	591024	SHAW MEREDITH L	020024	MEXICO
044512	571101	1	CF	450	600108	ROLFE GERALD S JR	020208	MEXICO
025658	571201	1	CF	450	600115	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	020115	MEXICO
010116	580201	1	VV	450	600320	SPERA ALFONSO G	020120	MEXICO
059127	580206	1	VV	450	600322	SILEO ANTHONY L	020117	MEXICO
013175	580616	1	CC	450	630619	MISKO GEORGE W	050004	MEXICO
027608	580818	1	FF	450	601029	PRINCE ALBERT [illegible]	020212	MEXICO
025057	580822	1	CC	450	600915	HAMPTON NELLIE T	020024	MEXICO
060740	580924	1	VV	450	620206	OUDERKIRK RICHARD H	030413	MEXICO
026063	581101	1	CC	450	610122	WEEKLEY ROBERT D	020222	MEXICO
005221	590522	1	64	450	610712	CAREY GILBERT W	020121	MEXICO
009052	590917	1	VV	450	650815	MANELL HERBERT	051029	MEXICO
018050	590921	1	FF	450	610921	CHAMES NICKLES	020001	MEXICO
063811	591004	1	CC	450	620719	RYDZEWSKI BERNARD	020916	MEXICO
010625	591218	1	VV	450	611216	FINNEY RICHARD A	011129	MEXICO
032013	600125	1	CC	450	620401	MARINE PAUL ALLEN	020207	MEXICO
012270	600129	1	CC	450	620221	SALMON JOAN A	020023	MEXICO
026050	600203	1	51	450	641005	KEENAN THOMAS J *mistey*	040803	MEXICO
029163	600306	1	CC	450	620601	HAWKINS M C III	020226	MEXICO
006098	620110	1	CC	450	640705	MURRAY WILLIAM JR *monterey*	020526	MEXICO
011340	620112	1	CF	450	670630	PEPPER B FRANKLIN	050519	MEXICO
032013	620501	1	CC	450	640615	MARINE PAUL ALLEN *monterrey*	020115	MEXICO
032703	620514	1	FC	450	650221	ANDERSON JAMES E	020908	MEXICO
064518	620708	1	CC	450	650715	DUNCAN ROBERT D	030006	MEXICO

S-E-C-R-E-T

SERIAL NO.	ARRIVAL DATE	TOUR	C/S CATEGORY	AREA	RETURN DATE		T/TIME YRMODA	
C35324	621106	1	CC	450	631214	MAWHINNEY ELLEN F	010109	MEXICO
C19143	621205	1	FC	450	681027	HENNICK DOROTHY J	051023	MEXICO
C35641	621207	1	CC	450	650615	HAMMEL RUTH I	020609	MEXICO
C54841	621209	1	RR	450	670930	FELDMANN ROBERT H	040922	MEXICO
C15782	630121	1	FR	450	671119	MUSGRAVE MARY G	040929	MEXICO
C98524	630216	1	51	450	680401	JOHNSEN PATRICIA L	020116	MEXICO
C59495	630421	1	CC	450	651201	SHAW ROBERT T	020709	MEXICO
C37507	630430	1	CC	450	650527	JOHNSEN MARTIN I	020028	MEXICO
C60942	630615	1	CC	450	680708	THOMAS WADE E	050024	MEXICO
C37004	630629	1	CC	450	650629	SILVERLIEB JOAN G	020001	MEXICO
062241	630717	1	FF	450	661016	DINAGEN JAMES F	030230	MEXICO
C38031	630819	1	51	450	651107	SANCHEZ DOLORES	020219	MEXICO
C27739	630823	1	CC	450	651001	ASHLEY JOSEPH P	020109	MEXICO
C25015	630911	1	FF	450	650715	SWIDER RAYMOND J	011005	MEXICO
C12037	631031	1	49	450	650531	MACKAY LORNA J	010701	MEXICO
C37954	631207	1	CC	450	651220	RODRIGUEZ NEIDA	020014	MEXICO
C27747	640219	1	CC	450	660810	HUMPHREY L D JR	020522	MEXICO
C38306	640429	1	CC	450	660513	PURKEY EARL K	020015	MEXICO
037171	640511	1	RR	450	661108	LADENBURG ARTHUR T	020528	MEXICO
C25644	640521	1	CC	450	660730	BRIGHT WILLIAM C	020210	MEXICO
C14680	640715	1	CC	450	670726	BOJARSKI TED S	030012	MEXICO
032616	640910	1	CC	450	671203	FARMER MICHAEL J	030224	MEXICO
C33697	640912	1	CC	450	661001	BERNARD JOAN	020020	MEXICO
C18055	640914	1	RR	450	661114	DAHLGREN HAROLD E	020201	MEXICO
C27605	641012	1	FF	450	670123	MCDONNELL H ANN	020312	MEXICO
C19765	641118	1	FC	450	670930	DURKIN SHIRLEY L	021013	MEXICO
C19816	650407	1	CC	450	671107	HAUSMANN CYNTHIA	020701	MEXICO
C60953	650501	1	CC	450	670601	SIMONS HOMER D JR	020101	MEXICO
027646	650605	1	CC	450	670701	PITTENGER ALICE H	020027	MEXICO
C13733	650616	1	RF	450	700626	HARRIS JOANNE LEE	050011	MEXICO
C63982	650708	1	CC	450	680601	COVINGTON ROBERT A	021024	MEXICO
C56440	650729	1	RR	450	690421	DILLON PAUL L	030823	MEXICO
C64769	650911	1	FR	450	670911	BURLEIGH CHARLES H	020001	MEXICO
C37764	650913	1	RF	450	700630	PELAYO ROSA M	040918	MEXICO
C25658	650929	1	FF	450	680120	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	020322	MEXICO
C56625	651012	1	CC	450	671212	MAGGARD PEGGY M	020201	MEXICO
371738	651128	1	RR	450	670901	HOOPES JUDITH A	010904	MEXICO
C29958	660109	1	VV	450	680113	SERVILLA ARTHUR D	020005	MEXICO
C39032	660405	1	RR	450	680405	BAKKE ALFRED C	020001	MEXICO
C21352	660504	1	FF	450	670928	HINKLEY CLYDE I	010425	MEXICO

S-E-C-R-E-T

SUPPORT ASSETS

Unilateral phono taps

1949 - 1961 Charles Anderson III Chief
4/55 - 4/60 Peggy Maggard Asst
4/56 - 1/62 Frank Estancona Chief
2/60 - 10/64 Thomas Keenan
9/64 - 12/67 Michael Farmer

49-71 Outside CO
David WILSTED (ps)
retired in Mexico

Unilateral photo Cubans

6/59 - 4/64 Robert Zambernardi (resigned Mexico)
7/59 - 6/62 Richard Spathar TSD (retired)

Unilateral photo Soviets

3/54 - 4/59 Harry T. Mahoney
(retired Chicago)
5/57 - 8/64 A. Goodpasture (alternate CO
and internal routing)
6/58 - 6/63 Louis D. Puckett (retired)
6/63 - 10/64 Thomas Keenan
65 - 66 William Bright

56 - 68 Outside Agent
Ramon Alvarez (resigned in Mexico)

Liaison phone taps

1959 - 1969 Winston Scott (deceased)
1959 - 1960 Alfonso Spera (retired)
1959 - 1960 Turner Smith (outside, now retired)
1959 - 1960 John (Training rept resigned)
1960- 1961 John Brady (retired)
1962 - 1968 A. Goodpasture
1961 - 1971 Charles Flick (outside TSD Staff Agent - retired)

Liaison - surveillance

Prior 1954 Robert Melberg (retired)
3/54 - 4/59 Harry Mahoney (retired)
4/59 - 1961 Thomas Hazlitt
12/62 - 9/67 Robert Feldmann

TSD Outside unit

4/58 - 12/63 Glen Widden (retired)
6/59 -4/64 Joseph M. Resigno (ps) Unit blown and closed down

8/56-6/69 COS Winston M. Scott (deceased)

DCOS
7/56 - 7/58 Alfonso Rodriguez (retired)
10/58 - 12/62 Warren Dean (retired)
6/63 - 9/65 Alan White (retired)
10/65 - 1969 Stanley Watson (retired in Mexico)

COVFRT ACTION
Prior to 1954 Howard Hunt (retired)
12/54 - 7/58 Williard Hill (resigned)
12/56 - 9/61 Stannard Short (retired)
Chief
9/61 - 3/64 David Phillips C/(retired)
8/62 - 9/64 Gunnar Beckman Asst
2/64 - 6/65 James Flannery C/(retired)
9/64 - 11/66 Harold Dalghren Asst
10/65 - 1967 Stanley Watson C/(retired)
66 - 68 Don Heath
68 - 71 Joseph SmithC(retired in Mexico)

CUBA OPERATIONS

56 - 4/62 Thomas Hazlitt Chief
2/60 - 4/62 Jack Stewart (retired Costa Rica)
4/63 - 4/65 Bob Shaw Chief
9/63 - 7/65 Ray Swider (retired)
10/63 - 5/65 Lorna Mackay
8/64 - 6/65 David Phillips Chief (retired)
9/65 - 10/68 Joseph Piccolo
10/65 - 12/67 Peggy Maggard

SOVIET TARGET
6/57 - 10/59 Louise Lyon (retired)
9/59- 8/65 Herbert Manell Chief
9/59 - 8/65 Barbara Manell
5/64 - 7/66 William Bright
4/65 - 11/67 Cynthia Hausmann
6/65 - 7/67 Alice Pittinger
7/65 - 4/69 Paul Dillon Chief

6/62 - 1/67 Prentice Marheine (ps)
(retired ?)
Outside CO

SOVIET TRANSCRIBERS
6/56 - 8/58 Morris Gordon (resigned)
6/58 - 6/63 George Misko
6/63 - 70 Boris Tarasoff (retired in Mexico)

14-00000

C25790	520701	1	CC	450	561001	DICKERS CHARLES B	040301	MEXICO
C55091	520903	1	CC	450	551115	KING MARY E	030213	MEXICO
C60736	521104	1	VV	450	570221	MORGAN JOHN S	040318	MEXICO
C14561	541006	1	CC	450	570406	GIAMMARINO J P	020601	MEXICO
C56625	550401	1	CC	450	600401	MAGGARD PEGGY M	050001	MEXICO
C09409	560109	1	VV	450	580215	BEARDSLEY BASIL A	020107	MEXICO
C10947	560130	1	CC	450	580221	EDMUNDS BARBARA J	020022	MEXICO
C61922	560501	1	CC	450	581101	HUTCHISON TERRELL	020601	MEXICO
C55495	560601	1	CC	450	590704	SHAW ROBERT T	030104	MEXICO
C56292	560701	1	CC	450	580701	RODRIGUEZ ALFONSO	020001	MEXICO
C59820	560810	1	VV	450	620131	ESTANCONA FRANK R	050522	MEXICO
063380	561206	1	CC	450	580615	SANCHO JOSEPH G	010610	MEXICO
C63429	570211	1	VV	450	630630	MCALPINE RICHARD D	060420	MEXICO
022489	570301	1	CC	450	610901	PALMER SYLVIA	040601	MEXICO
063114	570324	1	CC	450	630630	TORVESTAD GROVER E	060307	MEXICO
C09556	570407	1	FF	450	620707	SANCHEZ LORENZO B	050301	MEXICO
C14247	571001	1	CC	450	591024	SHAW MEREDITH L	020024	MEXICO
C64572	571101	1	CF	450	600108	ROLFE GERALD S JR	020208	MEXICO
C25658	571201	1	CF	450	600115	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	020115	MEXICO
C10116	580201	1	VV	450	600320	SPERA ALFONSO G	020120	MEXICO
C59127	580206	1	VV	450	600322	SILEO ANTHONY L	020117	MEXICO
C13175	580616	1	CC	450	630619	MISKO GEORGE W	050004	MEXICO
C27608	580818	1	FF	450	601029	PRINCE ALBERT L	020212	MEXICO
C25097	580822	1	CC	450	600915	HAMPTON NELLIE T	020024	MEXICO
C60740	580924	1	VV	450	620206	OUDERKIRK RICHARD H	030413	MEXICO
C26063	581101	1	CC	450	610122	WEEKLEY ROBERT D	020222	MEXICO
C05221	590522	1	64	450	610712	CAREY GILBERT W	020121	MEXICO
C09052	590917	1	VV	450	650815	MANELL HERBERT	051029	MEXICO
C18050	590921	1	FF	450	610921	CHAMES NICKLES	020001	MEXICO
C63811	591004	1	CC	450	620719	RYDZEWSKI BERNARD	020916	MEXICO
C10635	591218	1	VV	450	611216	FINNEY RICHARD A	011129	MEXICO
C32013	600125	1	CC	450	620401	MARINE PAUL ALLEN	020207	MEXICO
C12270	600129	1	CC	450	620221	SALMON JOAN A	020023	MEXICO
C26090	600203	1	51	450	641005	KEENAN THOMAS J	040803	MEXICO
C29163	600306	1	CC	450	620601	HAWKINS W C III	020226	MEXICO
C06098	620110	1	CC	450	640705	MURRAY WILLIAM JR	020526	MEXICO
C11340	620112	1	CF	450	670630	PEPPER B FRANKLIN	050519	MEXICO
C32013	620501	1	CC	450	640615	MARINE PAUL ALLEN	020115	MEXICO
C32703	620514	1	FC	450	650221	ANDERSON JAMES E	020908	MEXICO
C64518	620708	1	CC	450	650715	DUNCAN ROBERT D	030008	MEXICO

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO.	DATE		CATEGORY		DATE		YRMODA	
C35324	621106	1 Mex	CC finance	450	631214	MAWHIKNEY ELLEN F	010109	MEXICO
C19143	621205	1 Mex C.	FC COS/Sec	450	681027	RENNICK DOROTHY J	051023	MEXICO
C35641	621207	1	CC	450	650615	HAMMEL RUTH I Evening? Sov clk	020609	MEXICO
C54841	621209	1 Mex	RR CO/TSD Support	450	670930	FELDMANN ROBERT H	040922	MEXICO
C15782	630121	1 Mex	FR CP	450	671119	MUSGRAVE MARY G	040929	MEXICO
C58524	630216	1	51 SOV/SAT	450	650401	JOHNSEN PATRICIA L	020116	MEXICO
C55495	630423	1 Mex	CC CUBA	450	651201	SHAW ROBERT T	020709	MEXICO
C37507	630430	1	CC	450	650527	JOHNSEN MARTIN I	020028	MEXICO
C60942	630615	1 Mex	CC CP op.	450	680708	THOMAS WADE E	050024	MEXICO
C37004	630629	1 merida	CC Sec Mnty	450 merida	650629	SILVERLIEB JOAN G mnty	020001	MEXICO
062241	630717	1 Mex	FF COMMO	450	661016	DINAGEN JAMES F	030230	MEXICO
C38031	630819	1 Mexi	51 files	450	651107	SANCHEZ DOLORES	020219	MEXICO
C27739	630823	1 mexi	CC commo	450	651001	ASHLEY JOSEPH P	020109	MEXICO
C25015	630911	1 mexi	FF Cuba	450	650715	SWIDER RAYMOND J	011005	MEXICO
C12037	631031	1 mexi	49 Cuba	450	650531	MACKAY LORNA J	010701	MEXICO
C37954	631207	1 mexi	CC Sec Supt	450	651220	RODRIGUEZ NEIDA	020014	MEXICO
C27747	640219	1 mexi	CC photo TSD	450 inside	660810	HUMPHREY L D JR	020522	MEXICO
C38306	640429	1 mexi	CC files	450	660513	DURKEY EARL K	020015	MEXICO
037171	640511	1 mexi	RR LILINK	450 outside	661108	LADENBURG ARTHUR T	020528	MEXICO
C25644	640521	1 mex	CC sov sat	450	660730	BRIGHT WILLIAM C	020210	MEXICO
C14680	640715	1 mexi	CC files disp	450	670726	BOJARSKI TED S	030012	MEXICO
032616	640910	1 Mexi	CC Support	450	671203	FARMER MICHAEL J	030224	MEXICO
C33697	640912	1 mexi	CC CA Clk	450	661001	BERNARD JOAN	020020	MEXICO
C18095	640914	1 mexi	RR CA CO	450	661114	DAHLGREN HAROLD E	020201	MEXICO
C27605	641012	1 mexi	FF Reports	450	670123	MCDONNELL H ANN	020312	MEXICO
C19765	641118	1 Mexi	FC [illegible]	450	670930	DURKIN SHIRLEY L	021013	MEXICO
C19816	650407	1 mexi	CC Sov CO	450	671107	HAUSMANN CYNTHIA	020701	MEXICO
C60993	650501	1 mexi	CC admin	450 finance	670601	SIMONS HOMER D JR	020101	MEXICO
127646	650605	1 mexi	CC Sov clk	450	670701	RITTENGER ALICE H	020027	MEXICO
C13723	650616	1 mexi	RF file clk	450	700626	HARRIS JOANNE LEE	050011	MEXICO
C63982	650708	1 "	CC Commo	450	680601	COVINGTON ROBERT A	021024	MEXICO
C56440	650729	1 "	RR Sov CO	450	690421	DILLON PAUL L	030823	MEXICO
C64769	650911	1 "	FR Commo	450	670911	BURLEIGH CHARLES H	020001	MEXICO
C37764	650913	1 "	RF file clk	450	700630	PELAYO ROSA M	040918	MEXICO
C25658	650929	1 "	FF Cuba ops	450	680120	PICCOLO JOSEPH S	020322	MEXICO
C56625	651012	1 "	CC " "	450	671212	MAGGARD PEGGY M	020201	MEXICO
371738	651128	1 "	RR Cable clk	450	670901	HOOPES JUDITH A	010904	MEXICO
C29958	660109	1 mexi	VV CA outside	450?	680113	SERVILLA ARTHUR D	020005	MEXICO
C39032	660405	1 "	RR Commo	450	680405	BAKKE ALFRED C	020001	MEXICO
C21352	660504	1 "	FF files	450	670928	HINKLEY CLYDE I	010425	MEXICO

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO.	DATE			CATEGORY		AREA		DATE	NAME	YRMODA	
063074	530401	1	mexi	XX	CP ops	450		580701	POSTANY FLOYD	050301	MEXICO
061280	530501	1	"	VV	Sov ops	450		551115	KENNER RODHAM W	020615	MEXICO
055304	530901	1		VV	Reports	450		600226	OHARA PAULINE C	060526	MEXICO
010778	530901	1	mnty	SE	a/a	450		551101	STRATTON EUGENE A	020201	MEXICO
061591	530911	1	mexi	VV	Sat ops	450		560121	KRAVCOV FRED	020411	MEXICO
011047	540303	1	mexi	VV	Support	450	Co	590421	MAHONEY HARRY T	050119	MEXICO
012161	540701	1	mnty	32	COS	450		560801	NEELY JOHN C	020101	MEXICO
011331	541201	1	mexi	XX	CA ops	450		580701	HILL WILLARD R	030701	MEXICO
006475	541201	1		62		450		561101	SCHNITMAN EDWARD P	011101	MEXICO
057661	550816	1	mexi	VV	CP ops	450		581023	FLORSTEDT ROBERT F	030208	MEXICO
009029	550911	1		VV		450		570322	MACPHEE KEITH L	010612	MEXICO
010694	551101	1	mexi	64	Sat ops	450		580801	JETT CHARLES K	020901	MEXICO
9299	560506	1	mexi	46	Reports	450		581114	BRONDER IRMA	020609	MEXICO
017558	560601	1	mexi	64	Sov translator	450		580801	GORDON MORRIS H	020201	MEXICO
039366	560701	1	"	XX	finance	450		581101	HUTCHISON AUDREY	020401	MEXICO
005578	560801	1	mexi	64	DCOS	450		580701	SCOTT WINSTON M	011101	MEXICO
056304	560901	1	"	62	Sec COS	450		580701	VAN BIESBROECK M	011001	MEXICO
055966	561101	1		64		450		580701	WEITZEL ISABELLE	010801	MEXICO
009368	561201	1		XX		450		590701	DICKOW DANIEL R	020701	MEXICO
055866	561220	1	mexi	CC	CA ops	450		610930	SHORT STANNARD K	040911	MEXICO
055744	570101	1		38	finance	450		590718	LATHAM ROBERT F	020618	MEXICO
015780	570301	1	mexi	64	files	450		580301	JOHNSON KATHERINE	010001	MEXICO
057303	570506	1	mexi	CF	Support	450	liaison photos	681022	GOODPASTURE ANN L	110517	MEXICO
057110	570618	1	"	VV	Sov Co	450		591002	LYON LOUISE ANNE	020315	MEXICO
057550	570901	1	mnty	64	COS	450		580801	BODDEN ROBERT C	001101	MEXICO
057820	570901	1	mexi	RR	CP	450		571001	SLOAN LIN S	000101	MEXICO
013355	571001	1		18		450		580601	NORWAT STUART G	000801	MEXICO
025139	571014	1	mexi	CC	Reports clk	450		610121	CANTY KATHRYN	030308	MEXICO
1599	571201	1	mexi	VV	Sat ops	450		590517	CLARK PHILIP H	010517	MEXICO
063159	571201	1	mex	XX	Sov outside	450		581201	BROMUND DANIEL	010001	MEXICO
006191	571215	1	mexi	48	Sov outside	450		580910	CLINTON JOHN A	000826	MEXICO
025120	580201	1	"	CC	files	450		580501	RAWLS WILLIAM E	000301	MEXICO
057135	580201	1	"	VV	Reports	450		600215	BOWERS BETTY A	020015	MEXICO
061894	580403	1	mexi	VV	TSD outside	450		631204	WHIDDEN GLENN H	050802	MEXICO
063186	580502	1		XX		450		580601	NORWAT STUART G	000030	MEXICO
027409	580601	1	mexi	64	CS clk	450		580701	GUINAND ALICE B	000101	MEXICO
057999	580625	1	mexi	FF	Support	450	Co	630628	PUCKETT LOUIS D	050004	MEXICO
027607	580915	1	mnty	64	Admin a	450		601028	WILSON RONALD J	020114	MEXICO
055931	581004	1	mexi	VV	DCOS	450		621202	DEAN WARREN L	040129	MEXICO
060393	581029	1	mexi	46	finance	450		610723	SCHERL FRANK	020825	MEXICO

1950 = 1963 mexi LIFEAT

[illegible]

NO.	DATE		CATEGORY		DATE		YRMODA	
007547	590320	1 mexi	VV CA ops	450	630608	ANDERSON EDWARD L	040219	MEXICO
007143	590510	1 mexi	VV Reports	450	641202	OFFENBACHER ROSE R	050623	MEXICO
022592	590630	1 Mexi	41 TSD inside	450	640405	ZAMBERNARDI ROBERT	040906	MEXICO
063565	590713	1 "	VV Sov outside	450	620610	SPATHAR RICHARD Z	021028	MEXICO
057408	590915	1	CC CA ops	450	620705	CARLSON WILLIAM T	020921	MEXICO
063038	590916	1	53	450	600217	NONNEMACKER HAROLD	000502	MEXICO
019408	591029	1 mexi	CC outside	450	620927	STRUBE MURIEL D w/spathar	021029	MEXICO
027643	591117	1 mexi	64 See DCOS	450	611215	MOONEY MARY P	020029	MEXICO
055544	600204	1 mexi	CC Cuba ops	450	620401	STEWART JACK	020128	MEXICO
054603	600206	1 mexi	51 Lienvoy	450	611031	BRADY JOHN B	010826	MEXICO
031735	600308	1	50	450	621114	OSTROM GAIL A	020807	MEXICO
029622	600821	1 mexi	51 Sov outside	450 Student	630926	TRINNICH SEYMOUR D	030106	MEXICO
013368	601005	1 "	VV files	450	630601	SUPERFISKY AMELIA	020723	MEXICO
019399	601011	1	CC "	450	621217	LINTON JEAN L	020207	MEXICO
016245	601016	1	39 "	450	620105	HARMAN THELMA G	010220	MEXICO
029629	601113	1 "	45 "	450	630309	STINEBISER H C	020327	MEXICO
000322	610408	1 "	CF finance	450	630804	KLEIN OSCAR B	020327	MEXICO
061877	610702	1 "	CC finance	450	630716	BRIDGE JOSEPH F	020015	MEXICO
012796	610924	1 "	CC Commo	450	631009	BEMBRY A G	020016	MEXICO
024345	610925	1 mexi	RR CA + Cuba ops	450	640315	PHILLIPS DAVID A	020521	MEXICO
185016	611001	1 "	FF TSD outside	450	660825	RESCIGNO JOSEPH M	041025	MEXICO
017690	620102	1 "	51 Cuba clk	450	630401	ROBERTS GRACE W	010230	MEXICO
016158	620205	1 mexi	51 Reports	450	640717	CUDNEY CAROLE T	020513	MEXICO
055544	620401	1 Merida	CC Cuba ops	450	650801	STEWART JACK	030401	MEXICO
012741	620623	1 mexi	CC Sov outside	450	670131	MARHEINE PRENTICE R	040709	MEXICO
000390	620719	1 mexi	CC files	450	640727	DAIUTO DANIEL J	020009	MEXICO
025654	620818	1 "	CC CA ops	450	640925	BECKMAN GUNNAR W	020108	MEXICO
018687	630303	1 "	CC Sec Support	450	630703	GORE LAURA T	000401	MEXICO
019477	630605	1 mexi	RR Sov translator	450	670928	FEINGLASS DOUGLAS J	040324	MEXICO
055664	630618	1 "	FC DCOS	450	650908	WHITE ALAN P	020221	MEXICO
057746	630619	1 "	FF finance	450	650703	HARRIS HUGH F JR	020015	MEXICO
013079	630722	1 "	51 "	450	650915	CHANDLER HARRY A	020124	MEXICO
009274	630806	1 "	VV transcriber	450 Sov	641122	KARTY FLORYAN R	010317	MEXICO
037815	630901	1 "	CC Cuba/clk	450	660109	WALSH GERTRUDE A	020409	MEXICO
033314	631130	1	CC	450	660119	STEEVES CAROL C	020120	MEXICO
019704	631213	1 mexi	CC LILINK	450 outside	660507	ETSINGER HOWARD T	020425	MEXICO
036069	631226	1 mexi	CC finance	450	641115	FULLER VENNETTE K	001020	MEXICO
061062	640202	1 mexi	VV C/CA ops	450	650630	FLANNERY JAMES E	010429	MEXICO
008165	640617	1 Mnty	CC COS	450	680417	PAXTON PAUL P	031001	MEXICO
024345	640824	1 mexi	CC Cuba ops	450	650606	PHILLIPS DAVID A	000913	MEXICO

Poss. yes — This is possibly Dave's integration date for State cover.

S-E-C-R-E-T

20 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : Summary of STESCALADE - Audio Operation Against the New China News Agency in Havana

1. In May 1959, the New China News Agency (NCNA) opened an office in Havana in the El Medico Building which is occupied partly by business concerns and partly used for residential apartments. Shortly thereafter, the Havana Station obtained the concurrence of Ambassador Bonsal and Miss Carolyn O. Stacey, an Embassy employee, to mount an audio operation against NCNA through the wall of the adjacent apartment in which Miss Stacey lived. In November 1959, the FE Division sent one case officer and one TSD technician to Havana, and the installation of a microphone and tape recorder was completed in Miss Stacey's apartment on 29 November 1959.

2. By June 1960, it had become evident that two other rooms occupied by NCNA possibly housed communication equipment and were used for conferences. At that time Bryan Mills, FE Division case officer, went to Havana and explored the possibility of improving the operation. He managed to lease an apartment directly over the NCNA office and arranged for a stay-behind agent to occupy this space.

3. In August 1960, a team of three TSD technicians who were in Havana on a separate SR Division operation agreed to install the additional equipment required for the NCNA operation. A second FE Division case officer, Robert Neet, came down to Havana; and he, together with the technicians, installed a probe microphone and tape recorder in the apartment obtained by Mills over the NCNA office. About this time the equipment was removed from Miss Stacey's apartment, with the exception of the plastic probe which was left in the wall and plastered over.

4. As an additional security precaution to provide a safe haven, and after consultation with the Acting Chief of Station, a key to an apartment in the same building leased by Mrs. Marjorie Lennox, an Embassy secretary, was obtained. Mrs. Lennox was told that access to her apartment was needed for photographic surveillance purposes.

5. The Station was then faced with the probability that time and security would work against holding indefinitely the lease to the apartment over NCNA since the owners of the building were cancelling sub-lessors' contracts and recalling leases. It was, therefore, decided to install transmitters and switches in order to permit continued monitoring of the target from a distant listening post. Another three-man team of TSD technicians consisting of David L. Christ (alias Carswell), Walter E. Szuminski (alias Taransky) and Thornton J. Anderson (alias Danbrunt) documented as tourists had been sent to Havana to install audio equipment in the Chinese Nationalist Embassy before it was due to be turned over to the Chinese Communits. This operation aborted. This team was then sent to work on the installation of the transmitters in the apartment over the NCNA office.

6. At 2400 hours on 14 September, Christ, who with the other technicians was working in the target apartment, failed to keep a scheduled appointment with Neet. At 0100 hours on the 15th of September, the apartment of Mrs. Lennox was entered into and searched by Cuban authorities, and she was taken into custody. At 1540 hours on 15 September, Neet, the stay-behind agent and his wife were picked up by the Cuban authorities and detained.

7. As of today the agent remains in the custody of the Cuban authorities. His wife has been released and is still in Havana. Neet was released 1715 hours 16 September and has subsequently returned to Washington where he is being debriefed. Mrs. Lennox was subsequently released and has also returned to Washington where she is being debriefed. The three TSD technicians remain in confinement. They have been seen in confinement but not contacted by an Embassy officer when he first attempted to secure the release of Mrs. Lennox. Christ was last seen by Neet when they were jointly interrogated the morning of 16 September. At that time Christ did not appear

to have been maltreated.

8. According to articles in the Cuban papers the three technicians were arrested while in the apartment over the NCNA office and completing the installation of the equipment. The press article adds that the key to Mrs. Lennox's apartment was found on one of the technicians who identified the apartment to which it belonged. All Cuban press releases have referred to the men by alias and have not identified them as Government or Agency employees. It is unclear at present what story had been agreed upon by the technicians and station personnel to be used in the event they were caught. (While being interrogated with Neet, Christ indicated that Neet was his boss, and Neet consistently denied any knowledge as to why he was being held.) The sub-lease for the apartment in which the men were caught is in the name of the stay-behind agent with the original lease being in the name of Mills, the FE Division Case Officer.

9. Initial information indicated that the three technicians would be charged with espionage "against the people of China". Subsequent press releases have been unclear on this point. An attempt by Consul Hugh Kessler to contact the three men at 1730 hours on 17 September was unsuccessful. He was not permitted to see them but was told they were in custody.

10. The three technicians travelled to Cuba as tourists under very light commercial cover, two of them working for a company in New York and the third, one in Baltimore. In each case the cover company consists of a telephone answering service and a name on the door. Telephone messages and mail are picked up periodically by an Agency contract employee. The men were provided with this cover as well as unbackstopped home addresses for use when entering or leaving Cuba as tourists since the filling out of the landing card requires this information. Subsequent to their detention the home addresses have been partially backstopped so that inquiries will indicate that someone with this alias name had lived in the apartment house in question. Insofar as the cover companies are concerned, efforts are being made to provide a backstop to withstand inquiries from the press should the Cubans reveal this information. In view

of the thinness of the cover, it is uncertain whether this will succeed.

11. A cleared and witting law firm in New York has been briefed by Mr. L. Houston on the situation with the thought that inquiries received by the cover company could be referred to the firm of lawyers from whom no comment would be obtained by the press or other inquirers. The law firm has been briefed on the entire situation so that they may be in a position to act if any action by them appears desirable or feasible. It would not appear that much support of any kind can be obtained from the law firm or the law firms in Cuba which are associated with them.

12. Insofar as the families are concerned, one of the technicians is a bachelor presently on home leave between two tours in Japan. His father, a cook in a diner in the Boston area, has been contacted by the Office of Security, and he will get in touch with Security if he receives any inquiries on this matter. Security, by the same token, will keep in touch with him as the Cubans reveal their intentions and course of action.

13. The wives of the other two technicians have been told what has happened and are being contacted at least once daily by TSD staffers and their wives who have been briefed on the situation. A conference with the two wives was held in TSD on 19 September to go over the whole situation and determine if there were any personal problems on which the Agency could be of help. For the time being the wives are telling their neighbors that their husbands are on a trip. This story will be adjusted depending on what course of action the Cuban Government takes, whether the aliases remain unbroken and whether recognizable photographs of the individuals are released to the press. The two wives so far have taken the bad news exceedingly well.

RUDOLPH E. GOMEZ
Acting Chief, WH

Distribution:

DCI - 2	WH - 3
DDCI - 1	~~FE~~ - 1
DD/P - 1	OS - 1
COPS - 1	CI - 1

[illegible], DD/P

att

RELEASE CONTINGENCY OPLAN 62-2

CHART OR MAP REFERENCE:

Sectional aeronautical charts - As required.

TASK ORGANIZATION:

Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group. Major Billy B. Campbell, Commander.

1. SITUATION:

Daniel L. Carswell (Alias), Eustace H. Danbrunt (Alias) and Edmund R. Taransky (Alias) are TSD Staff Employees who were apprehended by Cuban authorities in September 1960 and who are now serving ten year sentences. Efforts are being made to secure their release. Since their release may occur without advance notice and at a variety of places, ie. Havana, Miami, Mexico City, Switzerland, Brazil, etc., it is imperative that a contingency plan be formulated to ensure the secure reception of these employees.

The controlling factor in all phases of the release procedure is that these employees were in Cuba under alias and that during the entire period since their capture their aliases and cover stories apparently have been maintained. Therefore it is essential that these aliases be maintained until such time as the employees have returned to Agency control and then have these alias identities disappear as quickly as possible.

For planning purposes the release points will be Havana, Mexico City or "other areas".

2. MISSION:

Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group provide black air transportation from port of entry CONUS to the designated safe area.

3. EXECUTION:

A. Black air transport will be provided under this plan at the request of TFW, COS Mexico, or Operational Support Division/OS/DDS depending on the release point and port of entry.

3. Request for black transport should include:

1. Request that RELEASE CONTINGENCY OPLAN 62-2 be implemented.

2. Port of entry.

3. Date, local time, and airfield desired for pick up.

4. Desired destination.

5. Other requirements, ie., stretchers or bunks in the event subjects are hospital cases.

6. Name, organization and telephone number of requesting party.

7. Name and telephone number of KUBARK contacts at loading and off-loading points.

C. The following personnel are knowledgeable and charged with the responsibility of activating this plan:

1. Major Richard I. Skinner, AC/ASD/DD/P
Organization: Air Support Division, DD/P
Home Phone: JE 3-1409
Office Phone: Sterile Numbers NE 8-6285, EX 3-8515
Extensions 6862, 7564, 7367
Red Line 1058

2. Mr. Robert Marrero
Organization: Air Support Division, DD/P
Home Phone: JA 4-3598
Office Phone: Same as 1.

3. Major Billy B. Campbell, Commander, Det. 1.
Organization: Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
Home Phone: 662737
Office Phone: Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 631590

4. Major Kenneth R. Burton, Ops Officer, Det. 1.
Organization: Det. 1, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
Home Phone: 662464
Office Phone: Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 631213

S-E-C-R-E-T

D. Det. 1 furnish 1 C-54 and crew in standby capacity until further notice. Standby capacity is herein defined as capability to position the aircraft at any port of entry in east, south or southwest U. S. from Boston to Los Angeles within 15 hours.

E. Assuming the subjects will be released in Havana or Mexico City, Det. 1 will prepare mission folders for flights from most probable ports of entry to Isolation and Andrews Air Force Base.

RICHARD I. SKINNER

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - CI Staff
3 - OS
3 - OP
3 - MS
3 - C/FE
3 - C/TSD
3 - CCG
3 - TFW
3 - C/WH
3 - DPD/DDR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO : CCS 3, VR

SECRET 071812Z

PRIORITY BOGO INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7292 7 DEC 63 IN 75863

1. MISS NORMA VALVERDE VARIG FLT CANCELLED AT MEXICO CITY.

2. ONWARD TRAVEL VIA AEROLINEAS PANAMA FLT 203 ARRIVING BOGO 0820 ON 8 DEC.

SECRET

SECRET

Copy No.

15045

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

5 SECRET

DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

ACTION: SAS 8 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1450 9 DEC/LMS)

INFO: DDP, CI/OA, RI/AN, WH 7, CC 8, VR

6537

S E C R E T 090155Z

IMMEDIATE DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7330

9 Dec 63 IN 76536

TYPIC COMMO

1. REQUEST PRITY POA TO INCLUDE COMMO TRAINING FOR [MARTA (VALDES) HERNANDEZ] SINGLE, D/O [LUCAS AND JULIA, DPOB 22 JULY 29,] MATANZAS, RESIDING [MAZON NUMBER 163] HAVANA.

2. [(VALDES)] EMPLOYED AS [STATISTICIAN] MINISTRY [HEALTH AND WELFARE] HAVANA. SHE SCHEDULED RETURN CUBA CA 20 DEC FROM MEXI WHERE RECENTLY COMPLETED LENGTHY STUDIES PROGRAM UNDER ASUSPICES [WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION.]

3. NO MEXI TRACES. INDEX.

S E C R E T

SECRET

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WE 6

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, O/OA, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

S E C R E T 140035Z

DIR INFO STOC CITE MEXI 7384 14 Dec 63 IN 80448

KEYWAY PBRUMEN [TI]CRYSTAL

REF DIR 84498

LETTERS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO: [ANGEL GUADALUPE RIVERA, HAMBURGO 78, DEPT. 302], MEXICO, D.F.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED MEXI PROVIDE LETTER DROP FOR [TI]CRYSTAL-1.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : DODS 4

INFO : DODS/L, CI/OPS, EE 4, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 140013Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7383

80439

@SOLOC WURHIN BEDOX OKROW

REF MEXI 7218 (IN 77865)*

1. JERZY PLEBANSKI GOING DALLAS 15 DEC ATTEND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON GRAVITATIONAL COLLAPSE AND OTHER TOPICS IN RELATIVISTIC ASTROPHYSICS. SYMPOSIUM UNDER AUSPICES OF SOUTHWEST CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDIES OF DALLAS AND MEETINGS TO BE HELD AT STATLER-HILTON. PLEBANSKI PLANS RETURN MEXI 18 DEC. SOURCE: PBSWING.

2. NO INDEX.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *REVIEW GOBERNACION FILE JERZY PLEBANSKI REVEALS SUBJ GRANTED PERMISSION LEAVE MEXI TO ATTEND CONFERENCES U. S.

SECRET

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, RI/AN DUMMY, C/TSD 3, C/SAS 5, VR

S E C R E T 221800Z

DIR CITE MEXI 7006

22 NOV 63 IN 66059

KAPOK PERUMEN

REF A DIR 82999* (IN 64813)

B MEXI 6967

1. PRQ DATA ON LICRAFT-1 AS FURNISHED BY BROTHER 20 NOV BEING POUCHED.

2. BROTHER FEELS SUBJ WILLING REMAIN INSIDE FORSEEABLE FUTURE. IS SENDING SUBJ ANOTHER LETTER FOR DEFINITE DECISION AND WILL INDICATE INTERESTED PARTY BEHIND AMSEVER-2 WILLING ESTABLISH TWO HUNDRED DOLLAR MONTHLY ESCROW ACCOUNT.

3. CONTACT WILL BE MAINTAINED USING PRESENT CHANNEL THROUGH NETHEMBASSY DIPLOMATIC POUCH. STATION FEELS SUBJ SHOULD BE TRAINED THROUGH THIS CHANNEL ASAP IN SW SYSTEM TO ENHANCE COMMO SECURITY.

4. SUBJ HAS ACCESS TO ALL SIGNIFICANT PLANS ACTIVITIES MINISTRY INDUSTRIES. IS FREQUENTLY CONSULTED BY ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA AND SITS IN ON ALL HIGH LEVEL PLANNING SESSIONS AT MINISTRY. WHILE KNOWN AS NOT FAVORING REGIME, IS CONSIDERED BY GUEVARA AND ASSOCIATES AS HIGHLY QUALIFIED AND CAPABLE ENGINEER WHO WILL NOT HESITATE EVALUATE SOVBLOC MACHINERY AS SUPERIOR TO AVAILABLE WESTERN ITEMS IF THUS CONVINCED.

SECRET

13532 21BR

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE [illegible] 01 [illegible] PAGE 2

5. KUBARK CONTROL WILL BE COMBINATION [illegible] AND [illegible] "CLEAR" SUBJ OF INVOLVEMENT WITH REGIME AFTER CASTRO [illegible]. BROTHER SAYS SUBJ STRONGLY PRO-PBPRIME AND FORESAW ADVENT COMMUNIST REGIME AS EARLY AS 1959 WHEN BROTHER HIMSELF WAS NOT YET CONVINCED CASTRO COMMUNIST.

6. SUBJ LOOKS LIKE EXCELLENT DIRECT LINE INTO "CHE" GUEVARA AND SHOULD BE USED ONLY FOR INFO TO WHICH HAS NORMAL ACCESS. BROTHER EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY THAT SUBJ SHOULD NEVER BE USED FOR CONTACT WITH OTHERS INSIDE NO MATTER HOW WELL SUCH PERSONS TRUSTED BY EDYCHE.

7. INDEX [201-356223].

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: [illegible] PERSON, HOW CONTACT WILL BE MAINTAINED, EXTENT OF KUBARK CONTROL, AND STATEMENT OF INTENDED USE.

13532 (p2)

VBR

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LIENVOY-8

ACTION REQUIRED; REFERENCES

1. As a result of the recent review done of the LIFEAT and LIENVOY Project, it came to Headquarters attention that LIENVOY-8, who was believed to have been terminated, was still covered by the LIENVOY Project.

2. According to HMMA-14676, LIENVOY-8 was the cause of a security problem for LIENVOY in February 1960 when he requested release from LIENVOY and a transfer to his parent organization, the [General Staff of the Presidency.] LIENVOY-8 was described as a "sour" nationalist who disapproved of ODYOKE's (sharing) of the LIENVOY take.

3. Headquarters now notes that LIENVOY-8's clearance has never been cancelled and there is no Agent Service Record or termination report in his file. LIENVOY-8 was included in the LIENVOY Project renewal request for the 1961/62 project year, but not for the 1962/63 year. The field project renewal request for the 1963/64 year included him again.

4. It is requested that the Station inform Headquarters of the present status of LIENVOY-8 (201-118406). If he has been terminated, please forward an Agent Service Record. If he is still being used, please provide a current analysis of his reliability and comments on any security probelms present in light of his actions and reputation in 1960.

END OF DISPATCH

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City

#15469

31 Oct 63

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-12027	23 October 1963
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-118406

ORIGINATING

SECRET/KAPOK

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: PRQ Part I - Alfonso Bibildox Torres

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached herewith is PRQ Part I on Subject. Provisional Operational Approval is requested, along with 201 number. Subject's cryptonym, assigned 15 October 1963 by the Station, follows under separate cover.

Willard C. Curtis

Distribution:
3 - WHD, w/att. h/w and u/s/c
2 - Files

15694

SECRET/KAPOK

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-22488	13 November 1963
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

1	4
2	5
3	6

DIRECTOR

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, VR

S E C R E T 171636Z

PRIORITY TEGU INFO DIR CITE MEXI 7416   17Dec63 IN 82479

REF DIR 88728

1. AT 16 DEC MTG [SVLUCK/1] SAID WIFE WROTE SHE ARRIVING MERIDA 23 DEC BY AIR AND WILL COME ON MEXI CITY SPEND XMAS WITH HIM. HE BELIEVES SHE BRINGING CHILDREN AND WANTS GO MERIDA MEET HER.

2. [S/1] REQUESTED 150 DOLLARS IN VIEW WIFE'S VISIT AND TO PURCHASE SANTA CLAUS FOR CHILDREN. ALSO MENTIONED XMAS BONUS BUT DID NOT PRESS POINT.

3. REQUEST TEGU DECISION ON AMOUNT BE GIVEN [S/1]. ALL PAYMENTS HERE WILL BE MADE IN PESOS.

4. [S/1] ASSIGNED BY PARTY LEADERS HERE LIVE ALONE IN HOME OF [HELIODORINA GARCIA, PCM MEMBER, CALLE NO. 17, COLONIA MONTEZUMA.] GARCIA IS DIRECTOR OF NEARBY SCHOOL WHERE FIVE PCM MEMBERS TEMPORARILY QUARTERED. [S/1]'S WIFE AND CHILDREN WILL LIVE WITH HIM AT ABOVE ADDRESS WHILE MEXI.

5. NEXT OP MTG WITH [S/1] SCHEDULED 20 DEC.

S E C R E T   C/S COMMENT: DESIRED INFO ON PRESENT STATUS SVLUCK 1 IN MEXICO AND OUTLOOK FOR NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.   Copy No.

14659

17 SECRET

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/SR 2 (SR NOTIFIED AND COPY ISSUED AT:1125, 20 DEC 63 OJ)

INFO : ADDP, C/CI, C/FI/D, CDC, VR

S E C R E T 201548Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7468 20DEC63 IN 84770

REDWOOD REDSKIN

REF DIR 90368 *

WELCOME HOS C/O. PLS PROVIDE IDEN AND ETA SO CAN MEET AIRPORT.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO CSSOP 210-501 CABLES.

**STAFFER IDENTIFIED SELF AS [RICHAIDSON] PHONED [MANUILA] WHO WAS AWAITING CALL AND WHO CONFIRMED CALL FROM MEXI.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14311

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

EE 6

CI/OA, CCS 3, WH 7, VR

S E C R E T 202255Z

CITE MEXI 7479 20Dec63 IN85191

CHASSAY LPSHRINK

MEXI 7480 (IN 85185)

SEEN IS MR. [GEORGE STEERS.]

S E C R E T

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No.

14722

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

22 SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: MEXICO CITY
ACTION: WH 8
INFO: DDP, ADDP, DODS/L, DODS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O 4, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IW, EE 4, WE 4, WH, DD/I, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, AD/RR 3, VR.

TDCS

SECRET 210030Z DEC 21 0147Z 63 IN 85247

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7489

INTEL TYPIC [DE]SIGNET

REF DIR 70123

SUPDATA SOURCE [DE]SIGNET FROM [ITALINA] AND [FRENCH] AMBASSADORS TO CUBA, CUBAN MERCHANTS AND SUGAR EXPERTS

FILED 21/0035Z

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM HMM-8185 SUBJECT EFFORTS OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO INITIATE COMMERCIAL BARTER WITH WEST EUROPEAN CONTRIES DOI DEC 63 PADA MEXICO MEXICO CITY 20 DEC 63 APR 3 SOURCE WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESSMAN WHO TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO CUBA WHERE HIS COMPANY MAINTAINS COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.

IW COMMENT:
NO DISSEMINATION OF THE ATTACHED TO PORTION OF ... HAS BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT.

TDCS PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
PRIORITY

RELEASING IWO: | DATE DISTRIBUTED: | BASED ON: LIAISON:

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

14932

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET (When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY

SUBJECT

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

REPORT NO. TDCS

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

REFERENCES IN 85247

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

1. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PAYMENT OF DEBTS RESULTING FROM EXPROPRIATIONS MADE FROM CERTAIN WESTERN EUROPEAN BUSINESS INTERESTS. THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE IS TRYING TO INTEREST WEST GERMANY, ITALY AND FRANCE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES SO THAT A FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE WILL PREVAIL AT THE TIME OF THE COMPLETION OF THE SUGAR CROP HARVEST IN MARCH 1964, WHEN THE COMMODITY IS NORMALLY MARKETED. NEGOTIATIONS FOR REPARATIONS ARE TAKING FORM IN CUBAN OFFERS TO SELL TOBACCO AT DISCOUNT PRICES.

2. IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO OBTAIN

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	CO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

TO
FROM
ACTION
INFO.
RELEASING

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TDCS

IN 85247

PAGE 2

FERTILIZER, TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS IN EXCHANGE FOR SUGAR ON A STRAIGHT BARTER DEAL. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTS A BUMPER CROP IN 1964 WHICH, IF SOLD AT THE AVERAGE WORLD PRICE OF 8 CENT A POUND (US CURRENCY), SHOULD PRODUCE ABOUT 800 MILLION DOLLARS (US) IN CREDITS.

3. FIELD COMMENT. SOURCE SAID THAT EXAMINATION OF THE CROP CONFIRMS THAT IT IS ONE OF THE BEST CUBA HAS HAD IN YEARS.

4. FIELD DISSEM STATE ECON CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

14732

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO DIRECTOR

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION C/WH 3

INFO DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FE 6, C/SAS 5

SECRET 210133Z

7492

21 DEC 63 IN 85274

A. DIR 70123

B. DIR 69575 02

KEYWAY [ ]

WHILE AWAITING RECEIPT ... [ ] ... ALONG LINES

FOLL KEYED TO REF B:

PART A:

1. DAY BEFORE HURRICANE CYNTHIA HIT CUBA, BETWEEN 500 AND ... SOVIET TECHS LEFT BY SHIP FROM SANTIAGO DE CUBA. ON 10 NOV APPROX 200 SOVS WERE SEEN WALKING STREETS HABANA WITH SUITCASES PRIOR DEBARCATION. (SOURCE [REMIGIO ...] DOI: 9 DEC).

2. ALL SOVS APPEAR TO BE TECHS, ALTHO YOUNG. MOST OBSERVED BY [ ]SIGNET HAD NO MILITARY BEARING, IN SLOPPY PHYSICAL SHAPE, ... HIS ASSUMPTION THEY CIVILIANS. FRIEND [ERIC ...] [...] LIVES ON ROAD TO PINAR DEL RIO, TOLD [ ] "SIX MONTHS ... THE SOVS DID NOT PERMIT ANYONE ... THEIR CAMP NEAR EL ... FOR THE LAST THREE MONTHS CUBAN OFFICIALS ENTER IN LARGE ... AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SOVS HAS BEEN REDUCED BY TWO ...". (SIC). ... CAMP IN SOROA CLOSED DOWN ABOUT SIX MONTHS ... IT THOUGH THEY HAVE ... (SOURCE ... ROCA).

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[illegible]). ORIGINAL CONTINGENT OF [illegible]

[illegible] ARRIVING WITH FAMILIES. (SOURCE: [ANGEL [illegible]])

[illegible] NEVER SEEN IN UNIFORM, ALL WEAR SPORT SHIRTS OF VARIOUS

[illegible], APPARENTLY CUBAN MADE. NO GUAYABERAS, OF COURSE, SINCE

[illegible] SYMBOLIC OF PLAYBOYS. IN A CAFETERIA [illegible] SAT NEXT TO TABLE

[illegible] CHINESE, ONE IN PALE BLUE TUNIC AND OTHER THREE IN

[illegible] SUITS. [illegible] SAW AND HEARD NO MENTION OF NO OTHER ASIATICS,

[illegible] SATELLITE TYPES.

[illegible]. [illegible] SAW ON 13 DEC TEN TANKS [illegible] RECOGNIZED AS SOVIET TYPE ON

[illegible] FROM MATANZAS TO VERADERO. EACH SIDE THEY HAD 5 LARGE

[illegible] AND ONE SMALLER WHEEL RAISED OFF GROUND. DOUBLE TURRETS,

[illegible] LARGE CANNON. ON 15 DEC SIX [illegible] SEEN GOING SAME DIRECTION.

[illegible] HE SAW 5 LARGE TRUCKS DRIVEN BY SOVS AND CARRYING FIVE

[illegible]. LATER SAME DAY SAW TEN MORE. ALL GOING FROM RANCHO

[illegible] AREA TOWARDS THE INTERIOR. IN ALL SAW [illegible] 250 DURING

[illegible] VISIT. ALL SOVS IN 22-28 AGE GROUP.

4. SEE TWO, ABOVE.

5. FLOW OF SOVS IS CONSISTENT WITH NEEDS CASTRO GOVT. MANY

[illegible] MANY MORE WILL COME AS NEED ARISES. TYPICAL ATTITUDE OF MAN

[illegible] STREET IS "SOVS HERE TO STAY".

6. NO INFO SOVS IN CUBAN MILITIA UNIFORMS.

[illegible] GUARANTEE FROM

[illegible] AGRESSION, ALSO CASTRO SENSITIVE TO CHARGE [illegible] SOVIET

[illegible] PROVE [illegible] INDEPENDENT, CAN VOTE AGAINST USSR

[illegible] NEEDS OF CUBA [illegible]

[illegible] THIS [illegible] LACK UNDERSTANDING REALITIES CUBA

SECRET

4/22

LIFE: NO GOC OFFICIAL OPPOSES FOR FEAR OF OWN LIFE. IN ANY EVENT, OPPOSITION WOULD HAVE NO VALUE OR MEANING. COMMON QUOTE: "FIDEL HACE Y FIDEL DESHACE".

3. SEE ONE, ABOVE.

4. NOT KNOWN, BUT CUBAN POSITION IN DISPUTE VERY INDEPENDANT, UNAFFECTED.

PART C

1. MOST OF THE MILITIA PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO ARMY REGULARS PAST SIX MONTHS.

2. UNKNOWN

3. [D] 02 IMPRESSION IS THAT CUBAN ARMY NOW WELL TRAINED AND ORGANIZED.

4. ON TEN DEC. NEAR SOROA, ALL CARS HALTED ON ROAD WHILE CONTINGENT CUBAN TROOPS SURROUNDED A CANE FIELD AND SPRAYED IT WITH GUNFIRE, SEARCHED IT, BUT FOUND NO ONE. TROOPS WELL FED AND SUPPLIED. (SOURCE: [NENITA ROCA] 05, 9 DEC). SOROA APPROX 80 KMS FROM HABANA TOWARDS PINAR DEL RIO.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: [illegible] HIGHLY INTERESTED [D] 02 [illegible] RETURN CUBA AS OBSERVER SINGLETON.

14735

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT: 6153
DATE: 21 NOV. 63

FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-

TO: MULTI - ADDRESSEE CABLE SEE BELOW

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 6

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, EE 4, WE 4, NE 4, FE 6, WH 7, VR, (POUCH FRAN 9, BONN 5, BRLN 5, MUNI 5, ATHE 6, ALL OTHER STA'S 3)

21 Nov 63 21 58z

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE INFO 15-20 15-13 15-8 15-21 CITE DIR 85387

PERUMEN (ZR)PRIMA

LOND PARI BRUS HAGU COPE STOC OSLO MADR ROME

CABLE SEC: (PLS POUCH CABLE TO FOLLOWING:) (WRENCH POUCH)

FRAN FROB BONN HAMB BRLN MUNI VIEN ATHE
BERN GNVA CAIR BEIR TEHE TELA RIOD SAOP
MEXI MRID SAGO MONT BUEN CARA LAPA LIMA
QUIT GUAT SNTO MELB TOKY HONG WAVE BARC
HELS LISB MILA OTTA TRIE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

ORIG : D. KONIS:jd
UNIT : SAS/EOB
EXT : 6153
DATE : 21 NOV. 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-47

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : CERTAIN STATIONS AND BASES

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

22 Nov 63 17 03 z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO MULTI-ADDRESSEE CABLE INFO CITE DIR 85087

RBRUMEN (ZR)PRIMA

REF: DIR 22218 *

1. RECENTLY CONCLUDED HQS REVIEW OF (ZR)PRIMA PROGRAM SHOWS THAT KUBARK EFFORTS HAVE NOT ACHIEVED ANY SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AND CONTINUATION OF PROGRAM AS SUCH NO LONGER WARRANTED. MAIN REASON FOR KUBARK FAILURE IS THAT CUBAN TECHNICIAN RECRUITING PROGRAM HAS BEEN MISERABLE FAILURE WHEN MEASURED AGAINST FIDEL'S ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF 2000 TECHS FROM WESTERN EUROPE ALONE. THOUGH OUR FIGURES NOT COMPLETE, WE ESTIMATE PROBABLY LESS THAN FIFTY CANDIDATES HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL AND WE ABLE CONFIRM ABOUT TEN WHO HAVE ACTUALLY MADE IT TO THE ISLAND. KUBARK SUCCEEDED IN INSERTING ABOUT THIRTY RECRUITED TECHS INTO THE VARIOUS HIRING CHANNELS, BUT SO FAR ONLY TWO HAVE RECEIVED CONTRACT APPROVAL FROM HAVA.

2. CUBAN FAILURE TO RECRUIT IN SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS APPEARS DUE LARGELY TO RELUCTANCE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS PURSUE TECH RECRUITING MISSION AGGRESSIVELY, BUREAUCRATIC INCOMPETENCE IN HAVANA, FEAR OF INFILTRATION OF HOSTILE AGENTS

CONT...

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

2/RV

16318

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NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

TO :
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 85387

AND PROBABLE LOSS OF INTEREST IN THE PROGRAM ON PART OF CASTRO HIMSELF. THESE FACTORS WHICH EMERGE FROM OUR STUDY OF THE CUBAN PERFORMANCE ACCOUNT FOR LACK OF RESPONSE FROM EMBASSIES TO APPLICATIONS, LONG DELAY IN GETTING WORD BACK FROM HAVANA AND SMALL NUMBER OF TECHS ULTIMATELY HIRED. LONG TIME LAG BETWEEN INITIAL APPLICATION AND ULTIMATE APPROVAL FROM HAVA, WHICH RUNS SIX TO NINE MONTHS, HAS COST CUBANS NUMBER OF TECHS WHO WERE INITIALLY EAGER BUT SUBSEQUENTLY LOST INTEREST OR TOOK OTHER JOBS.

3. IN FACE OF FOREGOING WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE TO CONTINUE INTENSIVE SEARCH FOR ZRPRIMA CANDIDATES FOR INSERTION INTO CUBAN HIRING CHANNEL. WISH STRESS STATIONS WITH ACTIVE LEADS SHOULD STAY WITH THEM IN THE HOPE THEY MAY STILL BE HIRED, BUT CEASE EFFORTS TO GENERATE LEADS FROM SCRATCH. ON OTHER HAND, THERE ARE FAIR NUMBER NON BLOC TECHS IN CUBA AND IT LIKELY CUBANS WILL CONTINUE TO HIRE NEEDED TECHS ON LIMITED SELECTIVE BASIS AS THEY DID PRIOR TO ZRPRIMA PROGRAM. STATIONS THEREFORE ARE URGED TO CONTINUE ON ALERT FOR SUCH OPPORTUNITIES AND TO EXPLOIT THEM IN SAME MANNER AS ALL OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO PLACE RESIDENT AGENTS IN CUBA.

CONT...

RELEASING | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

16318

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FROM: DIRECTOR

PAGE THREE

CITE DIR 85387

IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT MOST PBRUMEN OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECRUITING TECHS TEND TO RELY HEAVILY ON LOCAL CP STAMP OF APPROVAL OR OTHER STRONG INDICATION THAT CANDIDATE IS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. LACKING THIS THEY MAY EITHER IGNORE THE APPLICATION OR REJECT IT.

4. RESPONSE OF MOST STATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING ZRPRIMA HAS BEEN MOST GRATIFYING. WE PROVIDED CUBANS WITH GOOD NUMBER HIGHLY QUALIFIED ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS WHICH THEY FOR REASONS CITED UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO ACCEPT. KUBARK HAS MADE A RESPECTABLE EFFORT TO EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY AND FACT THAT WE HAVE NOT ACHIEVED SIGNIFICANT RESULTS IS MERELY REFLECTION CUBAN CONFUSION AND INEPTITUDE WITH RESULTANT FAILURE ACHIEVE THEIR OWN GOALS.

5. DISCONTINUE USE ZRPRIMA SLUG AND FILE 200-120-47.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *Cable pre-dates CS files. Copy may be seen in CIA reference file.

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

16318

14-00000

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

PAGE FOUR

TO INFO CITE 85387

SAS/EOB

SAS/MOB

WE/5 R C Locke

C/WE Thomas F. Thiele

AC/EE

C/EE/

C/

C/FE

WILLIAM D. O'RYAN
C/WE

C/TAS

SECRET

16318

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: ..., CI/AN DUMMY, C/WH 2, D/OS 2, /VR

ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

KUDESK ZROCEAN

65974

RE DIR-

IDEN A [RUREK DUDIN 201-83827.]

IDEN B [ARLETTE FRANCOISE MEZARIFEND ALIAS CARTIER BORN 2 MARCH 36 PARIS FRANCE.]

END OF MESSAGE

(Please cross-ref to attached outgoing)

C/S COMMENT: *DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO RYBAT ZROCEAN CABLES.

C/WH C/WH/3 DC/CI

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

16349

UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 30 SEPT 1963

SECRET

TO : MEXICO-ROME WAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WE 2
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

1 OCT 63 18 53z

X ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO ROME WAVE CITE DIR

KAPOK KEYWAY PBRUMEN 72346

REF: ROME C534 (IN 28856)* (NOT SENT MEXI)

1. [DESIGHET] (IDEN A), FORMER LONG TERM RESIDENT PBRUMEN, WILL RETURN PBRUMEN ON BUSINESS TRIP FOR IDEN B. LATTER IS FIRM HE REPRESENTED ALONG WITH OTHERS. PLANS DEPART ITALY 6 OCT TO VISIT FRIENDS SUISSE THEN PROCEEDING MADRID TO TAKE IBERIA FLIGHT DIRECT PBRUMEN 11 OCT HAS [ITAL] SERVICE PASSPORT. WILL ATTEMPT EXIT PBRUMEN APPROX TWO WEEKS AFTER ARRIVAL FOR BRIEF TRIP MEXI FOR DEBRIEFING BRIEFING BY KUBARKER. HOPES RETURN PBRUMEN FOR TWO OR THREE MONTHS MORE.

2. REQ MEXI CABLE ROME CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS FOR PASSAGE [DESIGHET] PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. HQS FORWARDING MEXI FULL DETAILS THIS OP.

END OF MESSAGE

* [DESIGHET] will travel PBRUMEN; requests contact Mexico City for brief exit.

WE/5
SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
C/WE/3
C/WE/4

15344

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

03

ORIG : STEPHEN I. MUNGER/AVH
UNIT : DC/WE/4/X
EXT : 5559
DATE : 30 SEPT 1963

SECRET

TO : MEXICO ROME WAVE
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/WE 2
INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

XX ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO ROME WAVE CITE DIR

72347

KAPOK KEYWAY PBRUMEN

REF: DIR 72346

IDEN A [GIULIO MONDELLO], BORN 26 FEB 1917 IN [ITALY], [ITAL] CITIZEN, FORMERLY AGENT IN CUBA FOR [FIAT] AND OWNER TV TUBE FACTORY.

IDEN B [NEBIOLO] (LINOTYPE) FIRM, TURIN

END OF MESSAGE

WE/5
SAS/EOB
SAS/MOB
C/WH/3

15345

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: W. [illegible]/bib
UNIT: SAS/EOB
EXT: 7646
DATE: 30 SEPT 63

INDEX
X NO INDEX
X FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-733547 201-338838

TO: JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/SAS 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, RI/AN DUMMY, C/WH 5, RF, VR

1 Oct 63

TO WAVE INFO MEXI CITE DIR 72383

RYBAT TYPIC

REF: WAVE 4369 (IN 20073)*

[JOSE LUIS (ZALA)] SUBJ PARA 4 REF, RESIDENCE [ULTIMAS NOVEDADES S.A.,] [illegible] 37-219 MEXI IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH [JOSE LUIS (ZALA)] 201-338838, SAME ADDRESS WHO CURRENTLY REGISTERED ANOTHER SERVICE. 201 FILE CONTAINS NO OTHER INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/COMMENT: *Ref is RYBAT.

SAS/EOB [signature]
SAS/EOB [signature]
SAS/CI Austin Horn (in draft)
WH/3/MEXI [Whiten] (by phone)

[signature]
DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[signature]
J. K. KING
C/SAS/INTEL.
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

315348

104-10100-10152 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

[Manuel Aragon]
CA/35
5352
8 October 1963

PARIS/LCPIPIT INFO MEXICO CITY

PALP [illegible]

DYVOUR IC [LCPIPIT]

REF DIR 74062

IDENTITY

IDEN A [ALFONSO DIBILDOX] [PRESIDENT CHB]

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/CA

WH/3/MEXI

CABLE SECRETARIAT: PLEASE ATTACHED CABLE.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

See Base for release

C/CA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[illegible] G. CABLE
C/CA/35
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

15538

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG D. RONIS : tw
UNIT SAS/EOB
EXT :6172
DATE :8 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 19-6-78

ROUTING

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TO MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, RF, VR

8 OCT 63 ... 15 z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO PRITY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 74184

TYPIC AMLONG

IDENTITY A [ALFREDO DAVINS]

IDENTITY B [... RONIS]

END OF MESSAGE

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

C/WH/3 [signature]

J. C. KING
C/WHD

[...] A. [...]
C/SAS/EOB

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

15543

DW/3

R. Lehman/ER
SAS/FE
4596
10 Oct 63

SECRET
201-
354405

MEXICO CITY

INFO: CI/OA, WH 7, RF, VR

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 74976

TYPIC AMSOUR

1. LETTER TO AMSOUR-2 BEING POUCHED MEXI BY NON ACCOUNTABLE MANIFEST NO. 577054 FOR MAILING TO SR. (JUAN GOMEZ BLANCO) IN PERUMEN.

2. REQUEST MEXI MAIL O/A 1 NOVEMBER AND ADVISE HQS ACCORDINGLY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SAS/EOB
WH/3 MEXI
C/WH/3

J. C. KING
C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

10-10

SECRET

E. A. MAHER
C/SAS/EOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

15871

106/14 OCT 63/CS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET/RYBAT

ROUTING

TO: BRUSSELS HAMBURG FRANKFURT HAGUE MADRID PARIS LONDON

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/SAS 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, RF, VR
ADDED: C/AF 3, C/WH 5, RF, VR

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO BRUS INFO HAMB FRAN HAGU MADR (ROUTINE) PARI LOND DIR 75124

RYBAT KEYWAY PBRUMEN ZRWAGON

REF: BRUS 3460 (IN 38151)* (NOT SENT PARIS AND LOND)

1. HURRICANE FLORA DAMAGE TO CUBA WILL PROBABLY RESULT HEAVY CONCENTRATION FOOD AND MEDICINE IN MARITIME CARGOES TO CUBA, THUS ALTERING PERCENTAGES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ANY SABOTAGE OPS AGAINST CUBAN SHIPPING. WISH EFFECT MORATORIUM SABOTAGE OPS UNTIL THIS FACTOR DISAPPEARS AND USE INTERVAL TO MAKE CERTAIN CHANGES IN APPROACH.

2. FURTHER GUIDANCE FORTHCOMING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/Comments: * Plans for sabotaging Rio Cronso.

TSD/CAB [Wally Jones] by phone
WE/2 [Jack Delaney] by phone
WE/5 [Vaughn Alleman] in draft
WE/3 [Roger Prent] By phone
WE/BC ... Young (By ...)
EE/G [West Porter] by phone

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

THOMAS THIELE
C/WE/INT

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EDWARD A. MAREQUIE (?)
C/SAS/...
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET/RYBAT

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

15878

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: BECKY FRANK
UNIT: FE/CIOP
EXT: 5662
DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1963

INDEX / NO INDEX / FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-736761

SECRET

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/FE 6

INFO: ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, VR

DEFERRED / ROUTINE

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

KAPOK LCHARVEST

REF MEXI 6483 (IN 38148)*

1. LIANG SZU CH'ENG 2733 1835 2052, 201-736761 BORN 1901, TOKYO. LANGUAGE ENGLISH. MEMBER CCP.

BACKGROUND:

1923 BA TSINGHUA UNIV

28 BA, MA UNIV PENN

28 MA HARVARD

28-31 PROF AT NATIONAL NORTHEASTERN UNIV, CHINA

31-41 RESEARCH FELLOW, INSTITUTE/CHINESE ARCHITEC URE.

32-33 PROF NATIONAL PEKING UNIV; PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING

41-43 RESEARCH FELLOW, ACADEMIA SINICA

46 PROF NATIONAL TSINGHUA UNIV, PEKING

47 HONORARY PHD YALE; VISITING PROF YALE

50-61 MEMBER OF TSINGHUA UNIV

53-61 HEAD OF DEPT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING AND ARCHITECTURE, TSINGHUA; VICE PRESIDENT ARCHITECTURE SOCIETY

(CONTINUED)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

15912

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : BERRY FRANK
UNIT : FE/CIOB
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 October 1963

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[ ] NO INDEX
[ ] FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

56 ASSOC, INSTITUTE CIVIL AND ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEERING, ACADEMY OF SCIENCES CPR, PEKING

DEC 58 MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, THIRD CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHINA DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE

SEP 58 MEMBER NATIONAL COMMITTEE CHINA SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ASSOC

APR 59 DEPUTY SECOND NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS FROM PEKING; MEMBER STANDING COMMITTEE, THIRD NATIONAL COMMITTEE CPPCC

OCT 6? VICE CHAIRMAN CHINA ARCHITECTURAL SOCIETY

SEP 63 DEPUTY LEADER OF CPR DELEGATION TO SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ARCHITECTS, HAVANA

2. RE SELF CRITICISM FOLLOWING EXTRACTS FROM LIANG'S SPEECH TO THE NPC, JULY 13 1957 ENTITLED "WHY I LOVE OUR PARTY". DEPUTY LIANG, AFTER DESCRIBING "THE BRILLIANT INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF OUR NATION," TOLD OF HIS PAST ANXIETY AND PERPLEXITY IN HIS OWN WORK. HE SAID THAT AT THE TIME HE HAD USED OUT-DATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES TO TEACH THE YOUNG INSTRUCTORS AND STUDENTS OF THE TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY BECAUSE HE WAS BOTHERED

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : [redacted]
UNIT : FE/CIOP
EXT : 5661
DATE : 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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3		6	

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO   INFO   CITE DIR

IMMEDIATE MEXI

BY THE STATEMENT THAT EVERYTHING OF THE PARTY WAS GOOD. HE SAID THAT AFTER HE HAD WRITTEN ARTICLES, MADE REPORTS, AND DELIVERED LECTURES ON HIS ANTIQUATED ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES, HE SUDDENLY DISCOVERED THAT HE WAS A NATIONAL TARGET FOR REFUTATION. HE SAID "I WAS DOWNHEARTED. I HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE PARTY. I WAS SURE I WAS BEING SUBJECTED TO CRITICISM BECAUSE MY ARCHITECTURAL THEORIES DID NOT FIT INTO THE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. MY PAIN WAS AS DEEP AS THAT OF A CHILD BEING PUNISHED BY HIS MOTHER. WHY? BECAUSE I TRUSTED OUR PARTY AS MUCH AS I HAD TRUSTED MY MOTHER. THE PARTY, HOWEVER, WAS VERY PATIENT WITH ME. AFTER I HAD STRAIGHTENED OUT MY THOUGHTS, I ADMITTED MY MISTAKES." HE SAID: "I WAS A PRODIGAL SON. AFTER THIS EDUCATION, I WILL NEVER LEAVE OUR PARTY --- NOT EVEN A STEP AWAY FROM IT."

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
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Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: [illegible] FRANK
UNIT: FE/CTOP
EXT: 5661
DATE: 12 OCTOBER 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

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3		6	

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE FOUR

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO CITE DIR 75338

3. STPLATE 1 (IDEN) WAS STUDENT UNDER LIANG AT UNIV [illegible] OF OPINION THAT LIANG WOULD NOT ACCEPT RECRUITMENT IN PLACE BUT THERE IS CHANCE HE WOULD DEFECT IF OFFERED CHANCE LIVE OUTSIDE CHINA. HQS CONSIDERS LIANG [illegible] CANDIDATE FOR [illegible] OR [illegible]. DOUBTFUL DUE AGE AND BACKGROUND THAT [illegible] WOULD MAKE GOOD IN PLACE AGENT.

4. SENDING STPLATE 1 TO WORK UNDER STATION DIRECTION AS A POSSIBLE BRIDGE TO LIANG. STPLATE 1 LONG TIME KUBARK CONTACT BUT IS NOT TRAINED CASE OFFICER. HAS BEEN USED PRINCIPALLY IN RESEARCH WORK IN PAST. SANSEED ~~CAN~~ MAY BE FILL [illegible] FURTHER BACKGROUND.

5. STPLATE 1 WILL USE TOURIST COVER AND WILL REMAIN ONLY TWO DAYS DUE HEAVY PERSONAL COMMITMENTS. HIS FUNCTION WILL BE TO USE PAST FRIENDSHIP TO ATTEMPT ESTABLISH CONTACT LIANG AND DETERMINE WHETHER LIANG INTERESTED DEFECTION. IF SO STATION SHOULD BE PREPARED SAFEHOUSE UNTIL FURTHER STEPS CAN BE TAKEN.

6. STPLATE 1 ARRIVING MEXI 12 OCTOBER 2145 HOURS VIA EASTERN AIR LINES FLITE 305. HAVE BRIEFED HIM WILL BE MET BY SANSEED. STPLATE 1

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Copy No.

14-00000

[illegible] FRANK
FE/CIOP
[illegible] 5661
12 OCTOBER 1963

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IN CS FILE NO

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

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DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE FIVE

INFO

CITE DIR

IMMEDIATE MEXI

WILL WEAR RED WHITE BLUE TIE. IF CONTACT MISSED STPLATE 1 TO PROCEED CITY AND CONTACT MARINE GUARD AT EMBASSY ASKING FOR SANBEED. AUTHORIZE STATION ADVANCE OPERATIONAL FUNDS AND PER DIEM AS NECESSARY TO STPLATE 1 SINCE NO OPPORTUNITY DO SO HERE. CHARGE LCHARVEST OOA.

END OF MESSAGE

FI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)

DC/PSD/OS Steve Kuhn (by phone)

CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)

DCFE(C) ✓

C/WH/3 J. Whitten (by phone)

William C[illegible]
CFE

RAYFORD [illegible] HERBERT
DC/WHD

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FE/CIOP
6738
OCTOBER

201-730711

MEXICO CITY

C/FE 6

C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WH 5, D/OS 2, RF, VR

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 75339

IMMEDIATE MEXI

KAPOK LCHARVEST

REF DIR 75338

LIEN:

RICHARD WALKER, Chairman, DEPARTMENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

FI Staff Lloyd George (by phone)

DC PSD/OS Steve Kuhn (by phone)

CI Staff Mr. Mertz (by phone)

C/CI(C)

C WH/3 (by phone)

William Colby
C, FE

SECRET

15913

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: FRANK/MICKUM:bjl
UNIT: FE/CIOP
EXT: 5661
DATE: 16 OCTOBER 1963

INDEX / NO INDEX
FILE NO 10-120-11

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

16 OCT 63 22

TO: RIO DE JANEIRO, MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/FE 6
INFO: DDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/D 4, CDC, C/WH 5, RF, VR

DEFERRED SIG CEN
ROUTINE

TO PRIORITY RIOD INFO PRIORITY MEXI CITE DIR 76166

REF: MEXI 6550 (IN 40823)* (NOT SENT RIO)

LCHARVEST KAPOK

1. FOR RIO: SOME MEMBERS OF CHICOM DELEGATION TO THE SEVENTH CONGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ARCHITECTS (UIA) HELD HAVANA 29 SEPT - 3 OCT AFTERWARDS WENT MEXI TO ATTEND UIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ARCHITECTURE. MEXI GROUP NOW SCHEDULED LEAVE MEXI 0100 HOURS 19 OCT FOR RIO. FOLLOWING BIO DATA ON THREE MEMBERS OF GROUP KNOWN TO BE MEXI:

A. YANG TING-PAO 2799 1694 1405, 201-735346; B. 20 AUG 1901, HONAN; U.S. EDUCATED; MBR NPC; MBR ACADEMIA SINICA; VP, UIA.

B. LIANG SZU-CHENG 2733 1835 2052, 201-736781; B. 1901, TOKYO; U.S. EDUCATED; MBR CCP; DEPUTY NPC AND CPPCC; VICE CHAIRMAN CHINA ARCHITECTURAL SOCIETY.

C. WU CHING-HSIANG 0702 2529 4382, 201-736317; B. CIRCA 1919, MANCHURIA; FRENCH EDUCATED; CHAIRMAN ARCHITECTURE DEPT TUNG CHI UNIV, SHANGHAI.

2. DURING STAY GROUP MEXI UNILATERAL APPROACHES MADE TO YANG TING-PAO AND LIANG SZU-CHENG FOR PURPOSES OF ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLE DEBRIEFING, DEFECTION OR RECRUITMENT IN PLACE. FOLLOWING CONTACTS WITH YANG BY FORMER PARTNER IN ARCHITECTURAL FIRM CHINA AND BY MBR U.S. FIRM YANG PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH, YANG ACCEPTED INTERVIEW WITH KUBARK STAFFER WHO USED COVER

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

16074

ORIG : [illegible]
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 76166

RESEARCH SCHOLAR CHINA. CONVERSATION FRIENDLY AND INCLUDED DISCUSSION MAINLAND SITUATION. LIANG APPROACHED BY KUBARK CONTROLLED U.S. SINOLOGIST WHO WAS STUDENT LIANG AT YALE 1947. CONTACT WITH LIANG KNOWN TO OTHER CHICOMS IN DELEGATION, ALTHO LIANG LEFT ALONE WITH OUR MAN FOR HALF HOUR. LIANG ATTITUDE FRIENDLY BUT SEEMED TO FOLLOW PREARRANGED LINE AND LIANG PROFESSED COMPLETE BELIEF CHINESE COMMUNISM. LIANG CLAIMED CONTACT BETWEEN CHINESE AND AMERICAN "FRIENDS" CONSIDERED HIGHLY DESIRABLE BY CHINESE. CONTACTS WITH BOTH LIANG AND YANG LIMITED TO FRIENDLY DISCUSSIONS SINCE OPERATIONAL DISCUSSION DID NOT SEEM APPROPRIATE IN EITHER CASE.

3. WU'S BROTHER, U.S, CITIZEN, ARRIVING MEXICO 16 OCTOBER TO TALK WITH WU AND ASK HIM IF WISHES REMAIN IN FREE WORLD.

4. REQUEST RIOD MONITOR ACTIVITIES GROUP BRAZIL AS FEASIBLE AND ATTEMPT DEVELOP FURTHER BIO AND ASSESSMENT DATA IF NATURAL ACCESS TO GROUP CAN BE FOUND. DO NOT RECOMMEND FORCED APPROACH TO ANY OF GROUP, SINCE OUR COVER FOR THIS ACTIVITY WEARING THIN AND THERE IS LONG RANGE GOAL OF FUTURE FOLLOW UP THESE CONTACTS WHEN APPROPRIATE ACCESS CAN BE ARRANGED.

CONTINUED

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : FRANK/MICKUM:bjl
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO

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DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE DIR 76166

5. FOR MEX 3: PLS IDENTIFY OTHER MBRS OF MEXI GROUP ENROUTE RIOD AND FORWARD TO RIOD ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON PURPOSE TRIP TO RIOD. ALSO INFORM RIOD OF RESULTS WU MEETING WITH BROTHER.

END OF MESSAGE

A/DCFE(C) ✓

WH/3

WH/5

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WH

RELEASING OFFICER

WILLIAM E. COLBY
C/FE

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Polly Pike
WH/LOG
7282
16 October 1963

Mexico City

DIRECTOR

WH 8

OL 4, RF, VR

18 OCT 63 15 27z

SIG CEN

MEXI INFO [MIDW] CITE DIR 76566

REF: MEXI 6547 (IN 40710)*

[MIDW] 3207 (NOT SENT MEXI)

[MIDW] ADVISES CARTRIDGES DELIVERED CORPUS CHRISTI 1 OCTOBER ONE BOX FIFTY POUNDS CARGO 64-M51104 MDIF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: *Requests Hdqs advise action taken on Reqn 559-5-64.

C/WH/3

Telecoord: OL/TD/CB, Mr. Daly

WILLIAM E. BROOKS
CHIEF, WH SUPPORT
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CHARLES F. REINER
ACTING CHIEF, WH LOGISTICS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

16102

ORIG: [R. HANSEN]
UNIT: SAS/EOB
EXT: 6172
DATE: 18 OCT 1963

SECRET

201 77541

TO: MEXICO JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

18 OCT 63 22z

SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO WAVE 76695

TYPIC

REF DIR 76694 05

IDEN IS [MICHEL CHIDIAC, LEBANESE] CHARGE IN HAVANA. SEE MEXI 5954 AND 6008 FOR RECENT TRAVEL.

SAS/MOB Sue Darling (in draft)

WH/3/MEXI Reichhardt

EDWARD A. MAREL
C/SAS/EOB
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

C/SAS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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#15408

L.G. NORRIS:jpm
WH/3/Mexico
5840
21 Oct 1963

SECRET

MEXICO CITY

77180

PRIORITY MEXI

LILINK

REF DIR 77179

1. IDEN A: ASH & COMPANY, NEW 420 LEXINGTON AVE NEW YORK, N.Y.

2. IDEN B: OVERSEAS REALTY SURVEY ASSOCIATES SEATTLE WASHINGTON (KUVEST NOTIONAL)

END OF MESSAGE

J.C. KING
CWH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. WHITTEN
CWH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

15494

03

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[JANET NIXON]

SAS/EOB

3169

22 OCT 63

SECRET/RYBAT

200-120-50

MADRID JMWAVE ROME CASABLANCA RABAT FRANKFURT HAMBURG BRUSSELS HAGUE LONDON MILAN OTTAWA PARIS MEXICO CITY

DIRECTOR

C/SAS 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/AF 3, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, C/WH 5, RF, VR

22 0 ... 47Z

SIG CEN

IMMEDIATE MADR INFO HAMB BRUS HAGU LOND CASB (ROUTINE) ... OTTA PARI MEXI

WAVE ROME

FRAN MILA

RYBAT ZRWAGON TECH

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

77347

1. FOLLOWING IS FBIS TICKER ITEM FROM CASTRO'S 21 OCTOBER SPEECH: "CASTRO REVEALS THAT HIS SECURITY FORCES HAVE JUST DISCOVERED AN ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE OF THE CUBAN MERCHANT SHIP LAS VILLAS. CASTRO CLAIMS THAT THE CIA PLACED A BOMB ABOARD THE VESSEL IN GENOA, ITALY, BUT THAT IT WAS DEFECTIVE AND FAILED TO GO OFF. THE BOMB WAS FOUND, HE SAYS, WHEN THE SHIP WAS BEING UNLOADED."

2. KUBARK POLICY IS NO COMMENT AND COMPLETE DENIAL IF SPECIFICALLY ASKED.

END OF MESSAGE

WE/G [West Parker] by phone
WE/2 Jack Delaney by phone
WE/4 [Steve Bunger] by phone
WE/5 [Vaughn Sherman] by phone
WE/BC [Joe Lynch] by phone
SAS/SOD [Arthur Maloney] by phone
... Austin Jones by phone
AF/1 [Mr. Charles Baker] by phone
WE/BC/C [R. J...r] by phone
WE/3 Mr. [Pierre] by phone
WE/3 Mr. [M...gy] by phone

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

RICHARD P. HANES
C/WE/X

EDWARD A. MCELLIUS
C/SAS/EOB

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — SECRET/RYBAT — GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

#15498

B. E. Reichhardt
ACWH/3
30 Oct 63

SECRET

MEXICO CITY

3 Oct 63 19 z

79359

MEXI

RYBAT

1. HDQS HAS INFO TO EFFECT [HILTON HOTELS] INTERNATIONAL SEEKING QUALIFIED PERSON AS PUBREL DIRECTOR FOR MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA. [illegible] GOOD POSSIBILITY WE BE ABLE PLACE [illegible] THAT POSITION

2. REQUEST STATION COMMENTS RE UTILITY THIS COVER IN TERMS TARGET ACCESS AND QUALIFICATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SUITABLE OFFICER TO FILL COVER POSITION.

END OF MESSAGE

CCG/SC - Mr. Strange (phone)

CWH/Pers - Mr. Cashman (phone)

R. HERBERT
DC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

B. E. REICHHARDT
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

Copy No.

#15826

MEXICO CITY

81033

MEXI

RYBAT TYPIC AMQUAR MHAPRON

REFS: A. DIR 78270

B. DIR 78271

PLS PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMQUAR 1 AT REF ADDRESS AND PROVIDE HIM SECURE COMMO CHANNEL FOR ANY MESSAGE HE DESIRES SEND TO HIS HQS CONTACT MATTHEW H. ONTRICH KNOWN TO AMQUAR 1 AS "DAVID SALAS".

"1. BE ASSURED NOTHING WILL BE DONE IN REGARD CONTACTING DAVILES UNTIL CLEARED WITH YOU. REQUEST YOU ALSO DO NOTHING UNTIL COORDINATED WITH US. BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR YOU TRY ARRANGE THREE TO SIX MONTHS LEAVE OF ABSENCE WHICH YOU CAN EXTEND IF NECESSARY.

2. HAVE ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH [LUIS CASAS CAMPA] WHO SAILING ON CUBAN SHIP. NEXT TIME [LUIS] AVAILABLE FOR CONTACT IN PORT OUTSIDE CUBA DESIRE YOU BE PREPARED TRAVEL TO THAT LOCATION FOR PERSONAL CONTACT WITH HIM.

3. PERSON WHO DELIVERS THIS MESSAGE WILL ALSO PROVIDE A SECURE COMMO CHANNEL TO MR. DAVID".

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/3

WH/3/MEXI

J. C. KING
C/WHD

EDWARD A. HARELL
C/SAS/EOB

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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16114

R. S. SCOTT
WH/3/MEXICO
3940
6 NOVEMBER 1963

SECRET

TO: MEXO MERIDA MEXICO CITY

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS 5, VR

TO MRID INFO MEXI CITE DIR 81481

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REF: MRID 0312 (IN 53124)

1. ODCOIL MEXI SHOULD BE GIVEN LEAD ON MILTON LYNN, AVOIDING KUBARK INVOLVEMENT THIS CASE.

2. NO TRACES ERNESTO ABREU GOMEZ. AGREE HE IS TARGET FOR DEVELOPMENT FOR PBRUMEN OPERATIONS. INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ABREU GOMEZ ON LYNN CASE AND POSSIBLY LATER INTRODUCTION TO ODCOIL AGENT MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPING RAPPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref reported U.S. citizen LYNN told Merida police chief of drugs case. Chief suggested U.S. agent be inserted in net. Merida wishes develop Chief ABREU for PBRUMEN ops.

SAS/EOB Ronis (In Draft)

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

B. REICHHARDT
AC/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TO: MEXICO CITY PANAMA CITY RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/O 4, VR

TO MEXI FOR [illegible] INFO PACY RIOD (ROUTINE) CITE DIR 81525

(IMMEDIATE)

1. [ENGINEERING] TOLD [BOIZELLE] HE PROVIDING CR$ 5,000,000 TO [ARI CAMPISTA] [PRESIDENT GUANABARA CHEMICAL WORKERS FEDERATION] THRU [RIO] [TEMOODCAP] OFFICE FOR USE IN DECEMBER [CNTI] ELECTIONS. [CAMPISTA] USING FUNDS GAIN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC SLATE, HOWEVER DEMOCRATIC GROUP NOT ABLE AGREE ON SLATE NOR WHO TO HEAD IT.

2. REQUEST OF DETAILS FROM [ENGINEERING] AS RIOD DEVELOPING PARALLEL ELECTION OP AND ANXIOUS AVOID CONFLICT OR COMPETITION AMONG DEMOCRATS. BELIEVE [ENGINEERING] OP NOT NECESSARILY COUNTERING RIOD PLAN BUT NEED CLARIFICATION.

3. FYI RIOD PREPARING PROVIDE FUNDS TO [HUGO GOMES DA COSTA,] [OF ALCOHOL AND SUGAR WORKERS] WHO NAMED AS MEMBER OF [CAMPISTA'S] DEMOCRATIC GROUP.

END OF MESSAGE

CA/4 Mr. [Ozga] (in draft)

WH/3/Mexico

WH/CA

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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J. B. NOLAND
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

15247

S E C R E T

201 160161

MEXICO CITY

SIG CEN

MEXI

CITE DIR 81778

PBRUMEN

REFS: A. HMMA-22285*

B. DIR 69900**

1. RE PARA THREE B REF A [RAQUEL PEDROSA DE LEIVA] WHO NOW RESIDING MEXI AND FRIEND OF LI[TAMIL 2] FAMILY, VERY PROBABLY WIFE OF [ENIO LEYVA FUENTES] WHO CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY LI[TAMILS] AND IMPORTANT RECRUITMENT/DEFECTION TARGET. AMSIP 1 WHO FORMER CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER MENTIONED PARA ONE REF B, FORMER CLOSE FRIEND OF [LEYVA] DESCRIBES HIM AS NON COMMUNIST AND PROBABLY WILLING COOPERATE WITH ANTI GOC ELEMENTS.

2. REQUEST MEXI EXPLORE POSSIBILITY UTILIZING [PEDROSA] AS LEAD TO [LEYVA].

3. HQS TRACES [PEDROSA] NEGATIVE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS Comment: *LI[TAMIL-2] Report
**Ref KYBAT

AC/SAS/CI [signature]

SAS/EOB Mr. Bonie (in draft)

WH/3/Mexi [signature]

J. C. KING
C/WHD

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

S E C R E T

15253

(SEE BELOW)

SECRET

PRIORITY

CITE DIR 91024

PRITY ABON BOGO BRIL BUEN YOGU PACY
GORG GUAT GAYA LAPA LIMA
MANA MEXI MRID PRIN QUIT
RECI SAGO SALV SAOP SJOS
SDOM TEGU

OOLONG

BOOK MESSAGE AMCA NET

WITH CHIEF MISSION AND COS CONCURRENCE, ADDEES MAY OBSERVE SAME OFFICE HOURS AS COVER MISSION. SET SELCAL PLUS MONITOR YOGU CQ/QRA AT 2300Z. STATIONS WITHOUT SELCAL MONITOR 2300Z CQ. ALL STATIONS WITH RESIDENCE RECEIVERS MONITOR WITHIN CAPABILITY DURING CLOSURE PERIOD.

END OF MESSAGE

D/CO

SECRET

#15729

Samuel Halpern
SAS/EOB
7896
24 Dec. 1962

SECRET

26 Dec 62 16 26z

MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/SAS 5

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/WE 2, C/WH 5, VR (6)

TO MEXI INFO WAVE CITE DIR 91222

RYBAT TYPIC

FYI: JOURNALIST NAMED FRANK PILGRIM REPRESENTING OBSERVER AND MANCHESTER GUARDIAN PLANNING ATTEND CUBAN ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS 1 JANUARY. PLANS LEAVE CUBA FIRST WEEK OF JAN PROBABLY CUBANA TO MEXICO. SMOTH HAS REQUESTED KUBARK NOT ATTEMPT CONTACT. KUBARK WILL RECEIVE DEBRIEFING RESULTS, IF ANY, FROM SMOTH.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/EOB [signature]

SAS/MOB [signature]

WH/3/MEXICO [signature]

C/WH [signature]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

#15734

SECRET

ROME PRIORITY

TO: PRIORITY ROME MEXI, SALV

CITE DIR 83692

REF: SALV 4839 (IN 63096)

IF PCI DOES NOT GIVE DEVISTA-1 CONTACTS IN SALV, STATION SHOULD PASS TO DEVISTA-1 ONLY FIRST FOUR NAMES OF ABOVE REF.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/COMMENT: Suggested Communists as possible contacts DEVISTA-1

C/WH/3

WE/Italy S. Munger

WH/3/MEXI

WH/3/CAN

C/WH
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. C. KING
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

15772

19-132-5

MEXICO CITY

SAS 5

DCP, ADCP,

MEXI

KUBAT TYPIC

86284

REF: DIR 86283

IDEN A: FERNANDO PALENZUELA VAQUET
SON OF MATEO AND JOSEFA
DPOB 9 NOV 1903 ARTEMISA, PINAR DEL
RIO, CUBA, 5'7" BROWN EYES, GRAY
HAIR, PASSPORT No. 45809, RESIDENT OF
AVENIDA 35 No. 9809, MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN B: MARIA FRANCISCA CRESPO FALCON
DAUGHTER OF ARTURO AND JOSEFINA
DPOB 28 NOV 1914 GUIRA DE MELENA, HABANA, CUBA
5'0" BROWN EYES/HAIR PASSPORT No. 28149,
RESIDENT OF AVENIDA 35 No. 9809
MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN C: HOWARD ANDERSON

SAS/SEC MKH for G.L.

WH/3/MEXI

C/WH/3

J. C. KING
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

15935

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S-E-C-R-E-T

6055

2 DECEMBER 1963

FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO: MEXICO CITY BOGOTA LIMA GUATEMALA JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, WH 7, VR

DEFERRED

X ROUTINE

TO MEXI BOGO LIMA GUAT INFO WAVE CITE DIR

REF: DIR 86693

86694

IDEN: GRACE HOLMES, P.O.BOX 1767, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SAS/ ... /PROP

A. A. MALONEY
C/SAS/MOB

S-E-C-R-E-T

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15951

[illegible] MESSAGE

TO : [illegible] [illegible]

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : FE 6

INFO : DDP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, WH 7, SAS 8, VR

TO [illegible] INFO [illegible] CITE DIR 86803

[illegible]

REF DIR 86802

1. IDEN A MR. [illegible] WATANABE.

2. IDEN B MR. [illegible] K. SUZUKI, TRANS PACIFIC COMMERCE CONSULTANTS, SUITE 315, 450 SUTTER STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. TELEPHONE DOUGLAS 2-6534.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/3/[illegible]

WILLIAM [illegible] COLBY

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

15958

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Manuel Aragon
CA/B5
5852
5 December 1963

SECRET
200-124-73/3

TO : PARIS/LCPIPIT INFO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4

INFO : CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS 2, ... 2,

TO PALP INFO MEXI 87038

BIDORIC HBEPITOME

REF: MONT 8437 (IN 72721) RELATED MEXI

1. FOR MEXI: HQS ANS TO REF SAID: A) AGREE MONT THAT CASTROISTA CONTROLLED FEUU UNACCEPTABLE AS HOST FOR COSEC EVENT B) INTENT OF OCT 11 COSEC LETTER WAS TO OPEN POSSIBILITY MOVING EVENT TO NEW BUT NOT YET DETERMINED SITE, C) COSEC LETTER WAS AUTHORIZED BY SEPT SUPERVISION COMMITTEE (SUP COM) MEETING WHICH BLAMED FEUU FOR FAILURE HOLD EVENT AND TOLD COSEC TO SEEK ANOTHER SITE.

2. FOR PALP: FOLL SUMMARIZES HQS UNDERSTANDING LATIN AMERICAN STUDY SEMINAR (LASS) TACTICS DISCUSSED WITH KOROHELOS (IDEN A). FIRST STEP REGARDLESS WHETHER LASS ULTIMATELY HELD IS SEIZING INITIATIVE ON SITE IN ORDER HONOR SUP COM DECISION AND OFFSET POSSIBLE INVITATION FROM UNFRIENDLY SITE. THIS NOW ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN VIEW REF. CHE [illegible] MOST DESIRABLE HOST FROM [illegible] CONTROL AND FLEXIBILITY. IN THIS RESPECT KOROHELOS AND AVILA (IDEN B) SHOULD CONTACT [illegible] BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE EUR. BRIEF HIM ON LASS STRATEGY AND GAIN HIS SUPPORT [illegible] CHE OFFER INVITATION ACT AS HOST

3. ASSUMING MEXI INVITE LASS CAN BE HELD IF FOLL CONDITIONS SATISFIED:

A) PARTICIPATION MINIMUM 7 DEMOCRATIC UNIONS WITH CLEAR EVIDENCE ALL [illegible] UNIONS WILL BOYCOTT SEMINAR

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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15963

14-00000

CLASSIFIED

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

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NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 87036

B) ENOUGH COORDINATION WITH UFUCH TO AVOID THEIR ACTIVE HOSTILITY LASS AND COSEC AND PREVENT FORCING THEM INTO CLOSER ALLIANCE WITH EXTREMISTS ON OTHER WH ISSUES.

C) LIKELIHOOD THAT LASS CAN BE USEFUL FORUM EXPRESSION DEMOCRATIC VIEWS ON SOCIAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT GROUNDWORK NECESSARY FOR IBC TACTICS.

D) EVENT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH MEXI STATION OPERATIONS.

4. LASS SHOULD NOT BE HELD IF ALL OR ANY PARA 3 CONDITIONS FAIL PERTAIN AND ALSO IF:

A) EARLY EVIDENCE WELL ORGANIZED EXTREMIST COUNTERACTION (POSSIBILITY OF WHICH RAISED BY VEHEMENCE FEOU RESPONSE COSEC LETTER REPORTED IN REF.)

B) PALP HQS JUDGEMENT THAT TIME EFFORT NEEDED SUSTAIN HOLDING EVENT BECOMES COUNTERPRODUCTIVE DIVERSION RESOURCES FROM OTHER ELEMENTS KEEPITOME PROGRAM, DEVELOPMENT OF IBC TACTICS, OR HARMFUL KUBARK LAYC COUNTERACTION.

5. IF PARA 4 SITUATION UNFOLDS CNE COULD WITHDRAW INVITATION ON GROUNDS INADEQUATE PARTICIPATION (ASSUMING BOYCOTT) OR CONTINUE AS HOST BUT CITE SUNDRY TECHNICAL REASONS REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT LASS.

6. FOR PALP: PARA ONE BRIEFING CORDERO WHICH CONTINGENT PALP RECEIPT MEXI COMMENTS, SHOULD INCLUDE CANDID OUTLINE PARA 2-5 THINKING SO THAT CNE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

PAGE THREE

TO

#72036

AGREEMENT ISSUE INVITATION ACT AS HOST INCLUDE AWARENESS OF AND COMMITMENT TO ALL CONTINGENCIES. MOREOVER, CORDERO SHOULD BE ASSURED CONTINUING COSEC SUPPORT LITERACY SEMINAR AND DESIRE HOLDING THAT EVENT AT EARLIEST DATE CONVENIENT TO ___.

7. FOR MEXI: HQS BELIEVES IT UNLIKELY THAT PARA 3 CONDITIONS CAN BE MET ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE THAT THIS EVENT COULD BE USEFUL. HQS DISPATCH WILL INCLUDE BACKGROUND AND DETAILS LASS STRATEGY. SINCE CORDERO MAY LEAVE EUR SHORTLY REQUEST COMMENTS TO PALP ASAP.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CA Scott Holloway

WH/3/MEX BER (in draft)

RELEASING OFFICER C/CA

EDWARD C. EARLE
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

ORIG: Manuel Arz...
UNIT: CA/25
EXT: 5552
DATE: 5 December 1963

SECRET

200-124-73/3

TO: PARIS/LCPIPIT INFO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CA/O 4

INFO: CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, WE 4, WH 7, VR

5 DEC 18 49Z 63

DEFERRED

X ROUTINE

TO PALP INFO MEXI CITE DIR 87037

DTDORIC HERPTRONE

REF: DIR 87036 *

IDENTITIES

A. DONALD EMERSON - NORTH AMERICAN SECRETARY COSEC

B. RAUL AVILA - LATIN AMERICAN SECRETARY COSEC

END OF MESSAGE

WH/CA Scott Holloway (in draft)

WH/3/MEX ___ HR (in dr.)

*CABLE SECRETARIAT PLEASE REFERENCE ATTACHED CABLE.

C/CA

SECRET

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15964

TO PRIORITY BOOK CABLE
CARA MANA WAVE LODS
MEXI LIMA PACY GUAT
BUEN MONT BOGO QUIT
GAYA RIOD SAOP SAGO
LAPA SANJ SDOM

CITE DIR 88205

REFS: A. DIR 83577
B. DIR 83638

1. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT EXCELLENT EXPLOITATION MOST AREAS HAVING BENEFICIAL EFFECT IN THAT HIGH INTEREST CREATED AMONG PEOPLE IS ENCOURAGING AND/OR CAUSING SOME GOVERNMENTS ADOPT STRONGER PRO VENEZUELA POSITION IN OAS. VIEW THIS, SUGGEST ADDEE ACTIVITIES CONCENTRATE PRIMARILY (BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY) THIS ASPECT, I.E. EFFORTS DEMONSTRATE TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THAT PUBLIC OPINION IS IN FAVOR VENEZUELAN POSITION OF TAKING FIRM STAND AGAINST CASTRO. EMPHASIZE THAT CURRENT ISSUE BEFORE OAS RAISED BY SISTER REPUBLIC, VICTIM OF SOVIET AND CHICOM SUPPORTED AGGRESSOR; IMPLICATION BEING THAT ODYOKE PLAYING NO MORE THAN SUPPORTING ROLE.

2. CONTINUE USE " NO COEXISTENCE WITH CASTRO" THEME. CONSIDER HAVING LABOR, STUDENT, OTHER ORGS SEND TELEGRAMS TO LOCAL GOVTS AND OAS IN SUPPORT VENEZ POSITION; FOLLOW ~~[illegible]~~ UP BY PUBLICIZING TELEGRAMS IN PRESS. VIA MEDIA SPECULATE WHAT STEPS LOCAL GOVT MIGHT FAVOR IN SUPPORT VENEZ, INCLUDING

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16006

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TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

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ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR 88285

A. BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA BY ALL LA COUNTRIES

B. CURTAILMENT ECONOMIC RELATIONS,

C. ALL POSSIBLE COMMUNICATIONS BREAK,

D. COOPERATIVE SURVEILLANCE OF OUTBOUND CUBAN CARRIERS.

3. WHERE THERE RELUCTANCE ATTACK CASTRO ON POLITICAL GROUNDS SUGGEST USE PEG THAT CASTRO'S EXPORTING OF REVOLUTION OVERTAKEN BY NEWER EXPORT COMMODITY, NAMELY CRIME. THIS EXEMPLIFIED BY ACTS OF ARSON, DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, MURDER, KIDNAPING, ETC., AND THAT CUBA TRAINING OF SO-CALLED REVOLUTIONARIES FROM THROUGHOUT HEMISPHERE NOTHING MORE THAN SCHOOL FOR CRIME.

4. FOR MONT GUAT BOGO SDOM: ADVISE WHAT ACTION TAKEN PER REFS

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/1
C/WH/2
C/WH/3
C/WH/5
C/WH/6
C/WH/7
C/CA/(
SAS/CA

SECRET

MEXICO CITY

MEXI 99012

RYBAT TYPIC AMROD

REF A. MEXI 7317 (IN 76917)
B: MEXI 7298 (IN 75880)
C HMM 22410, Para 2

1. PER REF A IT LIKELY A MEET WILL BE HELD WITH CUBAN IN NEXT WEEKS.

2. HENCE DESIRE LIFEAT COVERAGE ON IDEN AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE SINCE HE BELIEVED LOCAL CASE OFFICER.

3. IF NECESSARY TO EFFECT COVERAGE ON IDEN, STATION MAY SUSPEND COVERAGE AMSESS/1 BUT PREFER MAINTAIN BOTH.

4. REQUEST STATION TRACES ONLY ON SUBJECTS REF B AND C. NO HEADQUARTERS RECORD ON EITHER.

5. PLEASE RENEW THE TWO POST BOXES SERVICED BY LIKAYAK/2 IN LOMAS AND MIGUEL SHULTZ.

6. PLEASE HAVE GERENDE OR SCANTLING TRANSLATE AND SEND FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO MANUEL VEGA Y SOCIO, FRANCISCO MARQUEZ 160, COLONIA CONDESA D F "RECEIVED YOUR KIND LETTER BUT NO MONEY. SALUDOS. JULIO RODRIGUEZ." RETURN ADDRESSEE TO BE JULIO RODRIGUEZ AT LOMAS BOX.

(cont.)

SECRET

16033

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FROM : DIRECTOR

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TO INFO CITE DIR 8[illegible]

7. PLEASE HAVE THIS TELEGRAM SENT 14 OR 16 DEC, EVEN IF MONEY HAS BEEN RECEIVED.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/EOB [illegible]

WH/3/[illegible] [illegible]

J. C. KING
C/WH

[illegible] FITZGERALD
C/SAS

SECRET

MESSAGE

TO : [illegible]
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : [illegible]
DATE : [illegible] DECEMBER 63

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S E C R E T

TO : BOOK CABLE (SEE BELOW)
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF :
INFO :

TO ALL COS, &COB

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

1. 20 DECEMBER IS FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF SOVIET STATE SECURITY ORGANIZATION. THIS "CHEKIST BIRTHDAY" IS TRADITIONALLY CELEBRATED BY KGB RESIDENCIES AROUND THE WORLD BY DISCREET GATHERING IN EMBASSY OR OTHER OFFICIAL INSTALLATION, OR IN HOME OF REZIDENT OR OTHER REZIDENTURA MEMBER.

2. ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS SOME STATIONS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE NEW IDENTIFICATIONS OR TO CONFIRM PREVIOUS TENTATIVE IDENTIFICATIONS ON BASIS OF ATTENDANCE THIS PARTY. SUGGEST ADDRESSEES MOUNT UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE AND/OR ALERT LIAISON SERVICES TO THIS DATE AS APPROPRIATE.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

6051

ORIG: SKAMPOVICH:mg
UNIT: SR/CI/K
EXT: 6091
DATE: 16 DECEMBER 63

3 — SECRET

TO: SEE BELOW

89383

AF
ALGI, ORAN, UMBU, YAOU, ADDI, ACCR, CNRY, ABID, NOBI, MNRV, TPLI, WHEL, GAZI, TNAR, RABA, CASA, LABQ, LAGS, BRAZ, LEOP, ELIZ, STEY, BAKO, PRET, CAPT, DURB, LOME, DKAR, KIGA, [illegible], MOGA, [illegible], KHAR, [illegible], [illegible], KAMP

EE
VIEN, SBUR, MECA, FRAN, BRLN, BONN, DORF, FROB, HAMB, HEID, MUNI, STUT, ATHE, KAVA, SLON, BERN, GNVA, ZURI

FE
MELB, CNBR, RNGO, PENH, HONG, TAMI, HULA, DJAK, SURA, TOKY, SEOU, KSAN, VTEN, KUAL, WELL, OKIN, KABE, MANI, SING, BANG, SAIG, UDOR

NE
KABU, COLO, NEWD, BOMB, CALC, MDRS, TEHR, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], BAGH, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], BEIR, [illegible], KATH, [illegible], LAHO, RAWL, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], DAMA, ALPO, ANKA, ISTA, CAIR, ALEX, [illegible], TAIZ, [illegible]

WE
BRUS, OTTA, COPE, LOND, HELS, PARI, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], ROME, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], LUXE, HAGU, OSLO, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], STOC, [illegible], COBA, LAPA, RIOD, BLEM, BELO, BRIL, CURI, LGRE, RECI, SALV, SAOP

WH
GORG, SAGO, BOGA, SJOS, SDOM, QUIT, GAYA, GUAT, PRIN, TEGU, KING, MEXI, MRID, MNTY, MANA, PACY, ASUN, LIMA, SJAN, SALV, PIBO, PRIN, MONT, CARA

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FROM : DIRECTOR

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I certify that this cable must go to all stations and bases.

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SR/O/EE D.W. Schroeder
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SR/O/WE
SR/O/WH
SR/O/NE

C/AF
C/EE
C/FE
C/NE
C/WE R W H
C/WH

C/SR/CI

C/SR

(C/SR)

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TO : [illegible]

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8

INFO : DDP, DODS/L, DODS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, SAS 8, VR

17 DEC 63 23 07z

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

TO PRIORITY BOOK CABLE INFO CITE DIR 89778

CARA HAVA WAVE DOOS MEXI LIMA PACY GUAT MONT BOGO QUIT GAYA RIOD BAOP SAGO LAPA SANJ SDOM [illegible]

REF: DIR 88060 *

FYI. ACTION INTENDED PARA 2 REF WAS UNATTRIBUTABLE SURFACING VIA MEDIA. DO NOT DESIRE AT THIS TIME ADDEES MAKE DIRECT OR INDIRECT OVERTURES TO LOCAL OFFICIALS OR GOVTS IN THIS CONNECTION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADDEES TO CONSIDER SURFACING ANY EVIDENCE CASTRO FINANCING TERRORIST AND PRO CUBAN ACTS, ETC.

J. C. KING
C/WHD

William [illegible]
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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16160

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SECRET

Mary Parrish
7861
CA/PROP/G
19 Dec 63

FILE NO.

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SEE BELOW

DIRECTOR

19 DEC 63 15 28z

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CA/C 4, 2, AF 4, EE 4, WE 4,
WH 6, FE, SR

CITE DIR 90168

16172

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ROUTING
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2 5
3 6

INFO CITE DIR 90168

1. REUTERS, UPI, AP REPORT FROM MOSCOW EIGHTEEN DECEMBER THAT APPROX FIVE HUNDRED AFRICAN STUDENTS GATHERED AT GHANA EMBASSY, FOUGHT THEIR WAY PAST POLICE BARRICADES AND MARCHED TO KREMLIN TO PROTEST ALLEGED KILLING GHANA STUDENT ASARO ADDEO. STUDENTS CARRIED PLACARDS "STOP KILLING AFRICANS", SKULL AND CROSSBONES LABELLED "RUSSIAN FRIENDSHIP", "FRIENDS TODAY, THE DEVIL TOMORROW" "MOSCOW IS SECOND ALABAMA". STUDENT DELEGATION PRESENTED MEMO TO MINISTRY HIGHER EDUCATION CHARGING "OUR FREEDOM BEING THREATENED HERE BECAUSE STUDENTS ARE BEING BEATEN IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF SOVIET UNION AND ONE WAS KILLED RECENTLY IN KALININ. WE WANT THE POLICE TO TAKE STRONGER ACTION". SOVIET OFFICIALS CLAIM ADDEO DIED OF EXPOSURE WHILE INTOXICATED. STUDENTS BELIEVE HE KILLED BY RUSSIAN BECAUSE HE WANTED MARRY RUSSIAN GIRL.

2. USING WIRE SERVICE, FBIS SOURCES PLAY STUDENT ACTION ALONG LINES:

A. ~~[illegible]~~ INCIDENT IS EVIDENCE OF RACIST ATTITUDES DESPITE SOVIET PROPAGANDA ~~EFFORT [illegible]~~

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

14-00000

THAT COMMUNISM MEANS BROTHERHOOD

ALL PEOPLES

B. [illegible] DEATH PROBABLY ONLY SPARK SETTING OFF LONG SMOULDERING STUDENT RESENTMENT OF POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION, SEGREGATION, EXPLOITATION FOR PROP PURPOSES

C. TIE INCIDENT TO RECENT CONGO EXPULSION OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS AS ANOTHER FACET SOVIET LONG RANGE PLAN TO DUPE, EVEN TAKEOVER, NAIVE AFRICAN STATES BY MEANS OF SUBVERSION, STUDENT INDOCTRINATION AND CONTROL, ECONOMIC AID WITH POLITICAL STRINGS

3. SEE BIWEEKLY GUIDANCE SEVEN HUNDRED NINETEEN FOR FURTHER ACTION AND BACKGROUND. WATCH STUDENT GROUPS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS, ARTICLES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS FOR REPLAY. INTERVIEW COMMUNIST TRAINED STUDENTS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, EDUCATORS FOR REACTION.

4. SEND CLIPS HQS

END OF MESSAGE

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TO INFO CITE DIR 90164

Coordinating Officers:

AF/CA Wayne Murphy (in draft)
WE/IDE
EE/OPS/CA-
NE/OP/PA Walter Harris (phone)
WH/PO/B William Kent (phone)
FE/PO/P John Ishii (phone)
SR/CA Terry Seil (phone)

4215
19 Dec 63

SECRET

MEXICO CITY

ROUTINE

CITE DIR 90383

RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE AMWORLD

1. PLEASE ADVISE IF SAMBORA LEGEND COMPLETED AND ALL PERTINENT PAPERS POUCHED TO HQS.

2. SUBJECT HMMW 12212* DIRECTED TO APPLY FOR MEXI VISITORS VISA.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SEC: Please add C/WH to distribution.

*Antonio de Jesus (Pineda) Cabrera
201-297754

J. C. KING
C/WH

C/SAS

19-3

SECRET

16180

[illegible]

[illegible] COMMUNICATIONS

[illegible]	DOMS	ABUN	BOGO
[illegible]	CARA	GUAT	LIMA
[illegible]	MONT	PRIN	QUIT
RIOD	SAGO	SJOS	SDOM
TEGU	MEXI	LAPA	SALV
PACY	GAYA	GORG	RECI
WAVE	KOLA	OTTA	

BRIL SAOP

[illegible] 50598

RADNOTE

BOOK MESSAGE

1. [illegible] NOW ACTIVE MEMBER AXANET AND AUTHORIZED HANDLE ODYOKE CLASSIFIED CLEAR TEXT. ROUTING INDICATOR BUQSUM ASSIGNED.

2. OTTA NOW ACTIVE MEMBER AXANET. ROUTING INDICATOR BUKIOW ASSIGNED. ONLY KUBARK TRAFFIC HANDLED BY OTTAWA.

END OF MESSAGE

OC-AD
RELEASING OFFICER

OC-S -
OC-T -
COORDINATING OFFICERS

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SECRET - SENSITIVE

Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

This is not a controlled item

913

Draft:[illegible]
[illegible] Nov, 1962

OPERATIONAL PLAN - CUBA

I. SITUATION:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Castro/Communist government of Cuba during FY-63 and for such longer period as may be directed.

B. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. National objectives with respect to Cuba are essentially as follows:

a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.

b. further Discredit the Castro/ Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.

c. Maintain moderate economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.

d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.

e. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuban leadership, or split

on Cuban-Bloc relationships.

II. MISSION:

Covertly support the above-cited U. S. national objectives with respect to Cuba.

III. TASKS:

A. Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:

a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.

b. Activities of Cuban G-2.

c. Soviet activities in Cuba.

d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.

e. Military and militia order of battle.

f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.

g. Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cuban relationships.

h. Economic.

B. Political:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and Latin-American country support for the containment or overthrow of Castro.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.
4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban Government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

C. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.
2. Prevent essential material and supplies from reaching Cuba.
3. Harass Free World Trade with Cuba.

D. Psychological:

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.
2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.
3. Develop and exploit tensions between Cuba and Soviet bloc members.

E. Resistance:

1. Be prepared to covertly provide limited personnel and logistics support for any significant internal

SECRET
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-4-

resistance group or uprising.

3. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military [illegible] against Cuba.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION:

To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be re[illegible] to develop the following programs:

A. Intelligence (FI)/ Counter-Intelligence

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. The following types of acti[illegible] will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally establ[illegible] Cubans in Cuba [illegible] Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secu[re] communications will become more critical as poli[ce] state controls increase.

2 Spotting/recruiting/training Cubans in Government posit[ions]

~~2~~3. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.

~~3~~4. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant informat[ion] or who can provide significant operational support.

~~4~~5. Expansion of communications intelligence particula[rl]y in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

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GROUP 1
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SEC
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6. Maintain refugee

7. Maximize utilization

B. Psychological Warfar

The program must pri

reach the Cuban populati

warfare activities are

1. A propaganda bal

appropriate poli

balloon launchi

2. Continue and ex

operations infi

the open mails,

3. Continue propag

progessional,

which have p

to their c t

C. Paramilitary:

The program will b

maintaining a minimum

event of a significant

implementation of .

The following prog

1. Maintain the

limited number

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amounts of equipment.

2. Maintain sufficient covert assets to meet requirements levied on CIA in approved U. S. Military contingency plans. Where internal assets are not available, assets may be held externally.

V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

None

VI. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. Personnel

B. Estimated Budget

FY - 63
FY - 64

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DRAFT

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing Operations Against Cuba

1. Action: This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

SECRET - SENSITIVE

B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakenod.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will

severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two" course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelligence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.

II. **OBJECTIVES:**

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.

C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.

2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.

3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.

4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.

5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment.

6. The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.

7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.

8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.

B. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/Bloc relationships.

III. **OPERATIONAL PLAN:**

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communications with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. [Liaison] Operations: We will continue to press the [liaison services] who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The [services] most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the [British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian, Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean, and Israeli.] Direct approaches to several of these [services] either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the [services] underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other [liaison services] with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the [liaison] problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the [liaison services] to make greater use of their [national] assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the [Vatican.]

5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through [liaison services,] we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents.

6. <u>Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad</u>: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can gain access and concerning whom we have any reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through [unilateral] 24 operations and where appropriate in conjunction with [liaison services.] 24

7. <u>Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Abroad</u>: At the present time we have audio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in [Chile, Italy, Mexico, 24 The Netherlands, England, Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Canada.] No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and wherever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such installation worthwhile.

3/m

8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in [Miami] at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their seaborne intercept coverage of Cuban communications.

9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 23 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of 65 are bein individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

10. <u>Illegally Infiltrated Agents</u>: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.

11. <u>Exfiltration</u>: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further expldtation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations: Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.

H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within the Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementationof related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:

A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

ATT. A - To

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HBRA 9438

TO: Chief, WHD
INFO: Chief, EE

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-050539

FROM: Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

DATE: 20 June 1962

SUBJECT: BEDOX/Operational
SMEDIFY Information Concerning
Tad SZULC (201-050539)

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED ✓
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE(S):

1. Attached is a SMEDIFY report concerning Tadeusz SZULC which includes SMEDIFY's traces on SZULC.

2. Station has the following information regarding Ignacy SACHS, who is mentioned in the attachment.

ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 4 May 1961 (ultimate source: Henryk HRANKROWSKI, former member of the Polish Commercial Mission, in Brazil)

> Ignacy SACHS, upon his return from India, will not work in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but will be reassigned to the Latin American section of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade. He recently wrote a report on Latin America based upon material contained in the South and Central American press. He reportedly had a falling out with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry, hence the transfer.

ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 30 May 1961 (ultimate source: Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWICZ, Polish diplomat)

> Ignacy SACHS, after a period of disgrace, has a new job, economic assistant for underdeveloped countries in Department III of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

FREDERICK E. ROUZKY

Distribution
4 - WHD w/attachment
1 - EE w/attachment REC'D RID/AN 22 June 62
1 - Sao Paulo
2 - Files

200 w/att WH

19 June 1962/bcj

The attached info was not sent to the FBI because according to RID/CE 5 Feb '63 & attached discussion with Jane Roman & Office of Mr. R. Helms, we are not to send any info and on the Agency on subject. Any inquiries — domestic — should be referred to the FBI.

RID/CE

[signature]

ATT. A

FORM 10-57 53 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

CONTINUED

PAGE NO. 1

2nd June, 1961.

Tadeusz SZULC

(b)(3)(A)

The Station copies of the original reports on SZULC have been destroyed. I attach, however, a memorandum consisting of selected entries from his card.

2. All the information is from the same source, a Polish emigre who knew SZULC personally and also had informants in the Polish Embassy.

3. There is little doubt that SZULC was pro-communist at the time, and that he co-operated with Ignacy SACHS, a cousin who was employed by the Press Section of the Polish Embassy, and provided him with "information". It would, however, be unwise to jump to the conclusion that this collaboration took the form of espionage, since SZULCs does not seem to have made any secret of the relationship.

4. I can find no evidence that Ignacy SACHS was an intelligence officer, but he seems to have been an active propagandist. He returned to Poland in 1954. A report from the same source, dated June 1956, stated that he then occupied the Brazilian desk at the Polish Institute for International Affairs.

Att. to HBRA 9438

NOFORN / Cont...

Att. to HBRA 9438

CS COPY

201-50539

Tadeusz SZULC

Born: c. 1926.
Nationality: Pole. Naturalised U.S. citizen 1955.
Occupation: Journalist.

June 1947: Used to work for the "Brazil Herald" and now for FRANCE PRESSE. Is on good terms with the Polish Legation whom he supplies with information on Brazil. One of the party who accompanied Raul FERNANDEZ on his mission to Montevideo. He is the son of Seweryn SZULC.

Dec. 1947: sub-source: Harold HORAN of New York: Re subject's efforts to find employment in American press circles. Mr. HORAN tried to help him, due to a letter of introduction from SZULC's uncle, John WILEY, American Ambassador in Lisbon, but desisted on finding that SZULC had been connected with the Rio de Janeiro communist paper "Diretrizes".

Feb. 1948: Further details of subject's efforts to find a job in the United States. He is to work on the Palestine Commission of the U.N.O. as from middle of February.

March 1948: Subject still in New York and writing regular reports on U.S. political affairs and personalities to the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Trying to get a job with U.S. Press through the influence of Mrs. J. WILEY.

Sept. 1949: Subject at present in New York, married to an American girl, and working in one of the American News Agencies. Since arrival of new Legation (Warsaw) he was in touch with the Minister, the Secretary and the ex-Press Attache, the late Wikinski. Told by Warsaw Poles in Washington that to be useful he cannot have a job with the Press Dept. of the Washington Polish Embassy or the Polish Press Bureau in New York. Using his "Uncle" introduction letters (the U.S. Ambassador John Wiley married to Polish born, Irene BARUCH, who is the sister of the first Mrs. SZULC), he obtained a job with Americans on orders from the Poles. Subject is helped financially by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Thanks to introduction letters from the WILEYs, SZULC penetrated several circles in New York. He is writing reports to Rio de Janeiro and working with people in New York and is considered useful for future tasks.

June 1951: Nephew of newly appointed U.S. Ambassador in PANAMA, he is now trying to get a job in Panama as American correspondent. He has a job with U.P. in New York. In Rio de Janeiro in 1947/48, was fellow traveller and informer of communist nucleus on the staff of the communist newspaper "Diretrizes". Also worked for FRANCE PRESSE and reported regularly on the Polish colony in Rio de Janeiro.

June 1951: Visited Rio de Janeiro from 11.6.51 to 27.6.51 when he returned to New York. Whilst in Rio, he was in touch with Ignacy SACHS to whom he brought information from the USA. The two are relatives and boyhood friends and subject writes personal letters to SACHS containing matters of interest to the Polish Legation. Subject also has useful contacts in New York in political and artistic circles, obtained through his Aunt. Is believed to be trying to obtain American citizenship through having married an American woman.

Sept. 1951: Personal reports on the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, John WILEY, continue to be forwarded by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro to Warsaw via subject.

March 1952: Source met subject in America recently. Subject volunteered that he obtained much information on the differences of policy between the British and American Governments on the Persian problem through his aunt, the wife of John WILEY, and that he kept the Polish Government informed through Ignacy SACHS. He boasted acquaintance with Drew PEARSON and the Shah of Persia.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK
Project AMTRUNK Operational Review

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.

1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.

2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weaknesses:

A. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working "with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major refugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Escambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesitate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/attchs.

DATE TYPED: 5 April 1963

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-8381

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER:

DESENSITIZED

SECRET

#12922

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA - 8381

AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed. There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1.

B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, and AMCAPE/1 and his newspaper. The latter could prove to be most embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into Castro's hands.

NEW YORK TIMES

C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents, AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/27 is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK contacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop.

E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently patrolled by sea.

RABEL Nuñez

F. This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 operations aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same purposes. Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they expect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

4. Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level, it is requested that Headquarters advise JMWAVE as to its decision. In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Headquarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time, operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated.

END OF MESSAGE

See DIR 3:748

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31 March 1963

PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW

I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communications, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under discussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The results of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.

II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE

The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and

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4-9-6

the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as developed.

III. PHASE I.

A. AMTRUNK Personnel

1. AMTRUNK/2 is a 21 year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine operations. He attended Catholic Social University in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasion a great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout his training. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is conscientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.

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2. AMTRUNK/3, a 22 year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in August 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not interfere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.

B. TASKS

1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at A/3's father's farm in the Galera section (AMS 3885 III, Coords 993614).

2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.

3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his father's farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be exfiltrated at Punta Jijira.

4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.

5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.

6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandestine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration.

7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).

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C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to [redacted] farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.

2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.

3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.

4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts.

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by [redacted], located [redacted] from the point of infiltration. They will make contact with the manager of the farm named [redacted]. [redacted] is [redacted] years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon [redacted] to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo or Havana:

a. [redacted], who lives a few kilometers away in [redacted]. [redacted] owns a small farm and a butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is [redacted] years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.

b. If [redacted] is unsuccessful in getting [redacted] truck he will contact [redacted] who operates a farm next to [redacted] farm. He is [redacted] years old, married, no children, wife's name is [redacted]. He was the [redacted] in 1954. He owns a jeep.

19-6-

c. Another contact of A/3 is Ramon CALZADILLA, age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is Corojo #1, Cotorro, Havana. He owns a butcher shop in the Cotorro section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.

2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.

a. Elsa Maria NEGRIN, 25 years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.

b. Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55, born in Havana. He is a physician who lives and practices medicine in Havana. IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medicine at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. IGLESIAS is also a close friend of Elsa NEGRIN.

c. Sergio MENDEZ, age about 50, born in Cienfuegos, a former senator (1954) as well as the former head of the Railroad system in Cuba. Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. MENDEZ has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The husband of this daughter, however, works for Che Guevara. A/2 has maintained correspondence with MENDEZ.

d. Isabel MENOCOL, age about 35, born in Havana, single. Subject is an English teacher who runs a small private tutoring school in English in Havana. She was A/2's English teacher and offered support to the underground. MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.

e. Gloria BAMCIALLA, age 23-24, born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana. She has no record of underground work. She lives in Guanabo Beach during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at Guanabo Beach in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary.

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

a. Jorge VALS, age late 30s early 40s, married. Subject holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims VALS has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. VALS primary interest has been trying to organize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels VALS is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of VALS and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to VALS in 1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.

b. Jose DUARTE Oropesa, age early 40s, served in the U.S. Army during World War II. According to A/2, DUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military District by Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos, DUARTE was removed from the post and presently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said DUARTE started working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the military secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually DUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 DUARTE was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and revolutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention DUARTE as an opportunist.

c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.

Lester RODRIGUEZ, age late 30s early 40s, married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as head of one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he is now working in INRA in Oriente Province. He claims RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Cover

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his father to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3

to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his business. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to undertake a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his business competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his father's farm with maritime reception capabilities.

2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana However, he has not seen VALS and DUARTE for over a year. In addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on DUARTE conflict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that DUARTE is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims DUARTE is an opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. A/2's rebuttal to these remarks is that DUARTE has assisted him in the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of DUARTE which unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly security conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impression. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his father's farm and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated that a man named DUARTE would be one of their contacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candidate for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents.

3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and recruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.

IV. PHASE II

A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

1. AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41 year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly motivated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense. He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply resents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he presents a difficult handling problem.

2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been involved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME. He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made four black infiltration/exfiltration trips to and from Cuba and PBPRIME, and has an excellent knowledge of the northern Matanzas area. He is easy to work

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with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27.

3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a [redacted] year old fisherman from the [redacted] area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.

B. TASKS

1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations.

2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for transportation into Havana.

3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.

4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfiltration and future infiltrations.

5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.

6. Establish internal and external communications.

7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

It is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second infiltration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Director of Finance 1212 Key Building		DATE 27 February 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Inspector General 2 E 24 HQS.	27 Feb '74		D	
2. Breckinridge				
3. Richards			R	
4. ~~[illegible]~~ Wyatt				
5. Sandy-Arnadel - W/file				
6.				
7.				
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11.				
12.				RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce
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SECRET

27 FEB 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Howard Hunt

1. At the recent request of the Deputy Director for Management and Services, the Office of Finance has searched its records to determine if we could find any payment to Mr. Hunt in an amount of approximately $30,000 that required no accounting.

2. We have searched the following records:

a. The expense runs for the period July 1964 to June 1973 for the immediate Office of the DCI, the immediate Office of the DD/P, FI Staff, CI Staff, CA Staff and the Office of Security. We have checked various items that were reflected in these expense records but have identified nothing relating to Mr. Hunt.

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b. The [Madrid] Station, JMWAVE and FR/Washington Office accountings to determine if there were funds passed by the Stations to Mr. Hunt during the year he served under non-official cover in Madrid. We could find no payment to Mr. Hunt either in his true name or his two identified pseudonyms.

c. Mr. Hunt's travel claims for the period 1960-1972 and have found nothing in these travel claims that were not consistent with normal travel expenses, i.e., transportation, per diem.

d. We made a specific analysis of Mr. Hunt's advance account for the period he was under non-official cover (July '65-Sept '66) and have

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SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

determined that $33,500 was advanced to him for travel and transportation of household goods to and from Madrid with one trip to Paris for he and his family to renew their Spanish visas. All of this advance was fully accounted for. However, in his accounting, one item appeared unusual. It was an expenditure of $1,600 for a sensitive operation which was approved for write-off by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald on 1 June 1966 without further accounting.

3. Also, we confirmed that no other Agency advance accounts were established for Mr. Hunt during this period.

4. At the beginning of his non-official cover tour, it was necessary to establish a bank account in his name. The EUR Division accordingly requested we open an account at the Chase Manhattan Bank in Mr. Hunt's name to receive all non-salary payments. (Mr. Hunt had an account at Riggs National Bank to receive his salary and allowance payments). The following deposits were made to the account during 1965 and 1966:

<u>Account opened</u>: 13 July 1965

13 July 1965	$10,000
22 July 1965	5,000
15 September 1965	5,000
6 October 1965	5,000
19 July 1966	5,000
	$30,000

All of the above have been accounted for by submission of travel and transportation accountings.

5. We feel at this time without specific guidelines that further searching would be somewhat fruitless. One strange aspect of the non-official cover assignment in Madrid is that all the costs were charged to the support allotment of the EUR Division which is not normal as non-official cover people are usually assigned to a project. It is unusual to have a case officer abroad for one year on an operational assignment without him incurring operational expenditures.

SUBJECT: Howard Hunt

6. The Office of Finance has not found operational expenditures except for the $1,600 mentioned above. Therefore, it is suggested that Mr. Karamessines be questioned as to a project or projects to which Mr. Hunt's operational expenditures if incurred would have been charged.

7. Another possible course of action is to request the Director to approve my asking a cleared contact at Chase Manhattan Bank to provide a transcript of all entries into Mr. Hunt's Chase Manhattan Bank account.

8. We are currently reviewing records of all cashier's checks prepared and issued by Monetary to determine if any were payable to Mr. Hunt. Hopefully this effort will be finished by the end of the week.

Thomas B. Yale
Director of Finance

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Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

This is not a controlled item

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[SECRET - SENSITIVE]

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing Operations Against Cuba

1. Action: This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

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B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will

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severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two" course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelligence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.

II. <u>OBJECTIVES</u>:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.

C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.

2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.

3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.

4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.

5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment.

6. The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.

7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.

8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.

E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/Bloc relationships.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communications with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

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and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian, Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean, and Israeli. Direct approaches to several of these services either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the services underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make greater use of their national assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the Vatican.

5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through liaison services, we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twenty officers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents.

6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we are running 12 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can gain access and concerning whom we have any reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral operations and where appropriate in conjunction with liaison services.

7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in Chile, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, England, Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Canada. No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and wherever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such installation worthwhile.

8. <u>Communications Intelligence</u>: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their seaborne intercept coverage of Cuban communications.

9. <u>Communist Party Operations</u>: A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 23 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of 65 are bein individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

10. <u>Illegally Infiltrated Agents</u>: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.

11. <u>Exfiltration</u>: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further expldtation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrille Type Operations: Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.

H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within the Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementationof related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:

A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. **RECOMMENDED ACTION:**

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

14-00000

SECRET
SENSITIVE

Drafting
23 Nov. 1962

OPERATIONAL PLAN - CUBA

I. SITUATION:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Castro/Communist government of Cuba during FY-63 and for such longer period as may be directed.

B. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. National objectives with respect to Cuba are essentially as follows:

a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.

b. further Discredit the Castro/ Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.

c. Maintain moderate economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.

d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.

e. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuban leadership, or split

SECRET
SENSITIVE

on Cuban-Bloc relationships.

II. MISSION:

Covertly support the above-cited U. S. national objectives with respect to Cuba.

III. TASKS:

A. Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:

a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.

b. Activities of Cuban G-2.

c. Soviet activities in Cuba.

d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.

e. Military and militia order of battle.

f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.

g. Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cuban relationships.

h. Economic

B. Political:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and Latin-American country support for the containment or overthrow of Castro.

2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.
4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.

C. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.
2. Prevent essential material and supplies from reaching Cuba.
3. Harass Free World Trade with Cuba.

D. Psychological:

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.
2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.
3. Develop and exploit tensions between Cuba and Soviet bloc members.

E. Resistance:

1. Be prepared to covertly provide limited personnel and logistics support for any significant internal

resistance group or uprising.

2. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military plans against Cuba.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION:

To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop the following program:

A. Intelligence (CI)/ Counter-Intelligence

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. The following types of actions will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba ~~[illegible] government posts abroad~~. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.

2 Spotting/recruiting/training Cubans in Government posts abroad

~~2~~3 Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.

~~3~~4 Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information or who can provide significant operational support.

~~4~~5 Expansion of communications intelligence particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

6. Maintain refugee debriefing programs.

7. Maximize utilization of liaison services for above programs.

B. Psychological Warfare (CA):

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population. The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential:

1. A propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.
2. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.
3. Continue propaganda activities utilizing political professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. Paramilitary:

The program will be basically for developing and maintaining a minimum stand-by capability for use in the event of a significant up-rising or in the event of implementation of U. S. Military plans.

The following program is considered essential:

1. Maintain the capability to infiltrate/exfiltrate limited numbers of personnel and/or limited

amounts of equipment.

2. Maintain sufficient covert assets to meet requirements levied on CIA in approved U. S. Military contingency plans. Where internal assets are not available, assets may be held externally.

V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:

None

VI. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:

A. Personnel

B. Estimated Budget

FY - 63
FY - 64

ATT. A - To

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.: HBRA 9438

TO: Chief, WHD
INFO: Chief, EE

HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.: 201-050539

FROM: Chief of Station, Rio de Janeiro

DATE: 20 June 1962

SUBJECT: BEDOX/Operational
SMEDLEY Information Concerning
Tad SZULC (201-050539)

RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED ✓
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE(S):

1. Attached is a SMEDLEY report concerning Tadeusz SZULC which includes SMEDLEY's traces on SZULC.

2. Station has the following information regarding Ignacy SACHS, who is mentioned in the attachment.

ABICUSPID from ABICUSPID-5, 4 May 1961 (ultimate source: Henryk HRANKROWSKI, former member of the Polish Commercial Mission, in Brazil)

> Ignacy SACHS, upon his return from India, will not work in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but will be reassigned to the Latin American section of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade. He recently wrote a report on Latin America based upon material contained in the South and Central American press. He reportedly had a falling out with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry, hence the transfer.

ABICUSPID from ABICUSPID-5, 30 May 1961 (ultimate source: Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWICZ, Polish diplomat)

> Ignacy SACHS, after a period of disgrace, has a new job, economic assistant for underdeveloped countries in Department III of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

FREDERICK L. ROUZKY

Distribution
4 - WHD w/attachment
1 - EE w/attachment REC'D RID/AN
1 - Sao Paulo
2 - Files

200 w/att WH

19 June 1962/bcj

The attached info was not sent to the FBI. According to RIO/CC 5 Feb '63 & after discussion with Jane R[illegible] & office of Mr. R. Helms, we are not to send any info on us the Agency or subject. Any inquiries — domestic — should be referred to the FBI.

(RIO/CC)

[illegible]

ATT. A

FORM 10-57 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

CONTINUED

2nd June, 1961.

Tadeusz SZULC

(1)3(A)

The Station copies of the original reports on SZULC have been destroyed. I attach, however, a memorandum consisting of selected entries from his card.

2. All the information is from the same source, a Polish emigre who knew SZULC personally and also had informants in the Polish Embassy.

3. There is little doubt that SZULC was pro-communist at the time, and that he co-operated with Ignacy SACHS, a cousin who was employed by the Press Section of the Polish Embassy, and provided him with "information". It would, however, be unwise to jump to the conclusion that this collaboration took the form of espionage, since SZULCs does not seem to have made any secret of the relationship.

4. I can find no evidence that Ignacy SACHS was an intelligence officer, but he seems to have been an active propagandist. He returned to Poland in 1954. A report from the same source, dated June 1956, stated that he then occupied the Brazilian desk at the Polish Institute for International Affairs.

att. to HBRA 9438

NOFORN / Control [illegible]

att to HBRA 9438

20 JUN 62
201-50539

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Tadeusz SZULC (16) (3)(c)

Born: c. 1926.
Nationality: Pole. Naturalised U.S. citizen 1955.
Occupation: Journalist.

June 1947:	Used to work for the "Brazil Herald" and now for FRANCE PRESSE. Is on good terms with the Polish Legation whom he supplies with information on Brazil. One of the party who accompanied Raul FERNANDEZ on his mission to Montevideo. He is the son of Seweryn SZULC.
Dec. 1947: sub-source: Harold HORAN of New York:	Re subject's efforts to find employment in American press circles. Mr. HORAN tried to help him, due to a letter of introduction from SZULC's uncle, John WILEY, American Ambassador in Lisbon, but desisted on finding that SZULC had been connected with the Rio de Janeiro communist paper "Diretrizes".
Feb. 1948:	Further details of subject's efforts to find a job in the United States. He is to work on the Palestine Commission of the U.N.O. as from middle of February.
March 1948:	Subject still in New York and writing regular reports on U.S. political affairs and personalities to the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Trying to get a job with U.S. Press through the influence of Mrs. J. WILEY.
Sept. 1949:	Subject at present in New York, married to an American girl, and working in one of the American News Agencies. Since arrival of new Legation (Warsaw) he was in touch with the Minister, the Secretary and the ex-Press Attache, the late Wikinski. Told by Warsaw Poles in Washington that to be useful he cannot have a job with the Press Dept. of the Washington Polish Embassy or the Polish Press Bureau in New York. Using his "Uncle" introduction letters (the U.S. Ambassador John Wiley married to Polish born, Irene BARUCH, who is the sister of the first Mrs. SZULC), he obtained a job with Americans on orders from the Poles. Subject is helped financially by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Thanks to introduction letters from the WILEYs, SZULC penetrated several circles in New York. He is writing reports to Rio de Janeiro and working with people in New York and is considered useful for future tasks.
June 1951:	Nephew of newly appointed U.S. Ambassador in PANAMA, he is now trying to get a job in Panama as American correspondent. He has a job with U.P. in New York. In Rio de Janeiro in 1947/48, was fellow traveller and informer of communist nucleus on the staff of the communist newspaper "Diretrizes". Also worked for FRANCE PRESSE and reported regularly on the Polish colony in Rio de Janeiro.
June 1951:	Visited Rio de Janeiro from 11.6.51 to 27.6.51 when he returned to New York. Whilst in Rio, he was in touch with Ignacy SACHS to whom he brought information from the USA. The two are relatives and boyhood friends and subject writes personal letters to SACHS containing matters of interest to the Polish Legation. Subject also has useful contacts in New York in political and artistic circles, obtained through his Aunt. Is believed to be trying to obtain American citizenship through having married an American woman.

/ - 2 - ....

Sept. 1951: Personal reports on the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, John WILEY, continue to be forwarded by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro to Warsaw via subject.

March 1952: Source met subject in America recently. Subject volunteered that he obtained much information on the differences of policy between the British and American Governments on the Persian problem through his aunt, the wife of John WILEY, and that he kept the Polish Government informed through Ignacy SACHS. He boasted acquaintance with Drew PEARSON and the Shah of Persia.

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DISPATCH — SECRET

	PROPOSED	ACTION
	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
		ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
		ABSTRACT
		MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK
Project AMTRUNK Operational Review

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

PRIORITY

ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.

1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.

2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weaknesses:

A. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working "with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major refugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Escambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesitate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.

Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/attchs.

Removed from Project AMTRUNK 19-6-84/3
CS Classification: 19-6-84/3
JOB: 68-496/16
BOX: 7 FOLD: 1 VOLSKY
WASH, D.C.
SZULC
19-6-84 STATE

DATE TYPED: 5 April 1963
DATE DISPATCHED: APR 1963

CROSS REFERENCE TO: Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-8381

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed. There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1.

B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, and AMCAPE/1 and his newspaper. The latter could prove to be most embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into Castro's hands.

NEW YORK TIMES

C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents, AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/27 is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK contacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop.

E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently patrolled by sea.

RABEL Nunez

F. This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 operations aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same purposes. Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they expect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

4. Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level, it is requested that Headquarters advise JMWAVE as to its decision. In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Headquarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time, operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated.

END OF MESSAGE

See DIR 31748

31 March 1963

PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW

I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communications, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, working out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under discussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The results of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.

II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE

The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and

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the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as developed.

III. PHASE I.

A. AMTRUNK Personnel 08

1. AMTRUNK/2 is a [21] year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine operations. He attended [Catholic Social] University in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasion a great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in [January] 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout his training. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is conscientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.

3/PV

2. AMTRUNK/3, a 22 year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in August 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not interfere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.

B. TASKS

1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at A/3's father's farm in the Galera section (AMS 3885 III, Coords 993614).

2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.

3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his father's farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be exfiltrated at Punta Jijira.

4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.

5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.

6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandestine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration.

7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).

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C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to A/3's father's farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.

2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.

3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.

4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts.

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by A/3's father and Santos SUAREZ located 1 kilometer from the point of infiltration. They will make contact with the manager of the farm named Pedro CRUZ. CRUZ is 35 to 40 years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon CRUZ to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo or Havana:

a. Roman HERNANDEZ, who lives a few kilometers away in Sierra del Arzobispo. HERNANDEZ owns a small farm and a butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is 37 to 40 years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.

b. If CRUZ is unsuccessful in getting HERNANDEZ' truck he will contact Augusto MACHIN who operates a farm next to A/3's father's farm. He is 45-50 years old, married, no children, wife's name is Alicia. He was the mayor of Santa Cruz del Norte in 1954. He owns a jeep.

19-6-81

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c. Another contact of A/3 is Ramon CALZADILLE age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is Corojo #1, Cotorro, Havana. He owns a butcher shop in the Cotorro section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.

2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.

a. Elsa Maria NEGRIN, 25 years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.

b. Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55 born in Havana. He is a physician who lives and practices medicine in Havana. IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medicine at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. IGLESIAS is also a close friend of Elsa NEGRIN.

c. Sergio MENDEZ, age about 50, born in Cienfuegos, a former senator (1954) as well as the former head of the Railroad system in Cuba. Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. MENDEZ has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The husband of this daughter, however, works for Che Guevara. A/2 has maintained correspondence with MENDEZ.

d. Isabel MENOCOL, age about 35, born in Havana, single. Subject is an English teacher who runs a small private tutoring school in English in Havana. She was A/2's English teacher and offered support to the underground. MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.

e. Gloria BAMCIALLA age 23-24 born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana. She has no record of underground work. She lives in Guanabo Beach during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at Guanabo Beach in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary.

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

a. Jorge VALS, age late 30s early 40s, married. Subject holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims VALS has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. VALS primary interest has been trying to organize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels VALS is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of VALS and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to VALS in 1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.

b. Jose DUARTE Oropesa age early 40s, served in the U.S. Army during World War II. According to A/2, DUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military District by Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos, DUARTE was removed from the post and presently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said DUARTE started working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the military secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually DUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 DUARTE was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and revolutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention DUARTE as an opportunist.

c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.

06 08

(Lester RODRIGUEZ) age (late 30s early 40s,) married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as (head of) 08 one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he is now working (in INRA) in Oriente Province. He claims (RODRIGUEZ) assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Cover

A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his 24 (father's farm) for any length of time and he does not want his 24 (father) to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3

7/17

to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his business. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to undertake a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his business competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his (father's farm) with maritime reception capabilities. 24

2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient number of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana. However, he has not seen (VALS) and (DUARTE) for over a year. In addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on (DUARTE) conflict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that (DUARTE) is pro-regime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims (DUARTE) is an opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. (A/2's rebuttal to these remarks is that (DUARTE) has assisted him in the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of (DUARTE) which unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly security conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impression. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his (father's farm) and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated that a man named (DUARTE) would be one of their contacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candidate for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents.

10/17/

3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and recruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.

IV. PHASE II

A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL

1. AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41 year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly motivated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense. He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply resents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he presents a difficult handling problem.

2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been involved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME. He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made four black infiltration/exfiltration trips to and from Cuba and PBPRIME, and has an excellent knowledge of the northern Matanzas area. He is easy to work

19-6-8

with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27.

3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a [49] year old fisherman from the [Cardenas] area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.

B. TASKS

1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations.

2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for transportation into Havana.

3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.

4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfiltration and future infiltrations.

5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.

6. Establish internal and external communications.

7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

It is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second infiltration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).

2/17V

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA

1. Cayo Cinco Leguas. This key is used for production of charcoal and salt. Residents are reported solidly anti-Communist. A/14 has two contacts here that he used previously for infils and exfils. One is "Tango" Garcia Lezcano. Tango is a brother of Eustiquiano Garcia Lezcano (201-307338) whom A/14 wanted to use as a guide in this operation, but who was already being utilized elsewhere. The other contact is the owner of the Salina (salt drying beds). A/14 has not yet been able to recall this individual's name.

2. Finca Casualidad. This area is directly south of Cinco Leguas, on the mainland. Key contacts here are Antonio Garcia (not related to Tango, above) and Pablo Lopez both of whom have small farms in the area.

3. Town of Marti. Contact here is "Perico" LNU. Subject is about 50 years old, is employed by INRA and has a jeep which was used previously by A/14 for operational purposes.

4. City of Cardenas. Contact is Pedro Barbi owner of the Bate Marino restaurant. Subject is a close friend of A/14 who assisted him previously with transportation for maritime receptions. Barbi would be used to take A/14 and A/27 to Havana. Owns a car.

5. City of Matanzas. A-14 has a friend here named Carlos Pedraza who also assisted A/14 in underground activities in 1961. Subject is 60 years old, married, and is a forman of public works in the city. Subject has a son Carlos now in New York City. Pedraza will be contacted for transportation to Havana. Owns a car.

6. Varadero. "Fifo" Pineiro owns a car and was formerly a close friend of A/14. Subject was formerly active in the underground and might be used by A/14 in the event he could not use Barbi or Pedraza for obtaining transportation. Pineiro is the brother of the communist Manolo Pineiro, aka "Barba Roja", but is reported to be anti-communist himself.

7. Havana

a. Adolfina (Suarez) More. Subject is single and lives with her mother. Is friend of AMICE/27 (possibly mistress) and can be used as safehouse keeper. Subject is sister of Rafael (Suarez) More, a Commandante in the Navy who, according to A/27, was at one time chief of naval operations. His present assignment or location is unknown.

23/pv

06

b. Manuel (Garcia) Sanchez. 06 Is a close friend of A/14 and is uncle of A/14's wife. 06 Can be used for operational support, a car, and safehousekeeping. Was formerly a Lt. in Oriente under Calixto Garcia 06 but no longer in army. A/14 believes he is now an adminstrator of some type of industry in Havana.

06

c. Maria Josefa (Isalgue) Subject is aunt of A/14 and can be used as safehouse keeper. She is single, lives alone except for ten cats. Does not have a car. Was formerly a teacher but now has a pension and does not work.

06

d. Gonzalo (Lopez) de la Torre. Subject is a relative of A/27 and can be called on for ops support or safehousing. Subject has a car, is married, no children, is in his sixties.

06

e. Bebo (Orozco). To be recruited by A/14 as his principal agent in Havana. Subject and A/14 previously worked together in the underground. 06 Orozco was in the Sierra with Castro and also fought in Camaguey. He resigned from the army in February 1959, although he has maintained many contacts within the army. Was one time active in the 06 Movimiento Democratico Martiano and was a friend of Capt. Bernardo Corrales who was shot by Castro in Pinar del Rio. Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain arms and remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into Cuba without his absence having been known to the authorities. Was responsible for safehousekeeping Vargas Gomez 06 for nearly one month when authorities were searching for him. Will be used for intel collection and spotting on defectable army officers. He is also known to A/27, but not well. A/14 was last in touch with Orozco by letter about two months ago. 06

f. Ramon (Guin) Diaz. Subject to be recruited by A/27 as principal agent. Would be used for operational intelligence and spotting among disaffected army officers. Would be kept entirely compartmented from Orozco 06 Guin is an army Comandante, now managing a large INRA farm complex outside of Havana. He is known to A/27 and A/14, both of whom believe he can be contacted safely. He is anti-Communist and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos officers contacted by A/27 in early 1961 to join in an overthrow of the government.

Co-defendant in CUBELA trial - IN prison

()/P/

g. Target personalities who are suspected of being disaffected and on whom A/27 and A/14 will attempt to gather information in Havana are as follows:

1. Comandante "Macho" Parra
2. Cdte. Oscar Guerra
3. " Jose Pinares
4. Capt. FNU Lawton
5. " Manuel Avila
6. Cmdte. Rene de los Santos
7. " Pedro Miret
8. Capt. Juan Nuiry
9. Cmdte. Rafael Suarez More
10. Capt. Fernando Fernandez Superville
11. Capt. FNU Guerra Matos
12. Capt. Sandy Olivares
13. " Jose Fernandez Alvarez

These names have all been checked through JMWAVE RI and in most cases also with AMLEO/3. In a majority of cases there appears to be some evidence to indicate the subjects may be disaffected. In the case of Jose Pinares however, it would appear that he is completely loyal to the regime. This information was passed on to A/27 and A/14. RI files were negative on Avila and Lawton.

E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will live black during their entire stay in Cuba. They will be equipped with alias documentation and with disguises. Both of them have previously lived in the Havana area and know the city well. They will be trained in Secret Writing (SW) and will plan to train at least two and possible three agents in Havana in SW, prior to their own exfiltration. In addition, it is planned to train A/27 and A/14 in OWVL. At the time of infiltration, exfiltration plans will have been laid on with the agents. In the event that a change in time or location of exfiltration becomes necessary, an OWVL message could be sent to the agents. Any urgent and immediate message which might have to be sent by the agents during their short stay in Havana would be on a prearranged open code system by commercial telegram. Such a system will be worked out to cover several possible contingencies. Internal communications of whatever net is organized by A/27 and A/14 will be arranged by courier, cut-out, live and dead drops.

F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The LCFLUTTER examinations on both AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 were inconclusive. Although it is the opinion of both the case officers and the training personnel who have been in close contact with these individuals that both agents are

highly motivated and strongly anti-communist, this point will remain basically unresolved since it is almost certain that A/27 would refuse a second LCFLUTTER examination if asked. It is believed that A/27 was withholding information during the LCFLUTTER and subsequently. The nature, seriousness, and possible consequences of this are as yet not clear.

2. A/27 has told at least two people something about this operation. Although he says that he did not give any details of the operation, he does admit to having discussed it in very general terms with two individuals whom he named at the time of the LCFLUTTER test. One of these is a friend of Gutierrez Menoyo and one a friend of Vargas Gomez.

THERE SAME suspicion he was G-2 agents.

3. AMICE/27 has not seen his contacts in the army for the past two years. Although it is difficult to assess how well he knows various persons in the military about whom he speaks, it is the case officer's opinion that few of these contacts might be considered really close. AMICE/14 has been out of direct touch with his operational contacts since July 1961.

4. The infiltration into Cayo Cinco Leguas is dependent upon having a good guide in the boat. At this time, Phase II is awaiting the recruitment of AMTRUNK/4 as guide.

5. Control over AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 is basically lacking. Some control can be exerted through the implied threat of withholding support to the operation. Control however will remain tenuous at best and A/27 will continue to be a difficult handling problem.

6. On the positive side of the ledger is the calibre of the agents, both of whom are well educated, astute, and highly motivated. Both agents have experience in clandestine operations, particularly A/14 who has made a number of previous clandestine entries and exits and has many operational contacts. To date both have performed in a superior manner in training.

V. FUTURE PLANS

During the week of 1 through 6 April, the team will receive maritime instruction. During the week 8 through 13 April, they will receive SW training, possibly OWVL training, disguise training, and further operational planning sessions.

VI. COMMITMENTS

1. According to AMICE/27, the following principle, which he feels is a commitment from ODYOKE, was enunciated during his initial trip to ZRMETAL: "ODYOKE will recognize a new Cuban

government which is anti-Communist and which operates on democratic principles; ODYOKE does not desire to impose a government of its own choice upon Cuba". A/27 has made a big point of discussing this "commitment". It is apparent that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and his followers. It is also apparent that in his mind he links Batista and KUBARK, and fears that KUBARK would back Batistianos in a post-Castro government.

2. All AMTRUNK group members think that they received a commitment while in ZRMETAL that ODYOKE would support their operational plan, with funds, training, logistical support, and technical assistance, but would leave control of the operation entirely in their hands. In other words, they are not working for ODYOKE or KUBARK in any sense. On this point they are very sensitive.

3. Another commitment which AMICE/27 claims to have discussed in ZRMETAL is that ODYOKE should give "official recognition" to members of a conspiracy which culminates in a successful coup d'etat, following the coup, in order that these individuals will not be treated as political criminals by a future regime. This means recognition of an individual's participation in the conspiracy, not a promise of recognition of a specific government formed by the conspirators themselves.

4. Discussion of the above "commitments" has been pressed several times by A/27. PEGGINS has not agreed to any of these commitments with A/27. However, A/27 feels that the commitments have already been made by ODYOKE in ZRMETAL. PEGGINS has told A/27 that he will report these "commitments" back to ODYOKE to determine if, in fact, ODYOKE considers them as commitments.

5. The only commitment made by JMWAVE through PEGGINS has been that if any of the AMTRUNK group were killed or captured while on the mission, their families in PBPRIME would be assisted for a "reasonable amount of time" financially. PEGGINS declined to state what that time would be or how much financial assistance would be involved.

6. One further negative commitment has been discussed between PEGGINS and A/27. PEGGINS has stated to A/27 that no commitment will be made at this time to support any internal group organized by the AMTRUNKS with weapons or explosives and that this extends specifically to no promise to support active sabotage with demolitions.

N.B.

Why!

RO

19-6-51/1

24 February 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Estimate of Damage Which Could Accrue to CIA Miami Through Prosecution of the Rolando Masferrer Haitian Invasion Group

1. The decision by the Justice Department to seek a Grand Jury indictment against Rolando Masferrer and certain of his associates is a potentially explosive matter which could result in extensive damage to CIA activities in Miami. Recent adverse publicity on the national scene and in the Miami area have added substantially to the already sizeable embarrassment potential. Some of the main sectors of danger to CIA equities are described below.

2. Basic national publicity regarding student and foundation topics have already attracted attention of the local press to the CIA in general. Usually any reference to CIA covert activities leads the press to check files for references to any such activities locally. However, before this action could be taken, the story regarding the Pan American Foundation and the University of Miami broke, and the press immediately concentrated on this topic. The CIA Chief of Station learned through personal press contacts that this was partly a matter of luck and partly because of the friendly and cooperative attitude of these press contacts. Although several editorials highly critical of CIA have been published and the replay of wire service stories has been given much space, as yet there has been no local follow-up aimed at putting CIA or the CIA Station on the spot. However, the situation remains delicate, since, even with much good will, local newsmen cannot afford to let themselves be scooped by outsiders concerning stories in their own back yard.

3. Any new story, such as the 22 February story in World Journal Tribune on suspected CIA connection with recruitment of Cuban pilots for the Congo, the possible results of inquiry made on 21 February by three students connected with the University of Miami newspaper The Hurricane, or further revelations concerning the Pan American Foundation, could easily trigger publicity with an inevitable focus on the South Campus of the University of Miami and on the Miami Station cover firm.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

4. As has been the case for the past six years, Dr. Henry King Stanford, President and Dr. Eugene Cohen, Vice President and Treasurer of the University of Miami, have extended their fullest cooperation concerning the Miami Station and overall CIA interests and it is anticipated they will continue to do so. However, we believe there is a practical limit to the amount of pressure they could stand from their trustees and from certain public quarters if there is a flood of publicity regarding CIA activities allegedly centered in or controlled from the Zenith Technical Enterprises Inc., or its accused successor, the Melmar Corporation. If such a situation arises, it is conceivable that Dr. Stanford would feel impelled to take some action aimed at disassociating the University of Miami from any contact with the Melmar Corporation. Since the Melmar Corporation is ostensibly the tenant of the University of Miami although on Federal property, the resulting action might involve a request for the termination of the tenancy agreement.

5. Even if the above circumstances did not exist, we would remain concerned regarding the possible effects of the prosecution of the Masferrer group. Although no Station agents or persons with whom the Miami Station has contractual arrangements are among the persons arrested or those who will be prosecuted, it will be very easy for the defense to drag CIA Miami into the case. The defense has only to obtain testimony (true or perjured) from one of the defendants, or to summon as defense witness one or more disaffected former agents of the CIA Station, in order to begin a chain reaction surfacing much detail and rumor concerning CIA operations against the Cuban target. Given the sizeable reduction of infiltration and Covert Action agents during the past year, a general feeling of frustration and lack of support for Cuban freedom attributed to passive U.S. policy and reduction in CIA support in all sectors, the long standing animosity of certain exile circles against U.S. Government, notably CIA, and the evaluation that CIA now is the most vulnerable of Federal Agencies confronting them, exiles will be tempted to see an attack against CIA as accomplishing several purposes, that is, gaining acquittal, blackening CIA, and exerting pressure on the U.S. Government for a policy change.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING		
PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING attachment	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: TYPIC
Contact Report - IDEN *A

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: See Para 4

1. IDEN A, a wealthy and prominent New Orleans businessman, was recommended to JMWAVE and made available by Headquarters. He had been cleared by Headquarters for JMWAVE use under date of 15 December 1962 in DIR-05291.

2. IDEN A was initially contacted for JMWAVE by Eli A. SACHTSCHALE, who was introduced to him by the New Orleans KUJUMP office on 27 December 1962. The JMWAVE cover situation was discussed with IDEN A by SACHTSCHALE and IDEN A's assistance was requested. IDEN A was first enlisted as the President of YOCOUGH, a JMWAVE cover company. Also cleared and used as officers of YOCOUGH are IDEN D and IDEN E. Although cleared and witting, these individuals are contacted only when their signatures on YOCOUGH documents are required, all contact normally being with IDEN A. IDEN A also permits use of his own company as a funding mechanism for YOCOUGH. He has acted as a spotter for JMWAVE and has recommended several other businessmen who are being used by JMWAVE. He has also made available several oil companies in which he owns interests for use in backstopping cover of JMWAVE operational vessels. It is known that he is used by Headquarters for several JBECHO activities. IDEN A is contacted several times each month by JMWAVE. *Ace Marine Survey* *Ceres Enterprises Inc*

3. IDEN A has met Rufus E. MANGROLL and Colin R. HOWGRIND as well as Eli A. SACHTSCHALE. He knows YOCOUGH, YOAFT and the JMWAVE operational vessel IDEN B. He knows that Miami attorney IDEN C participates in JMWAVE activities. So far as is known, he knows no other JMWAVE personnel or assets.

4. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned IDEN A and that it be made known to JMWAVE.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

ATTACHMENT;
Identities u/s/c

DISTRIBUTION:
3 - C/WH/C w/att u/s/c

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED	DATE DISPATCHED
12 May 65	MAY 19 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-21422

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

14-00000

UNDER SEPARATE COVER

TO: UFGA-21422

IDENTITIES

IDEN A: Alfred J. *Moran

DPOB: Not available

Res: 8422 South Claybourne Avenue
New Orleans, Louisiana

Bus: 909 South Broad Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

IDEN B: M/V BARB

IDEN C: James Costello

IDEN D: Glenn E. Magnuson

IDEN E: Robert T. Nieset

104-10104-10262 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

File: Kennedy assassination - Garrison

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: E/BC

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE: 20 DEC 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/EURBC	20 Dec 67			00C 67-2367
2.				
3. Office of General Counsel John Greaney			JG	1-3: Per our conversation, incidentally, Jim still under [24 State] cover with my [08 daughter!] [03 ...]
4.				
5.				
6.				SECRET
7.				Passed oral info to Mr Kossack that FBI was given report in London by [24 MI-5] a Govt Garrison to Russell Foundation, on 2 Jan 1968 J.K.G.
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				file
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

4 RS 3 MC

 OGC 67-2367

20 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : Mr. John Greaney

SUBJECT : James Garrison

1. Per our conversation in the environs of the DD/P's office on 19 December, we have just received from [London] Station a scrap of information on Subject's activities. [MI-5,] the [British] Security Service, has provided the following in a report on Americans who are in correspondence with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation:

> "Jim Garrison, District Attorney, Orleans, Louisiana
>
> A secret and reliable source has reported that the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has been in touch with Jim Garrison. Our source states that the initiative in this contact appears to have come from the Foundation and the purpose of it seems to be to persuade Garrison to write an article about the late President Kennedy's assassination which presumably the Foundation could use in some way."

2. [MI-5] has also passed this information to the Legal Attache (FBI representative) in [London.] I would stress that [MI-5's] source is very sensitive and request that this office be advised in advance if any executive action is to be taken on the basis of the above information.

[Philip R. Fendig
AC/EURBC]

JMWAVE COVER FACILITY

A. NAME : Ace Marine Survey, Inc.

OFFICE ADDRESS : Room 214, 2525 S.W. 3rd Street, Miami, Florida

MAILING ADDRESS : P. O. Box 1337, Main Post Office, Miami, Florida

LOCATION : Office of Attorney Norman S. Pallot

B. TYPE OF FACILITY: This is a Florida Corporation established by and under the control of JMWAVE and certified to do business in Florida. Ace Marine Survey, Inc. was formerly known as Ace Cartography Company, a corporation which had been certified to do business in Florida on 11 July 1962. This Corporation was amended on 4 November 1966 to its new name, Ace Marine Survey, Inc.

The President of the Corporation is Alfred J. Moran of New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. Moran is a very prominent businessman in the New Orleans area. He is head of Kalvar and has investments in a variety of businesses which include many oil interests. He is known to Headquarters representatives particularly in Logistics.

C. OSTENSIBLE BUSINESS: Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is engaged primarily in marine research including the study of marine life and testing of marine equipment. However, its general provisions permit it to perform almost any corporate function.

D. USE : JMWAVE use of the Corporation is to provide cover for a maritime vessel, the M/V SONORA. The Corporation provides status cover and payrolling of the agents assigned to the M/V SONORA and the safe area or berthing site from which the vessel operates in the performance of its ostensible business.

24

E. FUNDING : Method - This account is funded through the [Bank and Hall covert account at the First National Bank of Miami] by the following method: A check in the total amount of the deposits is drawn on this account. A credit ticket is obtained by our cleared contact from the cash vault. This credit ticket together with the appropriate deposit slips for the various corporations is then turned over to a teller, where it is combined with all other transactions which are processed by that particular teller on the given business day. Since the number of transactions handled by a given teller may go as high as 250 to 300 there is slight chance of the deposits being attributed to the particular credit ticket which accompanied these deposits.

24

Overt Attribution or Source -[Offshore Navigation Company, 3503 Fern Street, New Orleans, Louisiana]

SECRET

F. TAX STATUS : This is a profit-making corporation and has met Federal and State requirements as follows:

1) Corporation Federal Income Tax Returns.

2) Federal Withholding and Unemployment Taxes.

3) Florida State Unemployment Tax.

4) Florida Corporation Report and Tax Return.

5) Florida Intangible Property Tax Return.

G. AGENT IDENTIFICATION: The Corporation was providing status cover and payrolling for 10 Cubans as of 31 January 1967.

H. ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY:

1. Maritime Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967: This cover company should be affected little by a flap. However, because of the berthing location within largely tourist or recreation areas, its commercial activity has been noted.

2. Cover Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967: A successor to Ace Cartography Company, Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is currently used in connection with the leasing of a waterfront berthing site for the berthing of M/V SONORA, which is registered under this firm. The firm also provides cover and serves as well as the vehicle for payrolling the agent crew.

Ace Marine Survey, Inc.,is engaged in the field of marine research, including the study of marine life as well as the testing of marine equipment.

In view of the current limited use of this cover, the likelihood of exposure is considerably reduced. However, if such an exposure did occur, it is felt that the damage to either WOFACT or the officers of Ace Marine Survey, Inc., would be of no great import. The major likely "injury" that would be sustained would be the denial of further use of the berthing site and the need for re-naming/re-registering the M/V SONORA.

In order to add depth and lend further substance to the cover story, the officers of a legitimate firm, [Offshore Navigation Company, New Orleans,] Louisiana, which is engaged in marine research and off-shore oil exploration activities, have agreed to backstop the activities of Ace Marine Survey, Inc. and to recognize the latter firm as a client.

SECRET

JMWAVE COVER FACILITY

: Ceres Enterprises, Inc.

[AD]DRESS : Suite 1409 Biscayne Building, 19 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33101

[MAIL A]DDRESS : P. O. Box 5045, Main Post Office, Miami, Fla. 33101

: Office of Attorneys George E. Brown and Thomas B. Duff

[F]ACILITY: This corporation was established in Florida and certified to do business on 10 March 1964. It was established by and is under the control of JMWAVE.

The President of this corporation is Mr. Richard W. Freeman, who is the retired Chairman of the Board of Delta Airlines. He is also the principal owner of the Coca-Cola Bottling Company in New Orleans. In addition he has many other varied interests including investments in oil ventures. He is extremely prominent in the New Orleans civic and social structure.

[...]E BUSINESS: This corporation was established ostensibly to maintain and operate boats for all types of marine research.

: This corporation provided cover for maritime vessels, the M/V BARB and the M/V JADE, and served as the status and payroll mechanism for the agents employed by this corporation.

: Method - This account is funded through the [Bank and Hall covert account at The First National Bank of Miami] by the following method: A check in the total amount of the deposits is drawn on this account. A credit ticket is obtained by our cleared contact from the cash vault. This credit ticket together with the appropriate deposit slips for the various corporations is then turned over to a teller, where it is combined with all other transactions which are processed by that particular teller on the given business day. Since the number of transactions handled by a given teller may go as high as 250 to 300 there is slight chance of the deposits being attributed to the particular credit ticket which accompanied these deposits.

Overt Attribution or Source - [Peterman & Peterman Associates, P. O. Box 8103, Main Post Office, Chicago, Illinois]

9NCORD

SECRET

TAX STATUS : This is a corporation for profit. It has met federal and state tax requirements as follows:

1) Corporation Federal Income Tax Return

2) Federal Withholding and Unemployment Taxes

3) Florida State Unemployment Taxes

4) Florida Corporation Report and Tax Return

5) Florida Intangible Property Tax Return

AGENT IDENTIFICATION: None at this time.

ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY:

1. Maritime Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967 - The cover mechanism established by the Ceres Enterprises, Inc. was very secure during the period of its operation and remained so until the loss of one of its agents who was captured in Cuba. This made it necessary to terminate the activities of this corporation and transfer its activities to another entity. This was accomplished without any unusual events or actual public exposure. If any should occur at this late date, the damage would be minimal.

2. Cover Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967 - This corporation is currently inactive and will become legally dormant after three years. It was placed in this status due to an operational flap which could have exposed the corporation. The last active tax return was filed at the tax year ending March 31, 1966. An additional tax return will be filed for the past tax year which will indicate no financial transactions.

   Its assets and activities were transferred to other JMWAVE entities. This corporation was established to provide cover for a Maritime Branch vessel and status and payroll cover for the agents assigned to it. The corporation is inactive and will be allowed to remain so. It was placed in this status due to a flap wherein an agent was captured in Cuba who had knowledge of this vessel and its ownership. There was no public exposure in the Miami area. However, because of the past incident the corporation should not be used in the future under its current name. While in use the corporation served very satisfactorily for the purpose for which it was established.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:
Seymour R. Bolten
2 E 14

EXTENSION: 7520

NO.

DATE: 19 September 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. John Morrison OGC 7 D 01	9/19/74		
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15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Attached is an advance informal copy of our proposed security deletions and revisions of the Hunt galley proof. Please note that this list has not yet been reviewed by Mr. Blee and is, therefore, still subject to change.

2. The DDO panel that reviewed the Hunt manuscript has designated items, numbered 12, 14, 19, 21, 24 and 25, as "hard core," by which we mean that the Agency should insist on their deletion or revision and be prepared to obtain an injunction and engage in litigation should Hunt refuse to cooperate.

Seymour R. Bolten
SAB/DDO

C/0

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☒ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Manuscript and Galley Proof of Undercover: Memoirs of an American Agent by E. Howard Hunt

NOTES: A. Pages and lines underlined and appearing at the beginning of the items below refer to the galley proof.

B. Corresponding page and line listings as they appear in the manuscript are provided in brackets at the end of each item.

1. Page 57, line 6 from bottom of page; the name "Henry Pleasants". Mr. Pleasants retired under cover and his past relationship should not be exposed. It is also recommended that efforts be made to have the name "John Richardson" also removed from the same sentence containing Mr. Pleasants' name. (Page 96, line 17.)

2. Page 59, line 38 beginning with "However" and ending on page 60, line 2 with "milieu". Rutherford T. "Pinky" Walsh ~~retired under cover and his CIA relationship should not be~~ exposed. His assignment in Paris under student cover is similarly classified. The description of this activity just a couple of pages before the author gratuitously mentions the lack of an agreement between the Agency and the French barring unilateral operations in France (Item 4 below) is potentially an additionally damaging blow to liaison relationships. (Page 100, lines 10-14.)

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3. Page 63, line 21; the name "Frank Holcomb" Mr. Holcomb retired under cover and his past relationship with the CIA should not be exposed. It is additionally recommended that the entire paragraph wherein Mr. Holcomb's name appears (lines 21-24) should be deleted because it acknowledges CIA operations in support of anti-communist political operations in Italy. (page 105, lines 18-21.)

4. Page 63, line 30 beginning with "By" and ending with "arrangement" on line 33, page 63. It is recommended that this passage be deleted since its inclusion not only is not pertinent to the narrative but it unnecessarily jars liaison with the British and is an implied insult to the French liaison services. (page 106, lines 4-7.)

5. Page 66 beginning with "Finis" on line 24 and ending with "world" on line 27. This passage describes a specific CIA operation which resulted in the production and distribution of an animated cartoon based on George Orwell's Animal Farm. (Page 111, lines 6-9.)

6. Page 68, the pseudonym "John F. Rittenhouse" on line 34. The author's original CIA pseudonym was classified, and even though compromised, never appeared in the press and still exists on various currently classified documents. (page 114, line 23.)

7. Page 71, beginning with "Spanish" on line 28 and ending with "America" on line 20, page 72, and including the footnotes on pages 71 and 72. This passage should be deleted because it describes the Agency's role in subsidizing, producing and distributing "El Campesino's" book, Life and Death in the USSR. (pages 120 [lines 4-20, including footnote] - 121 [lines 1-16, including footnote.])

8. Page 72 beginning with "Eudocia" on line 21 and ending with "Scribner's" on line 32. This should be deleted because it describes the Agency's role in the translation, publishing and distribution of Eudocio Ravines' book, The Yenan Way. It also describes William Buckley's role in that operation as a CIA officer. (Page 121, lines 17-23 and page 122, lines 1-6.)

9. Page 73 beginning with "Mexican" on line 5 through "Rivera" on line 8. This should be deleted because it not only describes sources and methods but also identifies a specific CIA operation. (Page 122, lines 19-21 and page 123, line 1.)

10. Page 73 beginning with "Communism" on line 14 and ending with "reputation" on line 15. This passage could serve to identify a former asset in Mexico who is still living. (Page 123, lines 7-8.)

11. Page 73 beginning with "cover" on line 17 through "legend" on line 19. This should be deleted because it identifies a CIA-sponsored cover arrangement in Bangkok. Furthermore, this particular type of cover, the movie industry, has figured in earlier unfavorable publicity to CIA in other Southeast Asian countries and thus serves to further render suspect the use of such cover in still other areas. (Page 123, lines 10-12.)

12. Page 73 beginning with "planned" on line 22 through "authentic" on line 5 of page 74 and including the footnote on page 74. This should be deleted because it describes a specific operation involving the forgery of a page of the [Shanghai Post], and also includes descriptions of sources and methods. (Page 123, lines 15-23 and all of page 124 including footnote.)

13. Page 77 beginning with "technical" on line 19 through "station" on line 21. This should be deleted because it describes and authenticates a CIA operation. (Page 131, lines 2-4.)

14. Page 80 beginning with "surreptitious-entry" on line 9 through "Embassy" on line 12, page 82. This should be deleted because it describes a specific, sensitive operation as well as sensitive sources and methods including the [acquisition of code materials]. (Page 136, line 3 through page 139, line 20.)

15. Page 86 beginning with "Greek" on line 18 through "countries" on line 20. This should be deleted because it identifies a specific operation and the foreign assets involved in its support. (Page 147, lines 6-8.)

16. Page 95 beginning with "quasi-military" on line 11 through "East" on line 16. This should be deleted because it describes various cover and support facilities used in Far East Asian countries. (Page 163, lines 6-11.)

17. Page 95 beginning with "Hong Kong" on line 16 through "Branch" on line 19. This should be deleted because it describes an operation conducted [jointly with a liaison service in Hong Kong targetted] against mainland China and as such is not only damaging to current American detente efforts but is particularly menacing to Hong Kong authorities in view of their proximity and susceptibility to potential Chinese retaliatory pressures. (Page 163, lines 11-14.)

substitute "In HK we ran no independent operation"

C/3

18. Page 99 beginning with "disrupting" on line 5 through "display" on line 27 and including the footnote on page 99. This passage describes specific CIA operations [in Tokyo targetted against China and as such are not only damaging to current detente efforts but are also disruptive to liaison relationships with the Japanese.] (Page 169 line 23 through page 170, line 22, including footnote.)

19. Page 102 beginning with "Despite" on line 6 through "returned" on line 10. This should be deleted because it describes a specific and sensitive CIA operation including [code materials]. (Page 175, lines 10-15.)

20. Page 105 beginning with "wiretap" on line 6 through "surreptitious-entry" on line 7. Ought to be deleted since it refers to sensitive Agency sources and methods. (Page 181, lines 2-3.)

21. Page 108 beginning with "tap" on line 17 through "Embassy" on line 7, page 109. This passage deals intermittently with various operational proposals, activities including a recruitment of an identifiable individual, as well as with sensitive methods of operation, e.g., surveillance teams. (Page 187, lines 6-24 through page 188, lines 1-15.)

22. Page 109 beginning with "FBI" on line 21 through "station" on line 26. The "Ramirez" operation. Describes an operation which began with the FBI's spotting of a possible Soviet intelligence agent. Since this information was then turned over to the Agency, a question arises concerning the need to seek the FBI's prior comments. (Page 189, lines 6-11.)

23. Page 111 beginning with "The" on line 22 through "triumvirate" on line 23. It would seem that an effort ought to be made to have this passage deleted or changed since its damage potential to [liaison relationships with the Uruguayan services] is considerable, and it does jeopardize the current careers and livelihoods of the Agency's contacts who are referred to by date and position and thus, are identifiable. (Page 192, lines 21-22.)

24. Page 115 beginning with "I" on line 23 through "department" on line 35. This passage should be deleted because it describes Agency methods of operation --- acquisition and passage of information to and from a liaison service --- as well as an overall Agency program of operational activities within Uruguay involving the '[monitoring of forty-two telephone lines]'. Page 200, lines 6-18.]

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25. Page 116 beginning with "technical" on line 10 through "secrets" on line 29. This passage should be deleted because it describes a sensitive operation conducted jointly with a liaison (Uruguayan) service which involved code materials. (Page 201, lines 12-23 and page 202, lines 1-9.)

NOT IN PASSAGE

26. Page 122 beginning with "The" on line 8 through "Djilas" on line 9. This passage should be deleted because it attests to the Agency's subsidization of publication of Djilas' book. In addition an effort ought to be made to have the author remove or appropriately alter the rest of the paragraph wherein he refers to an Agency news service located in "Washington's National Press Building". (Page 211, line 4.)

27. Page 122 beginning with "from" through "Gaines" on line 31. It is recommended that OGC's attention be called to this passage in order that they be made aware of its possible interpretations. (Page 212, lines 4-5.)

28. Page 123 beginning with "Soon" on line 12 through "Madrid" on line 35. This passage deals with the author's work on several "Peter Ward" books and, later, his assignment to Madrid. It is recommended that OGC's attention be called to this passage. (Page 212, last line through page 213, lines 1-23.)

29. Page 126 beginning with "Chief" on last line through "officers" on page 127, line 5. This passage should be deleted because it specifies the classified activities of a CIA officer, Roger Goiran. His assignments in Tehran and Brussels, as well as his involvement in the compilation of a classified "encyclopedic study" are unwarranted disclosures of Agency methods. (Page 219, lines 8-13.)

30. Page 130 beginning with "Free" on line 20 through "CIA" on line 21. This phrase should be deleted because it could serve to affect the life of one of the principals of the Free Cuba Committee, Mrs. Marieda Bourgin, a former witting contact, who is now employed by the State Department. (Page 225, lines 10-11.)

31. Page 150, all of lines 14 through 16. It would appear that this description of the author's contact with Dr. Barney Malloy of CIA is very unfair to the latter. It implies that Hunt had a special relationship with Dr. Malloy and an effort ought to be made by OGC to have the author rewrite this version in order to reflect Dr. Malloy's true role in this affair. Page 260, lines 22-23 through page 261, lines 1-2.)

32. Page 220, lines 5 through 10. This passage concerning the use of CIA alias documentation by Hunt and others includes loose language which implies that still another set of documents was prepared by the CIA for Hunt's use --- i.e., a set of documents which was not mentioned during the recent Congressional "Watergate hearings". As such this is misleading and could serve to create additional difficulties for the Agency. It is recommended that the OGC make an effort to have the author rewrite this paragraph in order that this potentially damaging language be removed from his manuscript. (Page 387, lines 4-9.)

add "old" + "[illegible]" [illegible] description documents.

C16

OGC 74-1755

SECRET

30 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with E. Howard Hunt Re His Memoirs, "Undercover"

1. On 28 September 1974 Ray Rocca, Deputy Chief/CI Staff, and I met in the DCD Washington Field Office with E. Howard Hunt, his attorney William A. Snyder, Jr., and Snyder's associate Thomas W. Coons. As the meeting began, Hunt asked if it was being tape-recorded; I assured him that it was not. He said he did not care; but that, if it were to be recorded, he would like to know. We then embarked upon the review according to the plan under which we would demand the deletion of three items as classified and then proceed to the remaining 29 items, only if Hunt was cooperative on the first three. He and his lawyers appeared very cooperative, and accordingly, the meeting continued to cover all 32 items.

2. Changes were agreed to in the items set forth in paragraphs 12, 14, and 25 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September 1974. These appear at pages 73, 80-83, and 115 of the galley proof and concern the fabrication of the Shanghai post for a Mexican operation, the entry into the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City, and the joint CIA-Uruguayan telephone monitoring operation. The wording of the agreed changes is as shown on the attached copies of the pertinent pages of the galley proof. Essentially, these changes disguise the identity of the fabricated newspaper and remove a reference to journalists as agents; delete the word "Guatemalan" to make the entered embassy non-specific; and delete the reference to listening posts and telephone monitoring to make that paragraph refer in more general terms to our ability to cover targets without referring to the use of electronic surveillance.

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3. We then proceeded to the 29 items which we would like to see modified but which we could not consider classified. We made this clear to Hunt and went through them one by one, discussing our concern with each. Hunt contended that most of these items should not be considered sensitive since they had been publicized extensively; in some cases confirmed in testimony; and, in the case of other items, the principals involved were dead. However, he agreed to changes in the items referred to in paragraphs 1, 3, 17, and 32 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September. These involve the deletions of the names of Henry Pleasants and Frank Holcomb, both now retired under cover; a direct reference to joint operations with the British in Hong Kong against China; and the wording of his reference to CIA alias documentation used by the Watergate burglars. The language of this last item will be changed so that it no longer leaves the impression that the documentation was prepared by the Agency for this operation.

4. When we had finished, Hunt and his lawyers emphasized as they had mentioned earlier in the meeting that it might be very difficult to get the publisher to agree to changes in the unclassified items. Mr. Snyder offered to present all of the items to the publisher for change without distinguishing between the classified and unclassified items. He said he would do this without implying they were all classified. I felt it necessary to turn down his offer because of the risk of the publisher being unwilling to accept that many changes with the result that we would have to go back to him on the three classified items, thus presenting a situation similar to our retraction of previously demanded deletions in the Marchetti book. I think there would be some danger of the publisher using this in his advertising and through reviewers for publicity purposes.

5. As we were leaving, Hunt showed me what was described as a "comfort letter." This was a letter written by him to the publishers on 17 May 1974 at the publisher's request which said that in his opinion nothing in the manuscript violated any agreement between himself and the CIA, nor would subject him to prosecution under the espionage laws. As the meeting was ending, Hunt expressed his hope that no publicity would be given to it and that the Agency would not issue any kind of a press release. In view of the Director's decision that we shall issue a press release, I took pains to persuade Hunt that public acknowledgment of the fact that we had reviewed his

manuscript would be in his interest as well as ours. He had referred more than once during the meeting to the need to avoid the appearance of "a bear hug"; in other words, collusion or cooperation between him and the Agency, leaving an inference that the book was designed to be a whitewash of CIA. In view of this, it was easy to convince Hunt that an Agency press release would be in his interest. I would note here, however, that both Mr. Rocca and I felt that Hunt and his lawyers were genuinely cooperative and that a press release which is too harsh or denigrates the book or Hunt's motives might be unfair and considered by him to be in bad faith. Hunt appears to retain admiration and respect for the Agency and seems convinced that nothing in his book will harm our operations or personnel.

JOHN D. MORRISON, JR.
Acting General Counsel

Attachments

cc: Acting DDO
SAB/DDO
DC/CI Staff
O/Security
Asst. to DCI
Mr. Walter Pforzheimer
C/CCS

OGC:JDM:sin
Original - OGC Subj: PUBLICATIONS
1 - Chrono

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CIA
RECORD NUMBER : 104-10105-10290
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 80T01357A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CHIEF, COVER & COMMERCIAL STAFF
TO : ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL
TITLE : MR. E. HOWARD HUNT - ALIAS BIRTH CERITIFICATE
DATE : 11/02/1973
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS : TOURIST CARD
JFK ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/21/04
COMMENTS : JFK37 : F10 : 20040112-1033571

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10105-10290

OGC 73 2074

2 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting General Counsel

SUBJECT: Mr. E. Howard Hunt - Alias Birth Certificate

1. On 30 October 1973 I saw Mr. John S. Warner, Acting General Counsel, to discuss two outstanding requests from the Special Prosecutor's office in regard to U.S. passports which had been issued to E. Howard Hunt and a MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD on Mr. Robert Bennett's session with the U.S. Prosecutor Silbert in July 1972. I handed Mr. Warner a memorandum listing the type, number and dates of the 2 passports which Mr. Hunt was issued between 1950 and 1970. In reviewing the information in this memorandum, I mentioned Mr. Hunt's tour in Spain in the middle 1960's and the fact that I had been instructed not to include Mr. Hunt and his activities in my inspection of the Madrid Station in 1965. I also mentioned to Mr. Warner that I remembered two discussions with Mr. Skip Dunn late in 1972 during which he inquired of me whether CIA had ever issued an alias passport to Mr. Hunt. I said that as I recalled, CIA did not initiate the issuance of a U.S. alias passport, but that Mr. Hunt did have in his possession an alias travel document. This came as a surprise to Mr. Warner. He had not been previously aware that Mr. Hunt possessed a U.S. international travel document in alias. As a result he called Mr. John Richards, Office of the IG, and asked whether Mr. Richards was aware of this and whether Mr. Dunn's reports provided this information. After an interval, Mr. Richards called back and told Mr. Warner that I had provided information to Mr. Dunn that Mr. Hunt had a tourist card in alias. According to Mr. Richards, Mr. Dunn's memorandum quoted me as saying that my information came from an " A-1 source." At that moment, I could not recall having made such a statement.

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2. Upon my return from Mr. Warner's office, I consulted with Mr. James W. Franklin, Chief, Official Cover Branch, CCS, with whom I had discussed Mr. Dunn's inquiry in late 1972. I asked Mr. Franklin whether he could refresh my memory. This he did immediately. He reminded me that a newspaper article (Tab A) had appeared claiming that one of the Watergate 5 had carried a U.S. passport in the name of Edward Hamilton. This newspaper article had been seen by Mr. Robert Johnson, Deputy Director of the U.S. Passport Office, who had had the U.S. Passport Office files examined with negative results. Mr. Johnson then determined from the FBI that the document involved was not a U.S. passport in the name of Edward Hamilton but a tourist card in that name. I then remembered that because the information came from the FBI via Mr. Johnson, I had not identified the source of my information. I immediately called Mr. Warner and advised him of the foregoing.

3. Later in the afternoon of 30 October 1973 Mr. Franklin came to my office with a number of documents. They consisted of a form memorandum signed by me which was addressed to Mr. Hunt dated 29 June 1970 (Tab B), a list of names numbering from 1 through 154, representing true names (Tab C), and a second listing similarly numbered, representing aliases (Tab D). Number 63 on the true name list reads E. Howard Hunt and on the alias list, Edward Joseph Hamilton. Mr. Franklin explained -- which I had forgotten -- that we had obtained from TSD this list of outstanding alias birth certificates issued by TSD in an attempt to recall--if possible-- as many of these documents, or to determine what had happened to them. (Most of these alias birth certificates were issued in connection with the Bay of Pigs Operation.) The memorandum was never forwarded to Mr. Hunt because by June 1970, he had been retired for 3 months. This memorandum had not been included in Mr. Hunt's cover file but had been kept with the working papers pertaining to the action trying to recall as many of the outstanding alias birth certificates as possible. As a result, the repeated reviews of Mr. Hunt's cover file had not yielded the information that an alias birth certificate had been issued to him. 97 of the 154 aliases were not previously recorded in the CCS central index and the indexing after the acquisition of the list had been overlooked. The surfacing of these documents at this time occurred because in re-discussing Mr. Hunt's possession of an international travel document in alias reminded Mr. Franklin of the 1970 CCS exercise of recouping outstanding alias birth certificates. Discussions on the same subject in December 1972 simply did not result in the same memory association.

4. In the late afternoon of 30 October 1973 Mr. Franklin and I saw Mr. Warner, reported the foregoing facts to him, showed him the documents, and agreed that we would ask Mr. Johnson to check the Passport Office files once more to confirm that no U.S. passport in the name of Edward Joseph Hamilton had ever been issued to Mr. Hunt. The result of Mr. Johnson's check is still outstanding at the time of this writing.

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
Chief, Cover & Commercial Staff

4 Atts:
A: News Article
B: 29 June 70 Form Memo to Hunt
C: True Name Listing
D: Alias Name Listing

cc: IG via DDO

TRUE

1. ASARIS, Gundaris
2. AASAL, Glen 6175
3. SHERWOOD, John 11007
4. ADKINS, Matt 48-336
5. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay
6. RAGONA, Ferruggia NR
7. BARAKAUSKAS, Algio NR
8. BROWN, James W.
9. SPEED, Horace III 8435
10. Amthrill-1 (Crypt) NR Julio Kauri Barreto
11. ROSENBAUER, William A. 13915
12. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr. NR
13. BEALE, W. H. 48-336
14. BENAS, Alis NR
15. BEGERT, Jerome F. NR — 12871
16. ERICKSON, Paul 14317
17. KINAMMER, James F. NR
18. BARQUIN, Casimiro 7797
19. BECKER, Alexander NR
20. BYZEK, Stephen Joe K-3097
21. BURKE, Paul J. 8497
22. BRADFIELD, Tony Edward 48-338
23. SHERWOOD, John
24. MELBERG, Robert L. 2219
25. SHACKLEY, Theodore 6777
26. BRANTLEY, Herbert NR
27. BURKE, Paul J. 8497
28. BLAIR, William 9181
29. CUNNINGHAM, James Allen Jr.
30. CHAS, Peter
31. [redacted]
32. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton 48-336
33. CAREY, William David 4894
34. CARTER, William R.
35. CROCE, Andrew
36. FLORES, Thomas J.
37. DAIGA, Janis NR T-421
38. DALEY, V. J. NR
39. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
40. DILLON, John E. 9540
41. DE GARDER, Constantine NR
42. DEMMONS, William H.
43. DALY, Vincent S.
44. DUBOIS, Rene E.
45. EGAN, Frank J.
46. ENDERS, Rudolf A.
47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr.
48. None ✓
49. HEATH, Donald R.
50. FUCHS, Robert H.
51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr.
52. FLICK, Charles E. 17765 ✓

TRUE

53. [illegible], John Norman
54. [illegible], Frank 7422
55. FILLINGER, Robert Peter 48-33
56. GROFF, Charles 3857
57. CRILE Greano, Aubrey
58. BRIGOLAT, Pedro Gonzalez NR
59. GOUDIE, Cecil Mario 14162
60. TISLER, Frantisek 16183 5-1567
61. GREENE, Bill NR
62. GRAHAM, Barbara 9808
63. HUNT, E. Howard 9 1088
64. None
65. HAWKINS, Jack NR
66. HORN, Rufus A. Jr. 11749
67. HILDALGO, Barney
68. HEWITT, Thomas M. 9922
69. [redacted]
70. HECHT, Elmer Edward K-2150
71. IWASKIW, Andrij NR
72. JENCSOK, Stephen NR
73. JANCHUK, Nicholas NR
74. JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund E. NR
75. JAUNZEMIS, Ulvis NR
76. JOANSON, Ivar NR 7428
77. JASUKOW, Nikolai NR
78. KYKER, Benjamin Franklin 3111 (48-336)
79. KAPUSTA, Peter
80. KARKLINS, Zigurds NR
81. KRYZANIWSKY, Myron NR
82. KOCELA, Paul NR
83. KAPPES, G. George M.
84. KURTZ, Walter NR
85. KIDA, Jack
86. KENNEDY, John W.
87. KRUTYHOLOWA, Walter NR
88. KREGZDYS, Joseph 25-103
89. [redacted]
90. LAMBERGS, John NR
91. [redacted]
92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen 10580
93. MAYERFELD, Ernest 5824
94. KLEIN, Theodore 5570
95. LOPUSZAUSKY, Myroslaw 47-5
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae NR
97. Unknown ✓
98. MAHONEY, Philip J. 48-336
99. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
100. MASLOVSKY, Serge T-835
101. MARTINEZ, Ruben
102. SMITH, Haviland Jr. 4593
103. MOORE, Andrew F. NR 25-5
104. MARSAK, Frank 2994
105. KRIESFELD, George NR
106. MULANE, Corrald J NR 25

David Lee — Joe Latorre TSD. 68

TRUE

107. BARQUIN, Casimiro
108. MORALES David S.
110. NEWMASTER, Harry Richard
111. NASARENKO, Michael
112. PIEPER, Harry C.
113. PHILLIPS, William D.
114. GREENE, Harris
115. PASLAWSKY, Nicholas
116. PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw
117. FRANK, Maryado
118. MOORE, Robert Butler
119. PRIBANYEC, Janos
120. None

121. RASTENIS, Jonas
122. REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene
123. RAUS, Juri
124. RIKAND, Enno
125. AMLFO-3 (Crypt)
126. RATCLIFF, Richard
127. REEVES, John M. Jr.
129. REYNOLDS, Robert E.
131. RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr.
133. SULLIVAN, Dennis B.
136. STAROSTENKO, Henry
137. IMLER, Norman C.
138. SLEEPER, Gordon
139. None
140. None
141. GONZALO, QUESADA Jr.
142. SAGER, John
143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrill
144. SLENYS, Lindas K.
145. SOLNZEFF, Henry
146. SOLER, Eva Diana
147. SATINSKAS, Henry
148. STEVENS, George A.
149. WALLIN, Jack
150. TASHEFF, Mary

TRUE

151. AIMAN, James Henry
152. STOIAKEN, Nicholas P.
153. TALLEY, Ulo
154. TURK, Leo L.
156. THOMAS, Edward
157. None
158. TRIANOSKY, Harry
159. VINING, James L.
160. VAN COURTNEY, Donald
161. HARVEY, William K.
162. BULIK, Joseph
163. WILL, Kenneth John
164. SHORTALL, John W. Jr.
165. WATTS, Roy Furniss
166. MERTZ, Richard
167. None
168. ZANKIN, Myroslaw
169. ALAGAZE-1 (Crypt)

CASE FILES WITH MISSING BIRTH CERTIFICATES

ALIAS

1. ACKER, Gerald
2. ADLAND, Glennon Edward
3. AHORN, Paul Rodger
4. ALVAREY, Matt
5. ASHBORNE, Howard Clay
6. AUDISIO, Mario
7. BARKER, Algis
8. BARNAUD, James Winston
9. BARKER, Andrew Frank
10. BARRETO, John Raymond
11. BAUER, William John
12. BAUGH, William James
13. BELT, William Henry
14. BENTON, Alan
15. BENUCK, Karl Donald
16. BERGETHON, David Bjorn
17. BERGSON, William Kinander
18. BERTELLI, Charles Angelo
19. BEST, Alexander
20. (T) BINSWANGER, Stanley Joe
21. BORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
22. BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
23. BREITHEIM, John Albert
24. BRICK, Robert Lee
25. BRICKHAM, Tad S.
26. BRIGGS, Herb
27. BROOKE, Paul Gregory
28. BRUTON, William Emmott
29. CAMPBELL, James Alan Jr.
30. CARNEY, Peter
31. [redacted]
32. BOWTECK, Cletus Winton
33. CLINE, William David
34. CONRAD, WILLIAM Robert
35. CROWE, Andrew Paul
36. CURBELO, Eduardo
37. (T) DAILEY, James
38. DEKANSKI, Vincent Joseph
39. DELAINE, William Alan
40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
41. DE LONG, Constantine
42. DONAINE, William Henry
43. DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
44. DUBOIS, Rene E. ARMY
45. EMELSON, Frank Joseph
46. ELFMONT, Rudolf Albert
47. ELLEGOR, William Monroe
48. EVANS, Arthur Hall
49. FARON, Charles Andrew
50. FILECCIA, Robert H.
51. FITSAMES, Lucian Charles
52. (T) FLICK, Charles E.

ALIAS

53. FORDASCH, John Norman
54. FROST, Frank
55. FRYLINK, Robert Peter
56. GENGARO, Charles Henry
57. GENISMAN, Aubrey Lyle
58. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
59. GUDINO-MARGAIN, Carlos
60. HABER, Frantisek
61. HALE, William Mark
62. HALLY, Roberta Shirley
63. HAMILTON, Edward Joseph
64. HARRISON, Louise
65. HASKINS, John Martin
66. HEBERDEN, Roger Andrew ARMY
67. HILLARY, Bernard Norman
68. HODONICKI, Thomas Mark
69. [redacted]
70. HURLEY, Edward Elmer
71. IRVING, Andrew
72. JACOBS, Stephan
73. JAMES, Nicholas
74. JARECKI, Stanley
75. JEFFRIES, Uldis
76. (T) JENKINS, Ivar
77. JUDD, Nicholas
78. KACKMAN, Benjamin Franklin
79. KARLQUIST, Paul
80. KASARIAN, Zigurds
81. KELLY, Myron
82. KENDALL, Paul
83. KERCHNER, George Michael
84. KERKSICK, Walter
85. KIMBEY, Jack Anthony
86. KINSLOW, John William
87. KOLA, Walter
88. KOSTIK, Joseph
89. [redacted]
90. LANSING, John
91. [redacted]
92. (T) LEE, Watson Hwa Shen ARMY
93. LEITNER, Richard Ernest
94. LENART, Charles Edward
95. LOWE, Myron
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae
97. (T) LYONS, George H. ARMY
98. MAGLIE, Philip Joseph
99. MALABRE, Howland Edward
100. MALOKOFF, Serge
101. MARKSCHATT, Ruben
102. MARSAL, Karl
103. MASCHGAN, Andrew Frank
104. MASON, Frank
105. MCADAN, George Thomas
106. MCGAVIN, Gerrald Joseph

ALIAS

107. MENICUCCI, Andrew Robert 7797
108. MIRANDA, Diego S.
110. NACHBRUNN, Harry Richard
111. NASH, Mike
112. PANOCK, Harry Charles 3-134-633
113. PAPPS, William David 8610
114. PARKER, Carl Frank
115. PASTOR, Nick
116. PAULSON, Marty
117. PEVER, Laura Jean 4021
118. POLACEK, Henry Franklin 4271
119. POLING, Janos
120. RAHILL, Richard Kent
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
121. RANALLO, Jonas
122. RATCLIFF, Matthew Edward K 739
123. REED, Juri
124. REESE, Eno
125. REEse, Joseph Anthony
126. RESTELLER, Richard Lawrence 13315
127. ROBERTS, John Martin Jr.
129. ROGERS, Robert E.
131. ROTTUM, Lowell Owen Jr.
133. SAKIN, Edmond Abel 25-3541
136. SEALE, Henry
137. SEALY, Robert Ruben 8852
138. SELFE, Gordon Dale ARMY
139. SHALER, Floyd A
140. SHIPLEY, Charles Joseph
141. SHOWCROFT, Richard E.
142. SIMPSON, John DEF. 4192
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
143 SIROTA, Edward G. K-5371
144. SLATER, Lawrence
145. SNYDER, Gene 13713
146. None
147. SORENSON, Henry
148. STANDARD, George Adam
149. STATEN, Samuel Addison
150. XXXXXXX, STEPHENS, Marina T. 11184

ALIAS

151. STEVENS, James Henry 48-335
152. None
153. None
154. TANIER, Lester Lewis
156. TOGGITT, Edward J. 48-338
157. TORREY, Erasmus
158. TRABAN, Gregorio R. 349
159. VALCHIN, James Louis N-113
160. VAN CHADDE, Donald
161. WALKER, William (RC) K-2395
162. WELK, Joseph Reinhold N-122
163. WIDEGREN, Keith J. 48-338
164. WILLEMS, Brenton Wall
165. WISHFORD, Roy Furniss 14856
166. WOLF, Frederick Morri
167. WONG, Lam
168. ZEAMAN, Myron
169. ZIMMER, Paul R.

NR 97 ...

1. ASARIS, Cundaris
2. AASAL, Glen 6/75 03
3. SHERWOOD, John 11907
4. ADKINS, Matt 48-336
5. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay
6. RAGONA, Ferruzzia NR
7. BARAKAUSKAS, Algis NR
8. BROWN, James W.
9. 03 SPEED, Horace III 8435
10. Amtharill-1 (Crypt) NR Julio Kauri Barreto
11. ROSENBAUER, William A. 13915
12. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr. NR
13. BEALE, W. H. 48-336
14. 03 BENAS, Alis NR
15. BECKET, Jerome F. NR — 12871
16. ERICKSON, Paul 14317
17. KINANDER, James F. NR
18. BARQUIN, Casimiro 7797
19. BECKER, Alexander NR K-3097
20. BYZEK, Stephen Joe
21. 03 BURKE, Paul J. 7497
22. BRADFIELD, Tony Edward 48-336
23. SHERWOOD, John
24. MELBERG, Robert L.
25. SHACKLEY, Theodore 6177
26. BRANTLEY, Herbert NR
27. BURKE, Paul J. 8497
28. 03 BLAIR, William 9181
29. CUNNINGHAM, James Allen Jr.
30. CHAS, Peter
31. [redacted]
32. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton 48-336
33. CAREY, William David 4874
34. CARTER, William R.
35. CROCE, Andrew
36. FLORES, Thomas J.
37. 03 DAIGA, Janis NR T-421
38. DALEY, V. J. NR
39. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
40. DILLON, John E. 9540
41. DE GARDER, Constantine NR
42. DEMMONS, William H.
43. DALY, Vincent S. 11597
44. DUBOIS, Rono E.
45. EGAN, Frank J.
46. ENDERS, Rudolf A.
47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr.
48. None
49. HEATH, Donald R.
50. FUCHS, Robert H.
51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr.
52. FLICK, Charlos E. 03

53. [illegible], John
54. [illegible], Frank 7422
55. [illegible], Peter 48-3
56. [illegible], Charles 03 Graciano, Aubrey
57. [illegible]
58. [illegible]OCLAT, Pedro Gonzalez NR
59. 03 GOUDIE, Cecil Mario 14162
60. 03 TISLER, Francisek 16183 5-1567
61. GREENE, Bill NR
62. GRAHAM, Barbara 9818
63. HUNT, E. Howard 9 1088
64. None 03
65. HAWKINS, Jack NR
66. HORN, Rufus A. Jr. 11749
67. HIDALGO, Barney 03
68. HEWITT, Thomas X. 9922
69. [redacted]
70. HECHT, Elmer Edward K-21
71. IWASKIW, Andrij NR 03
72. JENCSOK, Stephen NR
73. JANCHUK, Nicholas NR
74. JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund E. NR
75. JAUNZEMIS, Ulis NR
76. JOANSON, Ivar NR 7420
77. JASUKOW, Nikolai NR
78. 48-336 KYKER, Benjamin Franklin
79. KAPUSTA, Peter
80. KARKLINS, Zigurds NR
81. KRYZANIWSKY, Myron NR
82. KOCELA, Paul NR 03
83. KAPPES, 03 G. (George ?)
84. KURTZ, Walter NR
85. KIDA, Jack
86. KENNEDY, John W.
87. KRUTYHOLOWA, Walter NR
88. KREGZDYS, Joseph 9325-10
89. [redacted]
90. LAMBERGS, John NR 03
91. [redacted]
92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen
93. MAYERFELD, Ernest 5824
94. KLEIN, Theodore 5570
95. 03 LOPUSZAUSKY, Myroslaw 47-
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae NR
97. Unknown
98. MAHONEY, Philip J. 48-336
99. 03 CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
100. MASLOVSKY, Sergo T-
101. MARTINEZ, Ruben
102. SMITH, Haviland Jr.
103. MOORE, Andrew F. NR 25
104. 03 MARSAK, Frank 2-2994
105. KRIESFELD, George NR
106. MULANE, Corrald J. NR 2

David Lee (Joe Latorre) TSD. 6
03

22/RJ

14-00000

TRUE

107. BARQUIN, Casimiro
108. MORALES David S.

110. NEWMASTER, Harry Richard
111. NASARENKO, Michael
112. PIEPER, Harry C.
113. PHILLIPS, William D.
114. GREENE, Harris
115. PASLAWSKY, Nicholas
116. PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw
117. FRANK, Maryado
118. MOORE, Robert Butler
119. PRIBANYEC, Janos
120. None

121. RASTENIS, Jonas
122. REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene
123. RAUS, Juri
124. RIKAND, Enno
125. AMLFO-3 (Crypt)
126. RATCLIFF, Richard
127. REEVES, John M. Jr.

129. REYNOLDS, Robert E.

131. RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr

133. SULLIVAN, Dennis B

136. STAROSTENKO, Henry
137. IMLER, Norman C.
138. SLEEPER, Gordon
139. None
140. None
141. GONZALO, QUESADA Jr
142. SAGER, John

143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrill
144. SLENYS, Lindas K.
145. SOLNZEFF, Henry
146. SOLER, Eva Diana
147. SATINSKAS, Henry
148. STEVENS, George A.
149. WALLIN, Jack
150. TASHEFF, Mary

TRUE

151. AIMAN, James Henry
152. STOIAKEN, Nicholas P.
153. TALLEY, Ulo
154. TURK, Leo L.

156. THOMAS, Edward
157. None
158. TRIANOSKY, Harry
159. VINING, James L.
160. VAN COURTNEY, Donald
161. HARVEY, William K.
162. BULIK, Joseph
163. WILL, Kenneth John
164. SHORTALL, John W. Jr
165. WATTS, Roy Furniss
166. MERTZ, Richard
167. None
168. ZANKIN, Myroslaw
169. ALAGAZE-1 (Crypt)

ALIAS

1. ACKER, Gerald
2. ADLAND, Glennon Edward
3. AHORN, Paul Rodger
4. AIVNEY, Matt
5. ASHBORNE, Howard Clark
6. AUDISIO, Mario
7. BARKER, Algis
8. BARNAUD, James Winston
9. BARNER, Andrew Frank
10. BARRETO, John Raymond
11. BAUER, William John
12. BAUGH, William James
13. BELT, William Henry
14. BENTON, Alan
15. BENUCK, Karl Donald
16. BERGETHON, David Bjorn
17. BERGSON, William Kinander
18. BERTELLI, Charles Angelo
19. BEST, Alexander
20. BINSWANGER, Stanley Joe
21. BORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
22. BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
23. BREITHEIM, John Albert
24. BRICK, Robert Lee
25. BRICKHAM, Tad S.
26. BRIGGS, Herb
27. BROOKE, Paul Gregory
28. BRUTON, William Emmott
29. CAMPBELL, James Alan Jr.
30. CARNEY, Peter
31. [redacted]
32. BOUTECK, Cletus Winton
33. CLINE, William David
34. CONRAD, WILLIAM Robert
35. CROWE, Andrew Paul
36. CURBELO, Eduardo
37. DAILEY, James
38. DEKANSKI, Vincent Joseph
39. DELAINE, William Alan
40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
41. DE LONG, Constantino
42. DONAINE, William Henry
43. DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
44. DUBOIS, Rene E.
45. ENGLSCH, Frank Joseph
46. ELFMONT, Rudolf Albert
47. ELLEGOR, William Monroe
48. EVANS, Arthur Hall
49. FARON, Charles Andrew
50. FILECCIA, Robert H.
51. FITSAMES, Lucian Charles
52. FLICK, Charles E.

ALIAS

53. FORDASON, John Norman
54. FROST, Frank
55. FRYLINK, Robert Peter
56. GENGARO, Charles Henry
57. GENISHAN, Aubrey Lyle
58. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
59. GUDINO-MARGAIN, Carlos
60. HABER, Frantisek
61. HALE, William Mark
62. HALLY, Roberta Shirley
63. HAMILTON, Edward Joseph
64. HARRISON, Louise
65. HASKINS, John Martin
66. HEBERTEN, Roger Andrew
67. HILLARY, Bernard Norman
68. HODONICKI, Thomas Mark
69. [redacted]
70. HURLEY, Edward Elmer
71. IRVING, Andrew
72. JACOBS, Stephan
73. JAMES, Nicholas
74. JARECKI, Stanley
75. JEFFRIES, Uldis
76. JENKINS, Ivar
77. JUDD, Nicholas
78. KACHYAN, Benjamin Franklin
79. KARLQUIST, Paul
80. KASARIAN, Zigurds
81. KELLY, Myron
82. KENDALL, Paul
83. KERCHNER, George Michael
84. KERKSICK, Walter
85. KINNEY, Jack Anthony
86. KINSLOW, John William
87. KOLA, Walter
88. KOSTIK, Joseph
89. [redacted]
90. LANSING, John
91. [redacted]
92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen
93. LEITNER, Richard Ernest
94. LENART, Charles Edward
95. LOWE, Myron
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae
97. LYONS, George H.
98. MAGLIE, Philip Joseph
99. MALABRE, Howland Edward
100. MALOKOFF, Serge.
101. MARKSCHATT, Ruben
102. MARSAL, Karl
103. MASCHGAN, Andrew Frank
104. MASON, Frank
105. MCADAM, George Thomas
106. MCGAVIN, Gerrald Joseph

	ALIAS
107.	MENICUCCI, Andrew Robert
108.	MIRANDA, Diego S.
110.	NACHBRUNN, Harry Richard
111.	NASH, Mike
112.	PANOCK, Harry Charles
113.	PAPPS, William David
114.	PARKER, Carl Frank
115.	PASTOR, Nick
116.	PAULSON, Marty
117.	PEVER, Laura Jean
118.	POLACEK, Henry Franklin
119.	POLING, Janos
120.	RAHILL, Richard Kent
121.	RANALLO, Jonas
122.	RATCLIFF, Matthew Edward
123.	REED, Juri
124.	REESE, Eno
125.	REEse, Joseph Anthony
126.	RESTELLER, Richard Lawrence
127.	ROBERTS, John Martin Jr.
129.	ROGERS, Robert E.
133.	SAKIN, Edmond Abel
136.	SEALE, Henry
137.	SEALY, Robert Ruben
138.	SELFE, Gordon Dale
139.	SHALER, Floyd A.
140.	SHIPLEY, Charles Joseph
141.	SHOWCROFT, Richard E.
142.	SIMPSON, John
143	SIROTA, Edward G.
144.	SLATER, Lawrence
145.	SNYDER, Gene
146.	None
147.	SORENSON, Henry
148.	STANDARD, George Adam
149.	STATEN, Samuel Addison
150.	STEPHENS, Marina T.

	ALIAS
151.	STEVENS, James Henry
152.	None
153.	None
154.	TANIER, Lester Lewis
156.	TOGGITT, Edward J.
157.	TORREY, Erasmus
158.	TRABAN, Gregorio R.
159.	VALCHIN, James Louis
160.	VAN CHADDE, Donald
161.	WALKER, William
162.	WELK, Joseph Reinhold
163.	WIDEGREN, Keith J.
164.	WILLEMS, Brenton Wall
165.	WISHFORD, Roy Furniss
166.	WOLF, Frederick Morri
167.	WONG, Lam
168.	ZEAMAN, Myron
169.	ZIMMER, Paul R.

14-00000

ALIAS

1. ACKER, Gerald
2. ADLAND, Glennon Edward
3. AHORN, Paul Rodger
4. AIVVEY, Matt
5. ASHBORNE, Howard Clay
6. AUDISIO, Mario
7. BARKER, Algis
8. BARNAUD, James Winston
9. BARKER, Andrew Frank
10. BARRETO, John Raymond
11. BAUER, William John
12. BAUGH, William James
13. BELT, William Henry
14. BENTON, Alan
15. BERUCK, Karl Donald
16. BERGETHON, David Bjorn
17. BERGSON, William Kinander
18. BERTELLI, Charles Angelo
19. BEST, Alexander
20. (T) BINSWANGER, Stanley Joo
21. BORDEN, Paul Thomas Aquinas
22. BRADLEY, Thomas Edward
23. BREITHEIM, John Albert
24. BRICK, Robert Leo
25. BRICKHAM, Tad S.
26. BRIGGS, Herb
27. BROOKE, Paul Gregory
28. BRUTON, William Emmott
29. CAMPBELL, James Alan Jr.
30. CARNEY, Peter
32. BOWTECK, Cletus Winton
33. CLINE, William David
34. CONRAD, WILLIAM Robert
35. CROWE, Andrew Paul
36. CURBELO, Eduardo
37. DAILEY, James
38. DEKANSKI, Vincent Joseph
39. DELAINE, William Alan
40. DELLAFIORE, James Earl
41. DE LONG, Constantine
42. DONAINE, William Henry
43. DRAKOS, Victor Samuel
44. [DUBOIS, Rene E.] ARMY
45. EKELSON, Frank Joseph
46. ELFMONT, Rudolf Albert
47. ELLEGOR, William Monroe
48. EVANS, Arthur Hall
49. FARON, Charles Andrew
50. FILECCIA, Robert H.
51. FITSAMES, Lucian Charles
52. [T FLICK, Charles E.]

ALIAS

53. FORDASCH, John Norman
54. FROST, Frank
55. FRYLINK, Robert Peter
56. GENGARO, Charles Henry
57. GERISHAM, Aubrey Lyle
58. GONZALEZ, Pedro Francisco
59. GUDINO-MARGAIN, Carlos
60. HABER, Frantisek
61. HALE, William Mark
62. HAILY, Roberta Shirley
63. HAMILTON, Edward Joseph
64. HARRISON, Louise
65. HASKINS, John Martin
66. HEBERDEN, Roger Andrew ARMY
67. HILLARY, Bernard Norman
68. HODONICKI, Thomas Mark
70. HURLEY, Edward Elmer
71. IRVING, Andrew
72. JACOBS, Stephan
73. JAMES, Nicholas
74. JARECKI, Stanley
75. JEFFRIES, Uldis
76. (T) JENKINS, Ivar
77. JUDD, Nicholas
78. KACKMAN, Benjamin Franklin
79. KARLQUIST, Paul
80. KASARIAN, Zigurds
81. KELLY, Myron
82. KENDALL, Paul
83. KERCHNER, George Michael
84. KERKSICK, Walter
85. KINNEY, Jack Anthony
86. KINSLOW, John William
87. KOLA, Walter
88. KOSTIK, Joseph
90. LANSING, John
92. (T) [LEE, Watson Hwa Shen] ARMY
93. LEITNER, Richard Ernest
94. LENART, Charles Edward
95. LOWE, Myron
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae
97. (T) LYONS, George H. ARMY
98. MAGLIE, Philip Joseph
99. MALABRE, Howland Edward
100. MALOKOFF, Serge
101. MARKSCHATT, Ruben
102. MARSAL, Karl
103. MASCHGAN, Andrew Frank
104. MASON, Frank
105. MCADAM, George Thomas
106. MCGAVIN, Gerrald Joseph

3/mc

1. ASANIS, Gundaris
2. AASAL, Glen 6175
3. SHERWOOD, John 11007
4. ADKINS, Matt 48-336
5. ADERHOLT, Harry Clay
6. RAGONA, Ferruggia NK
7. BARAKAUSKAS, Algis NK
8. BROWN, James W.
9. SPEED, Horace III 8435
10. Amthrill-1 (Crypt) NK Julio Kauri Barreto
11. ROSENBAUER, William A. 13915
12. SEWARD, Major William A. Jr. NK
13. BEALE, W. H. 48-336
14. BENAS, Alis NK
15. BECERT, Jerome F. NK – 12871
16. ERICKSON, Paul 14317
17. KINANDER, James F. NK
18. BARQUIN, Casimiro 7797
19. BECKER, Alexander NK
20. BYZEK, Stephen Joe K-3097
21. BURKE, Paul J. 7497
22. BRADFIELD, Tony Edward 48-336
23. SHERWOOD, John 11007
24. MELBERG, Robert L. 2219
25. SHACKLEY, Theodore 6777
26. BRANTLEY, Herbert NK
27. BURKE, Paul J. 8497
28. BLAIR, William 9121
29. CUNNINGHAM, James Allen Jr. 5366 ✓
30. CHAS, Peter
31. [redacted]
32. BARTLEY, Cletus Winton 48-336 ✓
33. CAREY, William David 4994
34. CARTER, William R. ✓
35. CROCE, Andrew 4447
36. FLORES, Thomas J. ✓
37. DAIGA, Janis NK T-421
38. DALEY, V. J. NK
39. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
40. DILLON, John E. 9540
41. DE GARDER, Constantine NK
42. DEMMONS, William H. ✓
43. DALY, Vincent S. 11307
44. DUBOIS, Rene E.
45. EGAN, Frank J.
46. ENDERS, Rudolf A. 10015 ✓
47. EDWARDS, William Monroe Jr.
48. None ✓
49. HEATH, Donald R. ✓
50. FUCHS, Robert H.
51. FRANKLIN, Lucian V. Jr.
52. FLICK, Charles E. 765 ✓
53. [illegible], John Norman ✓
54. [illegible], Frank 7422 ✓
55. [illegible], Robert Peter 48-336
56. [illegible], Charles 3257
57. CRINK ✓ Greano, Aubrey
58. BRUGOLAT, Pedro Gonzalez NK
59. GOUDIE, Cecil Mario 14162 ✓
60. TISLER, Frantisek 16183 5-1567
61. GREENE, Bill NK
62. GRAHAM, Barbara 9808
63. HUNT, E. Howard 9 1088
64. None
65. HAWKINS, Jack NK
66. HORN, Rufus A. Jr. 11749
67. HILDALGO, Barney
68. HEWITT, Thomas M. 9922
69. [redacted]
70. HECHT, Elmer Edward K-215
71. IWASKIW, Andrij NK
72. JENCSOK, Stephen NK
73. JANCHUK, Nicholas NK
74. JAROSZEWICZ, Sigmund E. NK
75. JAUNZEMIS, Ulvis NK
76. JOANSON, Ivar NK 7420
77. JASUKOW, Nikolai NK
78. MYKER, Benjamin Franklin 3111 (48-336)
79. KAPUSTA, Peter
80. KARKLINS, Zigurds NK
81. KRYZANIWSKY, Myron NK
82. KOCELA, Paul NK
83. KAPPES, G. George M
84. KURTZ, Walter NK
85. KIDA, Jack
86. KENNEDY, John W.
87. KRUTYHOLOWA, Walter NK
88. KREGZDYS, Joseph 25-103
89. [redacted]
90. LAMBERGS, John NK
91. [redacted]
92. LEE, Watson Hwa Shen 10580
93. MAYERFELD, Ernest 5824
94. KLEIN, Theodore 5570
95. LOPUSZAUSKY, Myroslaw 47-
96. LUPU, Andrei Nicolae NK
97. Unknown ✓
98. MAHONEY, Philip J. 48-336
99. CHIPMAN, Harold E. 7168
100. MASLOVSKY, Serge T-835
101. MARTINEZ, Ruben
102. SMITH, Haviland Jr. 4593
103. MOORE, Andrew F. NK 25-
104. MARSAK, Frank 8-2994
105. KRIESFELD, George NK
106. MULANE, Corrald J NK 2

Denial [illegible] Joe Latorre TSD. 60

14-00000

TRUE

107. BARQUIN, Casimiro
108. MORALES David S.
110. NEWMASTER, Harry Richard
111. NASARENKO, Michael
112. PIEPER, Harry C.
113. PHILLIPS, William D.
114. GREENE, Harris
115. PASLAWSKY, Nicholas
116. PAWLYSZYN, Myroslaw
117. FRANK, Maryado
118. MOORE, Robert Butler
119. PRIBANYEC, Janos
120. None
121. RASTENIS, Jonas
122. REYNOLDS, Malcolm Eugene
123. RAUS, Juri
124. RIKAND, Enno
125. AMLFO-3 (Crypt)
126. RATCLIFF, Richard
127. REEVES, John M. Jr.
129. REYNOLDS, Robert E.
131. RUCKER, Lucian O. Jr.
133. SULLIVAN, Dennis B.
136. STAROSTENKO, Henry
137. IMLER, Norman C.
138. SLEEPER, Gordon
139. None
140. None
141. GONZALO, QUESADA Jr.
142. SAGER, John
143. SMITH, Edmund Gambrill
144. SLENYS, Lindas K.
145. SOLNZEFF, Henry
146. SOLER, Eva Diana
147. SATINSKAS, Henry
148. STEVENS, George A.
149. WALLIN, Jack
150. TASHEFF, Mary

TRUE

151. AIMAN, James Henry
152. STOIAKEN, Nicholas P.
153. TALLEY, Ulo
154. TURK, Leo L.
156. THOMAS, Edward
157. None
158. TRIANOSKY, Harry
159. VINING, James L.
160. VAN COURTNEY, Donald
161. HARVEY, William K.
162. BULIK, Joseph
163. WILL, Kenneth John
164. SHORTALL, John W. Jr.
165. WATTS, Roy Furniss
166. MERTZ, Richard
167. None
168. ZANKIN, Myroslaw
169. ALAGAZE-1 (Crypt)

OGC 74-1755

SECRET

30 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with E. Howard Hunt Re His Memoirs, "Undercover"

1. On 28 September 1974 Ray Rocca, Deputy Chief/CI Staff, and I met in the DCD Washington Field Office with E. Howard Hunt, his attorney William A. Snyder, Jr., and Snyder's associate Thomas W. Coons. As the meeting began, Hunt asked if it was being tape-recorded; I assured him that it was not. He said he did not care; but that, if it were to be recorded, he would like to know. We then embarked upon the review according to the plan under which we would demand the deletion of three items as classified and then proceed to the remaining 29 items, only if Hunt was cooperative on the first three. He and his lawyers appeared very cooperative, and accordingly, the meeting continued to cover all 32 items.

2. Changes were agreed to in the items set forth in paragraphs 12, 14, and 25 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September 1974. These appear at pages 73, 80-83, and 115 of the galley proof and concern the fabrication of the Shanghai post for a Mexican operation, the entry into the Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico City, and the joint CIA-Uruguayan telephone monitoring operation. The wording of the agreed changes is as shown on the attached copies of the pertinent pages of the galley proof. Essentially, these changes disguise the identity of the fabricated newspaper and remove a reference to journalists as agents; delete the word "Guatemalan" to make the entered embassy non-specific; and delete the reference to listening posts and telephone monitoring to make that paragraph refer in more general terms to our ability to cover targets without referring to the use of electronic surveillance.

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 058473

SECRET

3. We then proceeded to the 29 items which we would like to see modified but which we could not consider classified. We made this clear to Hunt and went through them one by one, discussing our concern with each. Hunt contended that most of these items should not be considered sensitive since they had been publicized extensively; in some cases confirmed in testimony; and, in the case of other items, the principals involved were dead. However, he agreed to changes in the items referred to in paragraphs 1, 3, 17, and 32 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September. These involve the deletions of the names of Henry Pleasants and Frank Holcomb, both now retired under cover; a direct reference to joint operations with the British in Hong Kong against China; and the wording of his reference to CIA alias documentation used by the Watergate burglars. The language of this last item will be changed so that it no longer leaves the impression that the documentation was prepared by the Agency for this operation.

4. When we had finished, Hunt and his lawyers emphasized as they had mentioned earlier in the meeting that it might be very difficult to get the publisher to agree to changes in the unclassified items. Mr. Snyder offered to present all of the items to the publisher for change without distinguishing between the classified and unclassified items. He said he would do this without implying they were all classified. I felt it necessary to turn down his offer because of the risk of the publisher being unwilling to accept that many changes with the result that we would have to go back to him on the three classified items, thus presenting a situation similar to our retraction of previously demanded deletions in the Marchetti book. I think there would be some danger of the publisher using this in his advertising and through reviewers for publicity purposes.

5. As we were leaving, Hunt showed me what was described as a "comfort letter." This was a letter written by him to the publishers on 17 May 1974 at the publisher's request which said that in his opinion nothing in the manuscript violated any agreement between himself and the CIA, nor would subject him to prosecution under the espionage laws. As the meeting was ending, Hunt expressed his hope that no publicity would be given to it and that the Agency would not issue any kind of a press release. In view of the Director's decision that we shall issue a press release, I took pains to persuade Hunt that public acknowledgment of the fact that we had reviewed his

manuscript would be in his interest as well as ours. He had referred more than once during the meeting to the need to avoid the appearance of "a bear hug"; in other words, collusion or cooperation between him and the Agency, leaving an inference that the book was designed to be a whitewash of CIA. In view of this, it was easy to convince Hunt that an Agency press release would be in his interest. I would note here, however, that both Mr. Rocca and I felt that Hunt and his lawyers were genuinely cooperative and that a press release which is too harsh or denigrates the book or Hunt's motives might be unfair and considered by him to be in bad faith. Hunt appears to retain admiration and respect for the Agency and seems convinced that nothing in his book will harm our operations or personnel.

JOHN D. MORRISON, JR.
Acting General Counsel

Attachments

cc: Acting DDO
SAB/DDO
DC/CI Staff
O/Security
Asst. to DCI
Mr. Walter Pforzheimer
C/CCS

OGC:JDM:sin
Original - OGC Subj: PUBLICATIONS
1 - Chrono

c2

Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at [Camp Peary], Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

14-00000

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Nosenko Case

1. Mr Helms, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.

2. Mr. Helms explained the Nosenko case briefly and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what we at least considered to be two problems on which we would like the advice of the Department of Justice. First, we would seeon feel compelled to begin hostile interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered what the legal position would be in circumstances in which we detained Nosenko against his will for this purpose. Second, we would have to be ready after determining that we could obtain no additional information from Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to Germany and transferring him to Soviet custody in Berlin where this has been done a number of times in the past.

3. There was some discussion of whether deportation to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Helms explained we would probably face publicity problems in deporting to a third country of the kind we would encounter if he were free in the U. S. Mr. Helms noted there were many items of information which we and the FBI realize are of no significance because of the file holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best place.

4. The question of the basis for detention was again raised and related by Mr. Foley to the conditions under which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "exclusion and parole case" which means he has not been admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is responsible for him while he is in this country. This

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific locale which would provide some justification for our detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not be able to detain him further. In this event, we would be faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest and deportation was probably the best instrument.

5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston. Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA Office of Security officials to get the background of their liaison with the INS on these matters.

6. Mr. Helms thanked Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall" in Berlin.

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

14-00000

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SECRET

OGC 64-0903

3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Parole Status of Defectors

1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency. It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.

2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states: "After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status." This means that the responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word "minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.

3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed departure.

para 1 declassified by AAL on 19 Sept 78

Lawrence R. Houston

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

cc: DD/P
C/SR

SECRET

January 1975

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles had appeared in the public media.

2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet officials in the presence of I&NS and State Department officials and NOSENKO reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in the United States.

3 OCT 1969 ER 69-5003/1

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Farrell:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance of subject into the United States for permanent residence since his entry is in the interest of the national security ~~and essential to the furtherance of the national~~ intelligence mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this matter to the Attorney General for his approval.

Since his defection in February 1964, the subject has provided valuable information to this Agency and he will continue to be of value in the future.

Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a period of five years and has submitted to a technical interrogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and should any information be developed definitely disproving his bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the Attorney General.

SECRET

There are enclosed Forms I-125 and background data, in duplicate, concerning the subject.

Sincerely,

/s/

Richard Helms
Director

Enclosures.

ORIGINATOR:

/s/ H. J. Osborn — 8 October 1969

Howard J. Osborn — Date
Director of Security

Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Signer's copy
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - SB Div.
1 - CI Staff
1 - DDP
1 - OGC
2 - OS Files

SECRET

14-00000

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)

30 October 1927 Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR

Male Divorced Brown Blue/Gray 5ft. 11 inches

Soviet Caucasian --

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

AKA: Yuri NOSENKO

DPOB: 30 October 1927, Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR

MARITAL STATUS: 1946 – Married and divorced Flavia NOSENKO (Nee SHLIKOV).
1948 – Married Augustina K. NOSENKO (Nee TELEGIN), 1949 – separated and 1951 – divorced.
23 June 1953 – Married Ludmila Yulianovna NOSENKO (Nee KOZHEVNIKOVA), January 1964 – separated and 1969 – divorced.

CHILDREN: Daughters – Oksana NOSENKO, born 21 August 1954, Moscow; Tamara NOSENKO, born 13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both living in USSR)

EDUCATION: 1942-1945 – Attended various USSR Naval Schools.
1945-1950 – Attended Institute of International Relations, Moscow.

EMPLOYMENT: March 1951-March 1953 – Soviet Naval RU (Naval Intelligence).
March 1953-February 1964 – Officer in KGB (The Committee for State Security).

MILITARY: Lieutenant in USSR Navy while in school and during RU service.

NATIONALITY: Soviet

PRESENT AND PAST POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS:
1943-1954 – Member Komsomol, USSR
1954 – Candidate Communist Party
1957-1964 – Member Communist Party, USSR

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~SECRET~~ SP-1687

18 JUL 1969

Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos

Dear Sir:

SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO

Reference is made to previous correspondence in this case.

~~Subject continues to be of operational interest to this Agency.~~ Therefore, it is requested subject's parole to this Agency be extended for an additional period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of his stay of 16 August 1969.

Your cooperation in this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)

OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR EXHIBITED TO ANYONE WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Chief, SR Division	5777	DATE 13 February 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DD/OS				TOP SECRET — EYES ONLY BY HAND
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

11 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.

4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account of the KGB operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorn which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB).

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his future in the West. He claimed his new work in the KGB (First Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was expanding and that he would not be able to visit the West with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for political asylum in the United States. He was taken to Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interrogation. Plans are now being made to remove him to the U. S.

6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject has not been extensive and that we will require additional thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides. It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not concerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference, and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed much, if any, light on that area of our interest.

7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was designed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered. The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Acting Deputy Director
for Plans

CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64
Distribution:
Orig - Adse
2 cc - SR/CI/K-Downey
1 cc - C/CI
1 cc - CSR
1 cc - DD/OS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.

2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.

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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

14-00000

Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 — Yuri I. Nosenko told a Soviet Embassy official at their confrontation here last Friday that he left Switzerland on the way to the United States 28 hours before his defection was reported by the Russians to the Swiss authorities.

This statement by the former staff officer of the Soviet Committee of State Security, the secret police, appeared to amount to a denial of the Soviet charge that the Swiss authorities had been negligent in preventing his defection.

Mr. Nosenko, who quit as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva disarmament conference Feb. 4, was allowed to meet with a Soviet diplomat here in the presence of United States officials.

The State Department announced at the time that the confrontation was taking place in Washington at the request of the Soviet Embassy, but no other details were made public. The department said that a

Defection Preceded Report to Swiss Police, Apparently Ruling Out Negligence

Swiss diplomat had been permitted to talk separately with Mr. Nosenko.

Information made available today has thrown new light on the defection.

The Soviet delegation in Geneva, it was reported, told the Swiss police at 5 P.M. Feb. 5 that Mr. Nosenko was missing. But Mr. Nosenko's statements in the presence of the Soviet Embassy official are said to have shown that his actual defection took place at 1 P.M. the preceding day.

The Soviet delegation announced Mr. Nosenko's disappearance Feb. 9.

The meeting between Mr. Nosenko and the Soviet Embassy official took place in the headquarters of the Washington field office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Officials of the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also present.

Mr. Nosenko was described as having been completely relaxed during the interview.

He is understood to have told the Soviet diplomat during their businesslike conference that he defected of his own volition, without any outside pressures.

His statements, it was reported, did not allay Soviet resentment against Swiss authorities. Diplomatic reports reaching the State Department said that Soviet diplomats in foreign capitals continued to register complaints about alleged negligence after Mr. Nosenko's conference with the Soviet diplomat.

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14-00000

U.S. Lets Swiss And Red Envoys Talk to Defector

Nosenko Again Voices Desire For Asylum

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Staff Reporter

Soviet secret police defector Yuri I. Nosenko is in the United States where he was interviewed yesterday by officials of both the Russian and Swiss Embassies.

The State Department said each interview lasted less than an hour and that a Department official was present each time. Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier request for aslyum in the United States and it will be granted.

State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips, in giving out this information, declined to say where the interviews took place or to give any details. Earlier he had said it was possible that newsmen here will be allowed to talk with Nosenko.

Soviet Kicks up Fuss

These developments came as the Soviet Union kicked up a diplomatic fuss over the disappearance of Nosenko on Feb. 4, from Geneva, where he had been assigned as an "expert" in the Soviet delegation at the 17-nation disarmament conference. Phillpps said he was "on temporary duty from KGB (secret police) headquarters in Moscow."

Up to yesterday Moscow had been directing its public diplomatic wrath at the Swiss, charging them with loose security. The provision for a Swiss diplomat to interview Nosenko was to assure the Swiss that the United States had taken part in no illegal act on their soil.

The Swiss already had strongly rejected the Soviet charges.

On Wednesday, Phillips re-

See DEFECTOR, A5, Col. 1

folio

Wash Post 2/15/64

Swiss, Soviets

See Defector

ported yesterday a Soviet Embassy messenger brought a message to the State Department asking for information as to the manner in which Mr. Nosenko presented himself to the U.S. authorities and requested an opportunity to interview him. The Department agreed to the interview with American officials present and said Nosenko also was agreeable. A reply about the defection also was given to the Soviet Embassy.

Also on Wednesday in Geneva, Soviet disarmament delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin gave newsmen an angry statement aimed at the Swiss and charging "provocative activity" by unspecified Western agents. Up to then Tsarapkin had been saying both privately and publicly that the Nosenko defection would not affect the disarmament talks.

Yesterday the Soviets stepped up their protest in two places, Moscow and Geneva.

In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko called in American Ambassador Foy Kohler and charged the United States with impermissable acts in the case. He stopped short of a kidnaping charge, however. Kohler replied that on behalf of the United States he rejected any implication of American wrongdoing.

Serious Effects Hinted

In Geneva, Soviet officials, including Tsarapkin himself, privately spread to the press hints of serious consequences. Soon there were rumors that Moscow would pull out its delegation, but up to last night no such threat had actually been made, according to word reaching Washington.

In public Tsarapkin said only "I have nothing to say. I am not in the position to tell you anything."

At some so far unspecified date, Nosenko, who had apparently crossed from Switzerland to France, was flown to the United States. It is assumed he is in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency, the normal course for defectors.

Officials here yesterday were knocking down the idea that he was a particularly big fish, that he knew any atomic secrets or that he knew anything about Soviet disarmament strategy. Rather, they said, he was a KGB staff officer, a security man operating, as is the Soviet practice, in a tight compartment. That would mean he would have useful and perhaps important knowledge of part of the KGB but probably not much more.

Believed Genuine

It is assumed here that the 36-year-old Nosenko is a genuine defector though the possibility of his being a double agent has not been overlooked. It also is felt here that the Soviet protest was no stronger than could be expected. The request for an interview, rare but not unprecedented, was granted in hopes of reciprocal treatment should the occasion arise.

Moscow dispatches said there had been no word up to last night of the defection on the Soviet radio or in the press though word of mouth reports had spread through the capital.

It was felt here that Moscow might have stepped up its protest after Tsarapkin had publicly downgraded the case in Geneva. At any rate U.S. disarmament negotiator William C. Foster and Tsarapkin held another business session in Geneva yesterday at which they said the case was not discussed.

It also was noted here that the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee has been meeting in Moscow all this week. But whether the Nosenko case was discussed was not known.

Folio

Wash Post 2/15

12 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch

FROM : Chief, Operational Support Division

SUBJECT : AEFOXTROT
#262 622

1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May 1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane, Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs. Bagley, Karpovich, McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.

2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:

Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the Subject:

(1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings," but may have the necessary silverware with which to eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be exercised with regard to controlling the silverware, and it was suggested that at least two of the guards be required to count the silverware in and out; that the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner where it could be observed before the guards enter the room, etc.)

(2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is understood that there is quite a bit of equipment available through Logistics channels.)

(3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear; change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.

	DDS/IOS
	ADDS/IOS
	ASST/IOS
	C/ID
	C/[illegible]
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(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.

(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.

(NOTE—These changes with regard to the bath, haircut, cigarette are not to be considered as something to be done on a regular schedule. We will await specific instructions from SR Division as to when these items are to be accomplished in the future.)

(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the Subject only on Tuesday each week.

(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely the same, and our security procedures, including searches, will continue to be at maximum control.

3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed as to their responsibilities in this matter.

Jack M. Bauman

Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)

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Yuriiy Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yuriiy Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Lit Crim - US v. Leon

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
(William H. Godson) CI/R&A/O 03	1592	DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. AC/CI/R&A/O	02 NOV 1977		[initials]	
2.				
3. AC/CI/R&A	2 NOV 1977	2 Nov	[initials]	
4.				
5. C/CI Staff	2 NOV 1977	3 NOV 1977	[initials]	5-6: This note is pursuant to an discussion of the black notebook several weeks ago. You may wish to talk directly with (Bill Godson) 03 who has reviewed the file.
6. OGC - Mr. John Greaney				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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[handwritten: SCI 77-6919 11-4-77]

1 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

FROM : William H. Godson
CI/R&A/O

SUBJECT : Herbert Itkin File

1. I have reviewed the material in the Herbert Itkin file which is divided into two main divisions. The first concerns the details of Itkin's use as an unpaid witting informant on matters concerning an attempt by Haitian exiles in 1963 to unseat then President Duvalier. This involved a large number of contacts with Haitian exiles in New York, Washington, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Itkin became a legal advisor for a Haitian Government-In-Exile and put up $15,000 of his "own funds" for this Haitian enterprise. Bernard E. MONCURE (P) a CI Staff staff agent in New York, rode piggy-back on Itkin's contacts with the Haitians to make his own operational contacts within the group. He also provided a small amount of money to them ($4,300) from CIA funds. It would seem from information in the file that there was high-level governmental interest in removing Duvalier from office in 1963. This information is contained in hand-written notes which are paraphrased and indicate high-level interest in the activities of the Haitian exile group. (I suggest that this material be kept in case there are Freedom of Information Act requests on CIA activities involving Haiti in 1962-1963.)

2. The second and bulkier section of material concerns Itkin's efforts to involve MONCURE and CIA in his attempts to secure custody of his wife's children from her second marriage. Itkin had been heavily involved as a lawyer and confidant with Mafia syndicates and labor unions, particularly the teamsters. While doing this he had gained a large amount of information on the Mafia. In March 1963, MONCURE had recruited Itkin for the FBI for domestic issues while maintaining for CIA the use of Itkin for foreign intelligence matters. The FBI and the federal prosecutors in New York starting in 1968 found Itkin to be a very important witness in a series of criminal indictments starting with New York City Water Commissioner Marcus.

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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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Itkin and his wife had for a long time been struggling to maintain custody over her children from her second marriage. Claiming that she had violated the custody stipulations of a New York court by moving them more than 50 miles from New York without his permission, Frederick Hersh, Mrs. Itkin's former husband, gained custody of the children by means of a ruling from the British court in 1966. Mrs. Itkin began legal procedures in New York to regain the children. As part of their effort they swore affadavits that Mrs. Itkin had taken the children to England at the request of the CIA. Itkin embellished on his CIA record by stating that he had worked for CIA for many years prior to 1963, and insisted that his original contact had been set up between Harold Stassen and Allen Dulles in Philadelphia in the summer of 1954. Most of these assertions were fabrications. MONCURE's CIA relationship was exposed in various legal circles in New York. The Agency wanted to avoid MONCURE's having to contradict Mr. and Mrs. Itkins' affadavits in court. The FBI seemed to have been more interested in protecting Itkin's reputation, as a witness than in protecting MONCURE's reputation for honesty.

3. MONCURE did not appear in court. The Federal authorities eventually placed protection around Itkin and his wife, keeping them on a military reservation, while he appeared as a star witness in numerous Mafia cases which led to covictions.

03

4. One small side issue 08 is worth noting: (Thomas L. Roberts,) who was a (law partner of Itkin) until mid-1961, became a (CIA staff agent under cover in Africa.) 24 The many fraudulent activities of Itkin spread a scintilla of suspicion around 03 (Roberts.) The latter was given a polygraph examination in Frankfurt. He answered questions on his relationship with Itkin including financial and his few contacts with Marcus to the satisfaction of his interrogators.

5. Comments: The thrust of the file is mainly defensive. CIA was reacting to Itkin's tactics to help his wife gain custody over her children. Itkin's numerous trips to England and Europe were made on behalf of the FBI, and they were part of an FBI attempt to gain information on the Mafia. Before the recruitment of Itkin and his utilization by the FBI, CIA did pass to the Attorney General in 1963 information on a Department of Labor official's alleged criminal involvement with the Mafia, which MONCURE had elicited from Itkin. The file also refers to MONCURE's continued contact with one Mafia figure Lenzieri, who was a legal client, as a means of self-protection as Lenzieri represented a channel back to the Mafia

for MONCURE, who was apprehensive of Mafia retaliation because of his involvement with Itkin.

6. I have talked to Will Kerbe who is presently the case officer in contact for MONCURE. He says that MONCURE is in limited law practice and is drawing a pension from the Agency as well as a contract for services connected with Golitsyn. There is probably nothing in the file which could damage MONCURE's security as much of the information regarding his association with Itkin has already been exposed. The most recent information in the file is a January 1975 memorandum for the record from Acting Chief, CI, which states that John K. Greaney, Assistant General Counsel had learned that Seymour Hersh had learned details of the Itkin-MONCURE relationship. It would appear that Mr. Greaney is the most knowledgeable person in the agency on the legal aspects of the Itkin case and probably maintains his own files.

03

William H. Godson
William H. Godson

CONFIDENTIAL

32814

10 April 1963

Security Division
Federal Aviation Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Charles F. Niles

Subject: HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

Dear Sir:

In accordance with existing arrangements made with the Federal Aviation Agency and to confirm our oral notification, it is requested that your files reflect the above-named individual, an employee of this Agency, as having been issued Federal Aviation Agency Credential Number 4883, on 2 January 1963.

In the event of an inquiry, this information may be released to verify the authenticity of this credential.

Nicholas R. Zubon
Chief, Building Security Branch
Office of Security

FORM 10-62 1995 CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-40)

12 December 1967

SUBJECT: SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION
(See Houma Munitions Bunker - Leased by Subject firm)

ALLEGATION:

GARRISON has charged that the burglary of the Houma munitions bunker was "CIA-inspired." He issued arrest warrants for Gordon NOVEL and Sergio ARCACHA SMITH charging them with the Houma burglary.

SOURCE:

Enclosure 24 of CI/R&A memorandum of 7 August 1967.

CIA CONNECTION:

CIA had no connection with the alleged burglary of the Houma Munitions Bunker or any connection with the bunker itself.

However, Pierre SCHLUMBERGER, president of the SCHLUMBERGER CORPORATION, was of contact interest in 1950 for routine exploitation as a foreign intelligence source. The FBI advised they had no objection to the Agency's interrogating Pierre SCHLUMBERGER who was an alien. In 1962 DAYSTROM, INC. was acquired by SCHLUMBERGER, INC. The Agency had a contract with DAYSTROM for an unclassified item ($49,000 contract for the production of Mark II limpet mines); Agency interest was classified Secret. SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. is a Dutch firm controlled by French nationals. After the merger, it was determined that future relationship with DAYSTROM must be governed by Agency policy not to place classified contracts with a foreign firm. In 1963 the same decision was reached concerning Agency contracts with Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc., a subsidiary of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. EMR dealt in all phases of telemetry. Contact clearances for other personnel of SCHLUMBERGER are set out below.

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OS INDICES RESULTS:

The SCHLUMBERGER COMPANY was the subject of a name check in 1947 because of a contract request, and it was determined that there are a number of SCHLUMBERGER corporations in Latin America which are dominated by French nationals. SCHLUMBERGER has a patented operation for an oil well "shooting" service which is subscribed to by various oil companies. The SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION in Houston was controlled by Henri Georges DOLL, a French national. He was of contact interest in 1956 and 1957. His wife is the daughter of Conrad SCHLUMBERGER.

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In August 1951 the Agency was interested in contacting Professor Edouard POLDINI, a geophysicist and professor at the University of Geneva and formerly an employee of the SCHLUMBERGER CORPORATION in Paris, for operational use. He was to be used as a channel to a Janus KANTAS who could give information about the fate of the previous employees of the Jersey Company in Hungary, the production figures and extent of exploitation of existing oil fields and exploration of new oil fields together with the names of the officials of the Russian Hungarian Company who took over the Jersey Company.

In March 1953 the SCHLUMBERGER file reflects that an FBI source furnished information that one Maurice Henri MARTIN, employed as an engineer by the SCHLUMBERGER Company, Paris, France, received a letter dated 27 July 1951 at Moscow from one Siegfied Stefanovitch MOROSOFF, asking MARTIN for specialized information concerning geophysics. The letter requested that MARTIN's reply be forwarded to Moscow through an intermediary. From January 1932 until April 1937 MARTIN represented the SCHLUMBERGER Company in Russia as an engineer, and it was thought that the correspondence from MOROSOFF may represent a Soviet attempt to resume contact with MARTIN and develop clandestine relations with him. The FBI conducted an investigation dated June 1953 and determined that Maurice Henri MARTIN resided at Nod Hill, Wilton, Connecticut and was employed by the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Co., Ridgefield, Connecticut. Informants advised that although MARTIN was strongly nationalistic toward France, he gave every indication of being anti-Russian and there was no evidence of CP activities.

When DAYSTROM, INC. merged with SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., research was done on the directors and officers of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD. The results are as follows:

OS indices reflect a record on Dillon ANDERSON, a trustee of Electro-Mechanical Research, Inc. (a subsidiary of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD.) who was also a proposed trustee of "NEW DAYSTROM" when it merged with SCHLUMBERGER. ANDERSON is an attorney from Houston, Texas who was appointed by President EISENHOWER as an advisor to the National Security Council from 1953 until 1956. He was considered for a special clearance in August 1955 but the briefing was not given. He was granted a covert clearance in December 1953 and April 1954 for use as a covert associate on Project LPFUNNEL.

Pierre SCHLUMBERGER, President and Chief Executive Officer, SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., Houston, Texas, French citizen, was of contact interest in 1950.

Charles C. PARLIN, Director of SCHLUMBERGER, LTD., and a member of the law firm of SHEARMEN, STERLING and WRIGHT, Englewood, New Jersey, U. S. citizen, was of contact interest in 1962 but was security disapproved. PARLIN was allegedly the boy friend of Johanna BEKER who was in contact with known Soviet Agents, ROBERT and JACK SOBLE. BEKER advised the FBI in 1957 that she received, paid for and transmitted to Robert SOBLE, OSS information which was given her by two former OSS employees. She also advised the FBI in 1957 that she

had given a very general outline of her activities to PARLIN and it is reliably reported that PARLIN and BEKER shared a hotel room in Holland in 1957. PARLIN recommended a William Woart LANCASTER for OSS employment. LANCASTER was a member of the same law firm as PARLIN and had a long record of Communist front affiliations. PARLIN in 1956 traveled to Russia as a member of a delegation under the sponsorship of the National Council of Churches. He was also the lawyer for a Swiss armament industrialist who sold arms to the Nazis and the Communist countries since that time.

Clark Drouillard GOODMAN, Vice-President of SCHLUMBERGER, Ltd., Houston, Texas, U. S. citizen, was security disapproved for use by TSD in 1952 and for contact use in 1955 based on his support of Professor Dirk STRUIK, a colleague at MIT, who was indicted on a charge of having been a Communist conspirator and identified as a Communist Party member. In March 1959 the same derogatory information was furnished the Contact Office to be considered in determining any use of GOODMAN. Also, a book written by GOODMAN's wife, May Ellen GOODMAN, was favorably reviewed by the "DAILY WORKER" in 1956.

Jean C. LEGRAND, Vice-President of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION, Ridgefield, Connecticut (U. S. citizen, naturalized Houston, Texas 1941) was approved for contact use in May 1957. His file is clear. There is a notation that one Mrs. J. C. LEGRAND, 5319 Mandell Street, Houston, Texas, in November 1944 was President of the Houston Chapter, France Forever, The Fighting French Committee in America.

Everett STRATTON, Sales Manager, Houston Area, SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING Corporation, Houston, Texas, U. S. citizen, was security approved (CAUTION) for contact use in October 1950. His file is clear.

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Daniel SCHLUMBERGER, French citizen, archeologist and teacher at the University of Strasbourg, France in 1955, was granted an operational approval (for use as a contract agent in Kabul) in April 1956 but the clearance was cancelled 20 September 1956. His file is clear. However, in a file on Nicholas KAGAN, French financier, and suspected Soviet agent, which contains a detailed study of the inter-relationships and family connections existing in French firms, information on Daniel SCHLUMBERGER is contained therin. Daniel SCHLUMBERGER, a member of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING Corporation, was head of the French Archeological Delegation in Afghanistan (1948-1954). An associate of Daniel SCHLUMBERGER was Raoul CURIEL of a wealthy Jewish banking family in Cairo, Egypt. Raoul and his brother, Henri CURIEL had Communist backgrounds and their mother was aunt to George BLAKE British Soviet spy who defected to Russia. BLAKE had lived with the CURIEL's in Cairo. Also Gilbert PONTECORVO, known Communist, was in contact with Eugenio CURIEL, a relative of the CURIEL family involved in the George BLAKE case. Bruno PONTECORVO, Gilbert's brother, and the atomic scientist who defected to Russia in 1950, worked for the Well Surveying Corporation, Tulsa, Oklahoma, from 1940 to 1942 but it was not known if the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation is in any way connected with the Well Surveying Corporation in Tulsa.

SCHLUMBERGER and Company and another SCHLUMBERGER subsidiary firm, Machine Bull (Competitor of IBM), are connected with Schneider and Company, 42 rue d'Anjou, Paris. Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL, manager of Compagnie Internationale de Commerce, represents SCHNEIDER for the USSR and is a Soviet agent. In September 1961, an investigation conducted in France disclosed that "everything that takes place in the Elysee is known in Moscow within 48 hours and the originator of such intelligence is Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL." Machines Bull is controlled by General Electric Company of the U. S. and SCHNEIDER and Company is affiliated with U. S. Westinghouse Corporation under the name SCHNEIDER-Westinghouse.

The Study in KAGAN's file contains the following additional information concerning SCHLUMBERGER and Company:

Maurice and Remi SCHLUMBERGER are affiliated with Lazard Freres and the Worms Bank. Lazard Freres controls SCHNEIDER-Westinghouse and has a New Orleans Branch Office. Closely associated with the SCHLUMBERGER's is Charles DOH. DOH was born at Odessa in 1911 and arrived in the United States in 1937 to join the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation at Houston, Texas. He became a U. S. citizen on 6 September 1950. Charles has a brother, Jean, who was closely associated with Leonard HOUNAU, a suspected Soviet agent. HOUNAU was closely associated with Francois SAAR-DEMICHEL, previously mentioned Soviet agent connected with SCHLUMBERGER and Company. Charles DOH was approved for Agency contact use in September 1955 as a member of the SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation. His file is clear.

Roger Robert Henri HENQUET, Executive Vice-President, SCHLUMBERGER Well Surveying Corporation, Houston, Texas, was approved for contact use on a limited basis in October 1950. He had been an employee of OSS from 1943 to 1945; was given American citizenship and the Congressional Medal of Honor for his deeds during World War II.

Arthur Henry FRENTROP, an employee of the SCHLUMBERGER WELL SURVEYING CORPORATION, Ridgefield, Connecticut, was of contact interest in June 1956. Information concerning his spouse's critical attitude towards American customs and institutions and the dominant position she exercised over her husband was furnished the contact office.

5 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of the General Counsel

VIA : Chief, Central Cover Staff

INFO : Mr. Rocca, CI Staff

SUBJECT : (Thomas Lee Roberts:) The Itkin Case

1. At our meeting on 30 January 1969, certain additional questions were raised relative to the relationship between (Roberts) and Itkin.

First, when did (LPGLOBE) become aware that Itkin and the (Conestoga Group) had approached (Roberts) with a proposal to represent them in (Africa?) We were advised in 1966 through case officer meetings with (Roberts) that he had been developing some potential cover company business with interests from the United States and England. We were given the name of the (Conestoga Group) no later than 27 October 1966. We cannot say that we then knew the individual names of those involved. It was not uncommon for (Roberts) to have discussions with a number of potential clients; when it became apparent that no real business was forthcoming from this group, our interest ceased.

At the 30 January meeting, we were also asked certain questions about (Roberts) financial involvement with the (law firm) he and Itkin has been with prior to (Robert's) association with the Agency.

2. We can add nothing to (Roberts') account of January 1968 reflecting that he entered into an agreement with the firm on 31 May 1961 wherein he was authorized leave of absence from 1 June 1961 to 31 May 1963 drawing $100.00 per week for that period.

EUGENE MILLIGAN
Chief, CCS/(LPGLOBE)

OGC 69-0402

4 March 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. I showed Mr. George Carey his memorandum of 1955 to the Director referring to T. and H., and said we thought that H. referred to a General Hardin. After considerable speculation Mr. Carey finally placed T. as being Juan Trippe and Hardin as an Air Force General who was being placed with 24 (Pan Am) for operational reasons, primarily technical information collection. Independently Mrs. Lovejoy had checked with Mr. Larocque, and he also recalled General Hardin was a man Mr. Carey was interested in placing with (Pan Am) 24 for operational reasons.

2. The Air Force Register lists a General Thomas O. Hardin, Air Force Major General, who retired in 1955, which would seem to fit in as he is listed as an airline executive. Mr. Carey had no knowledge whatsoever of the Itkin case, and we felt it was out of the question that General Hardin is synonymous with Philip Harbin.

LRH

LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

OGC:LRH:bt
1-C/CI/R&A
1-DCS
2-General Counsel chrono
✓subject HERBERT ITKIN

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP DISPATCH NUMBER

TELEPOUCH (FAMW)-4125

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CL BY: 034405 FYI

TO: (MELBOURNE, CANBERRA.)

SECRET TELEPOUCH

DISP NO: (FAMW)-4125

DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1973

TO: CHIEF OF BASE, (MELBOURNE)

CHIEF OF STATION, (CANBERRA)

FROM: CHIEF, EAST ASIA DIVISION

SUBJECT: MR. HERBERT ITKIN

FYI ONLY:

1. ON 6 NOVEMBER 1973 MR. (LESLIE V. JARVIS), (ASIO REP) IN WASHINGTON, HAND CARRIED TO HQS A LETTER FROM AUSTRALIAN JUSTICE A. R. MOFFITT REQUESTING INFORMATION ON THE RELIABILITY OF MR. HERBERT ITKIN WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS A FORMER CIA AND FBI EMPLOYEE. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE THE GIST OF MR. MOFFITT'S LETTER, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED TO "MR. WILLIAM CROSBY", (SIC) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

A. MOFFITT HOLDS A COMMISSION TO INQUIRE INTO THE INFILTRATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME INTO NEW SOUTH WALES. IT IS OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE TO HIS INQUIRY THAT HE CONSIDER EVIDENCE GIVEN DURING A

DATE:	COORDINATING OFFICERS	IP USE ONLY
ORIG:		
UNIT:		
EXT:		
RELEASING OFFICER		
CLASSIFICATION SECRET		
CROSS REFERENCE	FILE NUMBER 5-2-5/3	

OUTGOING TELEPOUCH

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

TEL 0 0 0 0 0 | PAGE 2 OF PAGES

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET | OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR: TELEPOUCH | DATE - TIME GROUP | DISPATCH NUMBER: FAMW-4125

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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 034405

COURT CASE IN ENGLAND IN JULY 1971 BY ITKIN.

B. IN HIS TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND MR. ITKIN CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN RECRUITED BY CIA IN AN "UNDERCOVER CAPACITY" IN ABOUT 1954. HE CLAIMED HE WAS WITH THE C.I.A. UNTIL MARCH 1963 AT WHICH TIME BY SOME ARRANGEMENT HE WORKED FOR BOTH THE FBI AND CIA, UNTIL JANUARY 1968.

C. MOFFITT ASKS FOR INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF MR. ITKIN DURING THE YEARS 1964 TO 1969 AND FOR COPIES OF "ANY RELEVANT AFFIDAVITS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY IN THE FBI OR CIA USED IN PROCEEDINGS IN USA."

D. MOFFITT NOTED THAT IN THE INTERESTS OF PRIVACY HE ROUTED HIS LETTER VIA THE AUSTRALIAN-DIPLOMATIC POUCH, AND ASKED THAT THE REPLY BE RETURNED TO HIM BY THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON.

2. MR. MOFFITT'S REQUEST WAS HANDLESD BY THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNCIL (OGC) WHO MADE AVAILABLE FOR MR. MOFFITT COPIES OF THREE AFFIDAVITS (ALL OF WHICH IN PUBLIC DOMAIN) RELEVANT TO HERBERT ITKIN AND HIS AFFILIATION WITH THE CIA. OGC CONCLUDED THEIR REPLY BY SAYING THAT HERBERT ITKIN FURNISHED INFORMATION TO THE CIA OVER A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS, BUT THAT HE WAS NOT SENT TO ENGLAND TO COLLECT ANY

DATE:
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UNIT:
EXT:

COORDINATING OFFICERS

IP USE ONLY

RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

CROSS REFERENCE | FILE NUMBER: 25-32-5/3

14-00000

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
TELEPOUCH

DATE - TIME GROUP

DISPATCH NUMBER
FAMW-4125

OGC SUBJ: ITKIN, HERBERT

22

0 INDEX 0 NO INDEX
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E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 034405

INFORMATION FOR CIA AND HE DID NOT FURNISH THE CIA WITH ANY INFORMATION WHILE HE WAS IN ENGLAND.

3. OGC'S REPLY WAS SENT TO MR. MOFFITT IN THE SAME CHANNELS HIS REQUEST CAME IN. HQS POUCHING COPIES AFFADAVITS, BOTH LETTERS.

U/S/C VIA POUCH

E2 IMPDET.H

DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 1972
ORIG: LANISHER BAK
UNIT: EA/[illegible]
EXT: 5681/9033

COORDINATING OFFICERS

OGC MR. GREANY (IN DRAFT)

CI MR. ROCCA (IN DRAFT)

IP USE ONLY

THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA
RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CROSS REFERENCE

FILE NUMBER 5-2-5/3

12/17

OGC 69-0181

31 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Herbert Itkin

1. A meeting was held on 27 January 1969 with Messrs. Rocca, Houston, Warner and myself to discuss the ramifications of the confrontation with the New York FBI office on 17 January. It was concluded that additional information was required on 03 (Thomas L. Roberts) and (Robert Delson). 03 I contacted the Director of Security and requested the security files on these two individuals and was advised that we could not have the security files but that Mr. Ward Greene would bring the files to the office and discuss their contents openly.

03 2. On 29 03 January, Mr. Greene brought the security files on (Roberts) and (Delson) and was most cooperative in explaining their contents. Attached is a chronological rundown on the pertinent information on (Thomas L. Roberts)' affiliation with the FBI, CIA and Itkin. 03

3. On 30 January a 03 meeting was held 02 with Messrs. Houston, Warner, Rocca, and (Eugene Milligan), CCS/(LP)GLOBE, to discuss the operational use of Mr. (Roberts.) Mr. 03 (Roberts) has been a Staff Agent of CIA since 28 03 August 1961. From March 1964 to November 1964 he spent time in (West Africa) writing a monograph 24 on (West African legal) problems. 10 It should be noted that this task was performed under a grant from a foundation which was blown in the MHDOWEL exposures. In November 1964 (Roberts) 03 was assigned for Cover to the (Radio Corporation of America 24 legal) staff where he remained until March 1965 and then went to (Dakar).

12-10

14/PN

14-00000

4. The facts in the attached chronology are subject to question since they are the result of Roberts' own explanation of his affiliation with Itkin rather than having been determined from independent sources. The most critical aspect would appear to be the knowledge or suspicion that Itkin may have known of Roberts' affiliation with CIA. This knowledge is borne out by the strange way in which Itkin repeatedly brings Roberts' name into the story which Itkin develops about his CIA affiliations. One of the questions to be answered by LPGLOBE personnel is whether or not Roberts reported his activities with Itkin in Geneva, Switzerland, in March 1966. There appears to be no record of Roberts' having explained why he never pursued the Itkin debt or what his financial contribution was to the law firm of Itkin, Roberts and Greenbaum.

5. Mr. Rocca was advised by Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI that the New York District Attorney may be considering prosecution against Roberts for having absconded with funds received from negligence cases. We do not have sufficient information to evaluate the likelihood of criminal prosecution. It may be necessary to discuss this problem with representatives of Mr. Hogan's office.

6. With regard to Robert Delson there appear to have been two operational considerations, one having been a request to use him with Project DTPILLAR from November 1953 to February 1955, and then a request in 1963 by the Domestic Operations Division for his use on Project WUBRINY. In March 1964 DO Division advised Security that Delson was not going to be used on WUBRINY. Mr. Rocca commented that there are some rather ominous allegations against members of the firm of Delson, Levin and Gordon indicating that one member of the firm was a card-carrying member of the Communist Party. At the present time Mr. Rocca is investigating the DTPILLAR use of Mr. Delson.

John K Greaney
JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel

Attachment

cc: C/CI/R&A

12/PN

14-00000

7 March 1966	Roberts received letter from Itkin but his secretary advised that Roberts was on vacation in Austria. Itkin contacted Roberts in Austria and set up meeting in Geneva, Switzerland.
15 March 1966	Meeting at Hotel Beau Rivage in Geneva. Present were Itkin and wife, Jim Marcus, Littman and wife. Meeting lasted three days. No projects get off the ground.
Nov 1966	Roberts in New York City, met at Marcus's apartment with Itkin and Marcus's father. Then met Itkin again at a dinner given by Mario Brod.
Nov 1967	Roberts again in New York and contacted Itkin. Had lunch with Itkin and Brod. Last time Roberts saw or heard of Itkin until he read in the press about the Marcus scandal.

THOMAS L. ROBERTS

Nov 1949	Roberts volunteered his services to Boston FBI; not accepted.
Jan 1950	Roberts left United States to study in Paris.
Nov 1950	From Nov. 1950 until Nov. 1955 reported on security matters to the Boston FBI Office, Labor Youth League.
Aug 1955	Itkin hired Roberts to work for Delson, Levin & Gordon. Roberts says he was hired to handle maritime matters in litigation.
Nov 1955	Roberts moved to New York City.
June 1956	Resumed services of reporting to FBI. Was a paid informant of New York FBI office reporting on the National Lawyers Guild.
Fall 1956	Roberts and others submitted profit-sharing plan to Delson, Levin & Gordon; not accepted.
Apr 1957	Roberts resigned from Delson, Levin & Gordon to form a new firm, Roberts, Greenbaum & Itkin. (No mention of financial arrangement of setting up new firm.)
6 Apr 1961	Roberts came to Washington and talked with Robert Amory about employment with CIA since Amory had been a former professor of Roberts. Roberts was sent to overt CIA personnel recruiter and filled out an application for employment with CIA.
1 June 1961	Roberts took a leave of absence from the firm of Roberts, Greenbaum & Itkin which was to last from 1 June 1961 through 31 May 1963. Roberts

was to receive $100 per week from the firm while on the leave of absence. Roberts did receive the following payments: Sept 1961 - $200; 4 Dec 1961 - $100; 10 Jan 1962 - $100; 1 June 1962 - $100; 18 June 1962 - $500. NOTE: Roberts received only $1,000 when he should have received $10,400.

12 July 1961	FBI advised that Roberts was still reporting to them in New York.
25 July 1961	Roberts was given CIA polygraph interview.
Aug 1961	Roberts approved by Office of Security for CIA employment as a Staff Agent.
Sept 1961	FBI advised they had broken off all contact with Roberts.
24 May 1963	Roberts wrote letter to firm withdrawing his membership effective 31 May 1963.
May 1965	Roberts received a check from Itkin for $2,500 but with the stipulation that Roberts send $1,250 to England in order to get the money out of reach of Itkin's first wife.
26 May 1965	Roberts arrived in Dakar.
16 June 1965	Roberts sent $500 to Itkin in England after asking Itkin about a desk and chair to be sent to Roberts in Dakar.
10 Nov 1965	Roberts forwarded money to Aida Itkin in England.
Jan 1966	Itkin advised Roberts about the formation of Conestoga, Ltd.
Feb 1966	Itkin wrote to Roberts about Senator Lodge.

OGC 69-0181

31 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Herbert Itkin

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2. On 29 January, Mr. Greene brought the security files on Roberts and Delson and was most cooperative in explaining their contents. Attached is a chronological rundown on the pertinent information on Thomas L. Roberts' affiliation with the FBI, CIA and Itkin.

3. On 30 January a meeting was held with Messrs. Houston, Warner, Rocca, and Eugene Milligan, CCS/LPGLOBE, to discuss the operational use of Mr. Roberts. Mr. Roberts has been a Staff Agent of CIA since 28 August 1961. From March 1964 to November 1964 he spent time in West Africa writing a monograph on West African legal problems. It should be noted that this task was performed under a grant from a foundation which was blown in the MHDOWEL exposures. In November 1964 Roberts was assigned for Cover to the Radio Corporation of America legal staff where he remained until March 1965 and then went to Dakar.

12-10

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SECRET

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JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel

Attachment

cc: C/CI/R&A

SECRET

12/pv

OC-111-67-091

Communications

1 FEB 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Logistics

SUBJECT : Request for Services of Collins Modem Field Service Engineer

1. The Office of Communications recently purchased two Collins Radio Company Model TE-216D-16D High Frequency Data Modems at a cost of $20,000 each. These Modems are specially designed equipment and will be used to test the feasibility of transmitting Secure (encrypted) Voice over a narrow band, high frequency, radio circuit. We also intend to determine their suitability for use in high speed data transmission, and tests by our Engineering Staff are scheduled to commence in mid-February.

2. Owing to the fact Modems are very complex in operation requiring special set-up techniques and adjustment, it would be advantageous to have a specialist available to assist our personnel and to assure timely completion of the tests. Accordingly, it is requested that a contract be let with the Collins Radio Company for the services of a Field Service Engineer. It is presently estimated that the services of this Engineer will be required at 24 (Station "D", WTC) for approximately six to eight weeks depending on test results. The exact date on which the Engineer is needed will be determined as preliminary installation of the equipment is completed. For planning purposes, however, we estimate he will be required on or about 6 March 1967.

3. It is understood from discussions with Collins representatives at Newport Beach, California, that engineering services of this type cost approximately $3,000 per month in addition to travel expenses. We recommend that the services of Modem Field Service Engineer, Mr. (Donald Warren Waycott,) 06 be secured, as he has an Agency TOP SECRET clearance effective 19 May 1965.

4. For any additional information, please contact Mr. (Jack W. Andrews) 03 on Extension 2045.

JOHN W. COFFEY
Director of Communications

Attachment:
Request for Procurement Services

3/17/

14-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: Request for Services of Collins Modem Field Service Engineer

CONCURRENCE:

(Signed) RICHARD H. LANSDALE
Office of General Counsel — Date: [illegible] 1967

Harlan A. Westrell
for Director of Security — Date: 3 FEB 1967

APPROVAL:

/S/ Dow H. [illegible]
for Director of Personnel — Date: 8 FEB 1967

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att.
1 - Director of Security w/o att.
1 - Director of Personnel w/o att.
1 - General Counsel w/o att.

SECRET

10 o'clock DCI's deadline.

Talked to Jim Collis, Deputy ~~[illegible]~~ Chief Ground Photo Services Branch, in the absence of Harry Van Tuyl. There is no photo of the "3 bums in police custody at the scene of the assasination". Without a credit at the bottom of the photo it cannot be obtained from the wire service directly.

Mr Collis called Herb Simmons CRS, Document Services Group could arrange for our man in New York (who has State cover) to ~~[illegible]~~ put in a request to Newsweek. Mr Simmons said he could not make a request for a domestic photo without the authorization of Dr Proctor but even w/ authorization he does not reccommend this route [as there is no plausible reason for a "State" person to be requesting this photo.]

10:15 18 June 1974

FILE

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

TRAVEL BRIEFING DATA

NAME		FILE NUMBER
BUSTOS-VIDELA, Charlotte		56840
OFFICE: WH	PHONE: x7811	RANK OR GRADE: GS-14 09
DEPARTURE DATE: 30 June 1974	STATUS: PCS	COVER: STATE INTEGREE
DESTINATION(s): Trinidad		DEPENDENTS BRIEFED: YES / NO

PREVIOUS TRAVEL yes

AREA	COVER	YEARS

EXPERIENCED TRAVEL - Formal briefing waived — YES / NO

RISK OF CAPTURE TRAVEL BRIEFING

CATEGORY -	A	B	C	D
	X			

SPECIAL BRIEFING PROBLEM

TYPE		YES	NO
	CIA VON A-Z		
	WHO'S WHO IN CIA		
	HIJACKING NOTICE		
	OTHER		

	YES	NO
SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL VERIFIED IN SUBJECT FILE		
SECURITY APPROVAL FOR TRAVEL BASED ON FILE REVIEW BY BRIEFING OFFICER		
SECURITY FILE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW BEFORE BRIEFING		

- EMERGENCY CONTACTS *(met on arrival, phone no., alternate action to make contact)*
- SECURITY REGULATIONS *(operational talk, documents, indigenous employee hazards)*
- TRAVEL PRECAUTIONS *(recognition overseas, camera, black market, currency exchange)*
- PERSONAL AFFAIRS *(charge accounts, traffic tickets, litigation, neighbors)*
- PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE *(limitations, home address, shop talk)*
- PERSONAL CONDUCT *(morals, drinking, representative americans)*
- ASSOCIATION WITH FOREIGNERS *(overseas briefing, phase out on return)*
- HOSTILE AUDIO SURVEILLANCE *(microphones, shop talk at home-hotels, report to security)*
- COVER PROBLEMS *(adequacy, request for briefing on arrival, family knowledge)*
- RESPONSIBILITY ABROAD *(local customs, traditions, religion, responsibility for dependents)*
- OTHER
  ✓ TRAVELING W/SPOUSE

REFERRED BACK TO CENTRAL COVER — YES / NO

EMERG. DES. - SPOUSE - IF NOT POSSIBLE THEN PARENTS.

DATE BRIEFED 6/18/74 BY [signature] SECURITY OFFICER

FORM 11-72 1987 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS — ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY (4-11-48)

SECRET

18 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch

FROM : Mr. Ramon R. Hart

SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
#210 838

1. The first phase of the audio surveillance of the Subject at the SAS safehouse in Bethesda has been completed. The Subject left Washington, D. C., on 13 July 1963. The owner of the listening post, Mr. [redacted], moved out of his house, bag, baggage, and furniture, on 12 July 1963 enroute to an overseas PCS assignment.

2. Mr. Charles MATT, the case officer in this case, has advised that the Subject, along with a Cuban companion, Mr. Rafael Aurelio QUINTERO Ibarbia (#252 529), will return to Washington, D. C., to be billeted in the Bethesda safehouse on Monday, 29 July 1963. Mr. MATT has fervently requested audio coverage of the downstairs bar and telephone and the main floor living room at this house in order to monitor the Subject's conversations with QUINTERO during the absence of SAS case officers.

3. The case was assigned to the District Field Office, and Special Agent [redacted] was designated as responsible agent. It is Agent [redacted] plan to place microphones in the downstairs bar and the main floor living room and a tap on the telephone and string all the wires to a crawl space over the garage. In that latter space, which will be kept locked, he will set up two regular AC-operated tape recorders to be actuated by the two VOR's obtained from Franconia and paid for by SAS. Unbeknown to the Subject and his companion, a case officer will have to service this equipment whenever an opportunity presents itself.

DDS/IOS
[illegible]/IOS
ASST/IOS
C/ID
C/[illegible]
C/S B
A&TS
FILES

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Page Two
#210 838

4. The cover story to be used by Agent [redacted] during the installation is that he is working on the house at the request of the leasor, Washington real estate agent, Mr. [redacted]. Mr. [redacted] supposedly maintains the house for a New York lawyer in order to billet the latter's transient clients. Case Officer MATT has engaged a maid to clean up the house Mondays and Thursdays; however, she can be told to stay away if Agent [redacted] needs to do work there on those days. It was also discreetly requested by the undersigned of Case Officer MATT not to kibbitz too much while the technicians are making the installation.

5. It is expected that the audio results of this type of coverage will be superior to the results of the previous "radio" phase. The only complication will be in servicing the recorders on a timely basis.

Ramon R. Hart
Ramon R. Hart

cc: #252 529

llg

SECRET

18 July 1963

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#210 838

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3. The case was assigned to the District Field Office, and Special Agent Harold G. TITTSLER was designated as responsible agent. It is Agent TITTSLER's plan to place microphones in the downstairs bar and the main floor living room and a tap on the telephone and string all the wires to a crawl space over the garage. In that latter space, which will be kept locked, he will set up two regular AC-operated tape recorders to be actuated by the two VOR's obtained from Franconia and paid for by SAS. Unbeknown to the Subject and his companion, a case officer will have to service this equipment whenever an opportunity presents itself.

DDS/IOS
ADDS/IOS
C/S
A&TS
FILES

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3/JD

Page Two
#210 838

03

4. The cover story to be used by Agent (TITTSLER) during the installation is that he is working on the house at the request of the leasor, Washington real estate agent, Mr. [R. V. Cortlandt HERBST] (DI 7-8865). Mr. [HERBST] supposedly maintains the house for a New York lawyer in order to billet the latter's transient clients. Case Officer MATT has engaged a maid to clean up the house Mondays and Thursdays; however, she can be told to stay away if Agent (TITTSLER) needs to do work there on those days. It was also discreetly requested by the undersigned of Case Officer MATT not to kibbitz too much while the technicians are making the installation.

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cc: #252 529

llg

5/JD

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch DATE: 1 July 1963

FROM : Mr. Ramon R. Hart

SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
#210 838

1. On 24 June 1963, Mr. Charles Matt, SAS/MOB/PM, extension 6488, was referred to me by the SAS Security Officer, Mr. George Ladner, and visited me in Room 4 E 21 to request some operational support beginning 1 July 1963. Mr. Matt advised that two leaders of the Cuban Exile Group were coming to Washington, D. C., on that latter date to confer with CIA and other Government officials, including probably Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General, concerning the "new program" for the exiles.

2. Mr. Matt explained that a covert site (#302 922) located at 9218 Aldershot Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, had recently been procured to billet these exiles and to serve as the meeting place for these sensitive discussions to take place. Mr. Matt said that SAS is vitally interested in what these two exiles say to each other when the U. S. Government officials have departed after a day's discussions. He, therefore, requested that microphones be concealed in the house to monitor their comments.

3. Mr. Matt said that the two men would arrive on 1 July and would be in Washington at the house for about a week or ten days. The audio coverage was requested for this entire time. Mr. Matt also said that the house would be retained for several more months and that the two exiles would return to Washington several more times in that period and that an audio surveillance would probably be requested for these latter visits also.

4. Mr. George Ladner supplied the true name of the leader of the two men, the captioned Subject. Having been informed by Mr. Matt that the covert site was a private dwelling place in an expensive neighborhood, I assumed that there would be only two methods of making an audio penetration of the premises:

DDS/IOS
ADDS/IOS
ASST/IOS
C/TD
C/
C/
C/
C/
C/SAB
C/S B
4 Hart
3 C/SB
A&TS
FILES

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(a.) Concealing a tape recorder in the attic, basement, or garage, and using a voice-operated relay to actuate the recorder.

(b.) With the use of directories, search the environs of the safehouse for the purpose of locating a potential listening post where radio transmissions could be monitored.

5. After checking with Mr. Joseph Langan, Acting Chief, Operational Support Division, I assigned the case to the District Field Office and directed some agents to case the house and the neighborhood to determine which method of penetration should be used. Mr. John Cryer was designated responsible agent at the District Field Office, and after a quick survey, he reported that the concealment and servicing of a tape recorder on the premises would be impossible and that the only method would be the use of a transmitter and a nearby listening post.

6. Using the directories in SRS, I ran the names of all the residents of the houses within a quarter-mile of the covert site through SRD Indices and found one Fred C. Thomas, Jr. (#57 328), of 9127 McDonald Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, to be a Staff employee. Through telephone information, I located Mr. Thomas at the Langley Headquarters Building and personally contacted him the first thing in the morning of 25 June 1963. I indicated to Mr. Thomas the fact that there was a safehouse in his neighborhood which we wanted to "bug" and that he was the only Staff employee who lived within range of our covert transmitters. I asked him if it would be too much of an imposition on him for us to set up a listening post in his house. Mr. Thomas explained that he was scheduled to depart for Karachi, Pakistan, on a PCS assignment in approximately a month but that he would be glad to make his home available as a listening post. He confided that his primary mission in Karachi was to be the audio penetration of the Communist Chinese Embassy and so he would look forward to the next week's operations in his home as valuable training. The next step I took was to set up a meeting among George Ladner, Charles Matt, Sam Halpern, Executive Officer of SAS, and myself in Mr. Halpern's Office. I advised Mr. Halpern that the

audio surveillance appeared to be technically feasible since I had located a possible listening post. However, I admitted to him that, even though the Office of Security has the "charter" to conduct the surveillance, TSD controls the necessary expensive equipment; Mr. Halpern must arrange for TSD to transfer this equipment to the Office of Security. Mr. Halpern declared that the procurement of the necessary equipment should pose no problem after he would make a few telephone calls. I then returned to my office and made out a list of the equipment which I felt would be necessary, and awaited advice from him as to whom to contact in TSD to obtain it.

03

7. After checking with Mr. [H. T. Bent] of the Audio Operations Branch of TSD as to appropriate equipment and after checking through the specifications in the "Audio Manual" of TSD, I selected the following:

Two voice-operated relays, QSC-2, $1,100 each	$2,200.00
Two Transmitter Radios, FM, 130 - 140 MCS, SRT-6H, @ $275 each	550.00
Two Battery Packs, 130 hrs. ops., UWB-7, $25 each	50.00
Two Battery "A", 1.5 volts, Burgess 2 F $. 54 each	1.08
One Battery "B", 45 volts, Burgess A-30 $1.87 each	1.87
TOTAL	$2,802.95

8. About Noon on 25 June, I received a telephone call from Mr. John W. McBee, extension 2481, of TSD, who told me that everything had been laid on by SAS for me to obtain from TSD any

1/JD

equipment necessary for this operation. Mr. McBee directed that I fill out a Form #88 and have the technicians hand carry it to the Franconia Depot in order to obtain the equipment. The use of the Form #88 disturbed me in this matter because I had assumed from Mr. Halpern that he would arrange it so that TSD would turn over the equipment to us without charge to anyone. The use of the Form #88 implies that a division is allocating funds for the purchase of equipment. However, I filled out the Form #88, listing the above equipment, and walked it down to SAS, where I gave it to Charles Matt to have signed. The form, bearing the SAS Cost Center #3132-5455-3400, was completed and returned to me within an hour, whereupon I gave it to DFO Agent Stan Lach, who drove with it immediately to the Franconia Depot. I called ahead to Bob Woods and Charlie Beall of the T & I Shop at Franconia and requested that they give a little briefing concerning the operation of this equipment to Mr. Lach and Mr. Cryer, who was to meet Mr. Lach there. Neither Cryer nor Lach had ever had any experience with any of the pieces of equipment on the list. Mr. Woods and Mr. Beall were quite cooperative in this request.

9. Several problems kept appearing and disappearing while the DFO technicians were transporting, installing, and testing the equipment. One problem was the payment of the equipment. I received a telephone call from Mr. Dayton S. ("Doc") Barrows of TSD, informing me that SAS had reneged on paying the $2,802.95 for the equipment, but that if I would tell him what equipment we wanted, he might be able to arrange to lend it to us. I told Mr. Barrows that as far as I knew, we had indeed obtained the equipment with the Form #88, but that if we needed anything else, I would contact him. Another problem which appeared was the rumor that it was not two Cuban exiles who would be residing in the safehouse, but only the captioned Subject and a Spanish speaking Staff employee. If the rumor were actually true, it would seem that an audio surveillance of the safehouse would not be necessary. I called Charles Matt for an explanation, and he informed me that Senor Artime was going to be the only person living in the house after each day's discussions were completed - no Staff employee would be living with him. I asked Mr. Matt to whom Senor Artime would be

holding the conversations which we were to record. He replied that he was interested in any visitors which the Subject might receive and any telephone calls which he might make. I suggested that possibly a telephone tap might be sufficient under these circumstances. Mr. Matt disagreed and still requested a microphone installation to cover the whole house if possible.

10. In addition to the equipment obtained from TSD, the DFO agents took their own SRR-4 tuneable receiver and the SRR-4 charged to the WFO. These receivers would be used in the listening post to pick up the radiations from the two SRT-6H transmitters. It was suggested to the DFO agents to borrow the two WFO transceivers to be used to communicate during the installation between the listening post and the safehouse; however, the agents chose not to use them and relied solely on telephonic communications. The "A" and "B" batteries picked up at Franconia were to be used in the SRR-4 receiver so that checks could be made from an automobile to see just how far the radiations extended around the transmitters. A report on the area covered by the transmitters was requested of the DFO agents.

11. The first test of the SRT-6H from the safehouse to the listening post was a failure. Its 50 milliwatt output, ordinarily good for a quarter mile, wasn't sufficient to reach the receiver, 2/10th's of a mile away. Its failure was blamed partly on the distance, partly on the brick construction of the listening post, and partly on the hilly contours of the housing development, which deflected the 135 megacycle, line-of-sight radiations.

12. When this disheartening news arrived, I immediately telephoned Mr. Barrows of TSD and requested a pair of the more powerful 150 milliwatt SRT-7 transmitters. I telephoned Mr. Barrows rather than filling out another Form #88 to avoid a possible furor within SAS. Mr. Barrows consented to loan two of these transmitters with their proper receivers on a hand receipt to us, and Stan Lach was dispatched to Franconia to pick them up. An opportunity to test it on 28 June 1963 was thwarted because Mr. [Thomas] was having foreign visitors in for cocktails that afternoon. But the equipment was installed and tested the next day, Saturday, 29 June, and appeared to work satisfactorily.

13. At 1330 hours on 1 July 1963, Mr. Cryer telephoned Headquarters to announce that one SRT-7 transmitter had been installed in the ceiling over the bar and telephone in the basement of the safehouse and that the SRR-1 receiver was picking up the transmissions satisfactorily in Mr. [Thomas's] basement. The QSC-2 voice-operated relay was also satisfactorily actuating the Ampex tape recorder when conversations began to take place in the safehouse. The AC-powered FM transmitter is crystal controlled to operate at a frequency of 157.4 megacycles in the VHF Band. Its operating range is supposed to be approximately one mile.

14. The DFO agents also fitted the transmitter with a hidden switch which would enable the case officers to turn the transmitter off when they are present at the house holding the sensitive discussions and to turn it on when they leave.

15. Mr. [Thomas] and his wife have consented to do most of the operating of the tape recorder themselves in their own basement. With the use of the voice-operated relay, the monitoring will be almost 100% automatic anyway. No more than one visit a day by a field office agent should be necessary to pick up the day's take and to make minor adjustments, repairs, or corrections to the receiver, actuator, and recorder. Mr. [Thomas] is well-known to his friends as a "hi-fi bug", and the presence of the new equipment in his basement would not raise the eyebrows on any of his visitors, some of whom are expected to be foreign dignitaries - Mr. [Thomas] will be going to [Karachi] under [Department of State] cover.

Ramon R. Hart
Ramon R. Hart

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cc: #57 328

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